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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to provide an understanding of the practical and conceptual 
significance of foreign, security and defence policies within the changing 
epistemology of the state, and the impact of the development of such policies upon 
the process of European integration. 
In order to achieve this analysis the thesis proceeds by examining the linkage made 
in traditional International Relations and Strategic Studies discourse between the 
state and security before considering alternative concepts whereby the state is 
becoming detached from its role as the primary provider of security in the 
international system. This is followed by an examination and assessment of the main 
theories of integration in International Relations. An historical bridging chapter then 
highlights the relationship between foreign and security policy and the process of 
European integration. The two core empirical chapters focus upon the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI) and are linked by a short chapter assessing the significant of the second 
Treaty on European Union, concluded at Amsterdam. The former traces factors 
leading to the inclusion of CFSP into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) at 
Maastricht followed by an outline of the institutional structures established and an 
assessment of CFSP in operation. The latter considers the factors promoting and 
preventing the EU's acquisition of a defence capability. In particular attention is 
drawn to the significance of reform within the Atlantic Alliance, the future of the 
Western European Union (WEU) and the national positions of the British and French 
governments. The content of these chapters has required constant updating as 
circumstances change. A great deal of information for these chapters is, therefore, 
based two series of elite interviews, the first with British officials and Members of 
the European Parliament conducted during the summer of 1997; the second with 
personnel from EU, WEU and NATO institutions, conducted in March 1999. Finally 
a conclusion is reached as to the significance of such developments in assessing the 
nature of the European Union. 
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Introduction: 
State Building? The case of the European Union's Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
The starting point of this thesis is an essentially realist/neo-realist assumption about the 
state as an international actor in an anarchic system, dominated by the security dilemma 
and the monolithic character of its constituent units. Within such a system the primary 
concern for any state is the provision of security through the accumulation of military 
power. In this context the European Union (EU), as a system of integration leading to 
supranational governance, appears either anomalous, explicable during the Cold War as 
the product of the unique opportunity afforded West European states by nuclear 
protection of the United States (Waltz 1979), or it will be required to take on the 
characteristics of the dominant international unit i. e. the state. However, such an 
approach appears rather simplistic, particularly in the light of contemporary discourses 
on the state and security. Within this debate the state is becoming detached from 
security, which is being reconfigured at alternative levels. In this context the EU could 
be regarded as part of this process or an attempt by the member states to retain control 
over the last bastion of state power. Clearly the EU itself does not constitute a state as it 
lacks a central sovereign authority and its member states retain a significant degree of 
independence. Nevertheless, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is indicative of 
a collective will to produce a distinct EU identity on the global arena, or be it one which 
finds itself in conflict with the persistence of individual national interests. 
Consequently any discussion of EU foreign policy falls within 'the wider debate about 
European integration and, as such, is a very live political issue' (White 2001, p. 37). 
What this thesis aims to do, therefore, is to place the development of the EU's foreign, 
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security and defence policy within the context of changing discourses on the state and 
security, using theories of European integration to assess the processes through which 
this is being achieved. 
The nature of the EU as an actor on the international arena is, as Allen and Smith 
(1990) observe, `a matter of contention and debate, reflecting its often elusive and 
intangible nature' (p. 19). It may be alternatively viewed as an entity evolving into a 
federal state or as a hybrid inter-governmental organisation. However, given the 
difficulties involved in establishing its precise nature, the EU is frequently regarded as 
sui generis, with no pre-ordained destiny as a super-state. This is reflected in 
contemporary EU studies by the predisposition to look beyond conceptualisation of the 
`nature of the beast, ' accepting the EU as simply a polity where decision-making can be 
analysed using the same conceptual tools as domestic policy (Caporaso 1996, Hix 1994, 
Risse-Kappen 1996). Hence a debate has emerged between those who promote a 
Comparative Politics approach (ibid. ), and those who continue to apply traditional 
International Relations integration theories. This thesis will conform to the 
International Relations approach, for, as proponents of the Comparative Politics 
approach would concede, there are certain sectors of EU policy for which such an 
approach remains the most valid. Hix distinguishes between EU `politics' and EU 
`integration. ' Politics in the EU is `not inherently difference to the practice of 
government in any democratic system' (Hix 1994, p. 1) and is suggestive of a certain 
degree of `stasis' (ibid. p. 12). In contrast integration theory describes a `process' 
whereby formerly independent states join together to form some sort of over-arching 
structure (ibid. p. 13). Similarly, Hix recognises that `in areas where the EC member 
states remain sovereign, International Relations theories of `co-operation' may produce 
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accurate and parsimonious explanations' (ibid. p. 23). The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) is one such area `where intergovernmental bargaining 
dominates the decision-making process' (Risse-Kappen 1996, p. 67). 
In adopting such an approach it is, therefore, necessary to consider `the nature of the 
beast' and its relationship with the external environment. The EU already possesses a 
large degree of internal and external `sovereignty' in economic affairs through the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities (TEC). The EU is endowed with a 
Common External Tariff, a Common Commercial Policy, a Common Agricultural 
Policy and the right to make trade and association agreements with third parties. While 
such attributes may be confined to the `low' politics branch of external relations, they 
do contribute to the perceived `weight' of the Union on the international stage. This is 
reinforced by the increasing importance attached to economic issues in the international 
political economy. Thus `the cumulative impact of its external activities might suggest 
that the European Union was a significant actor in the global international system' 
(Bretherton & Vogler 1998, p. 1). However, the EU continues to lack similar authority 
and weight in the political sphere. As such the EU's international character is captured 
by Allen & Smith's concept of `presence, ' whereby it `is neither a fully-fledged state- 
like-actor nor a purely dependent phenomenon in the contemporary international arena. 
Rather, it is a variable and multi-dimensional presence, which plays an active role in 
some areas of the international system and a less active role in others. ' (1990, p. 20). 
However, it is the contention of this thesis that if the EU is to develop beyond mere 
`presence' it must develop the ability to formulate its own outlook and defend its 
interests on the international arena, i. e. a foreign policy, and the ultimate means of 
implementation i. e. military capability. In so doing, it is proposed that the EU will be 
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assuming some of the key characteristics of the state. Such an argument is open to 
attack on two fronts. Firstly, that it is erroneous to assume that the EU is a `nascent 
state' but rather a completely new level of governance in Europe (Allen 1978). And 
secondly, that the proper place to look for the `actorness' of the EU is in its external 
economic relations (Smith 1998). Such criticisms may well be valid, however, the 
acquisition by the EU of a foreign, security and defence policy continues to inspire 
images of a European state among politicians and journalists, informing much of the 
public debate about European integration, and therefore calls for serious debate and 
research. 
In order to achieve this analysis the thesis proceeds by developing various concepts 
of the 'security state' (i. e. the state defined as the primary provider of security in the 
international system) from International Relations theory and its sub-branch Strategic 
Studies. The focus, therefore, is on the significance of the theoretical relationship 
between the state and security. By examining concepts of the state, security and 
foreign policy a framework for analysis will emerge in which conventional 
assumptions regarding the synthesis of these concepts are challenged by changes in 
the substance and structure of international governance. This is reflected in the 
transformation of the security agenda and in the perceived roles and functions of 
states. Both these processes, it is suggested, have implications for the 
conceptualisation of the security state and the European Union, as it aspires to 
provide and project security for its citizens. The second theoretical chapter considers 
the utility of the main theories of integration as tools for understanding the 
development of state-like structures, within the context of changing perceptions of 
the state and security. This will also provide a basis for the identification of 
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integrationist or non-integrationist forces throughout the empirical section of the 
thesis. The following chapter then highlights the historical significance of the 
relationship between foreign and security policy and the process of European 
integration. 
The two core empirical chapters focus upon CFSP and the European Security and 
Defence Identity (ESDI) and are linked by an assessment of the significance of the 
reforms introduced by the second Treaty on European Union, concluded at 
Amsterdam in 1997. The former traces factors leading to the inclusion of CFSP into 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) at Maastricht followed by an outline of the 
institutional structures established and an assessment of CFSP in operation, in terms 
of both its integrationist potential and effectiveness as foreign policy. This focus on 
the two intergovernmental conferences on the TEU inevitably leads the thesis to 
emphasise the interaction of national ministries in determining the character of 
CFSP, at the risk of overlooking the input of Brussels-based experts at working- 
group level (White 2001, p. 100). However, while it is recognised that multiple levels 
of governance operate in CFSP, the `big bang policy-making, ' such as negotiating 
framework treaties, continues to reflect essentially intergovernmental decisions 
(Sorensen 1997, p. 263). This is also true of the chapter on ESDI, which considers 
the factors promoting and preventing the EU's acquisition of a defence capability. In 
particular, attention is drawn to the significance of reform within the Atlantic 
Alliance, the future of the Western European Union (WEU) and the national 
positions of the French and British governments. Finally a conclusion is reached as 
to the significance of such developments in assessing the nature of the EU. 
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Methodology 
Having established a theoretical framework, based around concepts of the security 
state and theories of integration, it was necessary to identify the empirical data to be 
utilised in order test the overall thesis. Given the nature of the subject primary 
sources were difficult to come by, particularly in the United Kingdom. This could be 
regarded as an occupational hazard given that one of the main interests in studying 
foreign and security policy is its special status as an area of government policy, 
subject therefore to greater restrictions on public access to government documents. 
This problem is further compounded by the decision-making procedures within the 
European Council and Council of Ministers, which remain essentially closed to 
public scrutiny. Subsequently it has been necessary to draw upon statements as 
reported by the (quality) press; this inevitably entails the risks of miss-reporting and 
contextual dislocation. Indeed, the inevitable reliance on secondary sources when 
dealing with such sensitive issues as foreign and security policy provides one of the 
most difficult challenges to producing research based upon accurate evaluation of the 
facts. The art is therefore in the evaluation but as with all art it is artist (or 
researcher) who must judge what merits attention and what can be dismissed. Such a 
process is bound to be flawed. 
Nevertheless, it has been possible to overcome some of the deficiencies in the 
availability of primary documentation. Political speeches and core EU documents 
have been accessed using the internet. However, while proving an invaluable source 
of material, internet sources are restricted to official government/EU statements and 
consequently fail to provide an insight into the behind-the-scenes negotiations that 
lead to the production of these texts. One means employed to overcome this 
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difficulty was to conduct a series of interviews with those involved, at some level, in 
the decision-making process. Again, the sensitive nature of the subject restricted 
access to an extent, although this was partially overcome with regard to access to 
EU, WEU and NATO officials by my own connections within the British armed 
forces. As a result it was possible to gain some insight into the workings of CFSP 
and ESDI, making up for some of the short falls in the primary documentation 
available. Indeed, these interviews, conducted between March 22nd - 25th 1999, 
proved to be of especial interest taking place one week after the entire European 
Commission had resigned and in the very week NATO started its bombing campaign 
against Yugoslavia! Additional interviews were conducted with members of the 
European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, officials from the British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office and one former British Minister of State who had been 
involved in the Maastricht negotiations. The approach adopted within these 
interviews was to question the subjects regarding their personal experiences of 
working within the environment of CFSP and their perceptions of how the EU was 
developing in terms of political integration and thus to substantiate (or not) the 
argument being evolved from secondary sources. An additional insight was also 
provided by highlighting differing institutional cultures, between civilian and 
military and national, intergovernmental and supranational level actors. 
Structure 
Firstly it is necessary to establish those qualities commonly associated, in traditional 
International Relations discourse, with the modern state as a unique actor in 
international relations. In particular, the apparent significance of military power and 
external sovereignty in a state's make-up needs to be defined. Political theorists since 
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Thomas Hobbes have defined the state in terms of its relationship vis-ä-vis society, in 
which the need to provide external security is more or less assumed as a precondition 
for state-society relations. Max Weber, however, provides a useful structural definition 
of the state, formed around four independent elements - monopoly, territory, legitimacy 
and force. No one element can exist without the other, but it is the exclusive right to 
use force, which alone distinguishes the state. The danger here is to be drawn into a 
circular argument whereby it is established that a state possesses certain attributes, the 
EU does not have these, therefore to become a state the EU must acquire them. This 
leads to a restrictive approach, overlooking the significance of the EU as part of the 
transformation of the nature of governance in the international system. Indeed the EU 
could be constructed as either a dependent or independent variable in this process, 
whereby it is both a cause and/or a consequence of change. 
An investigation of International Relations theory (Waltz, Hoffmann, Koehane, 
Morganthau, Buzan, and Nye) fails to produce a comprehensive definition of the state. 
The main schools of rationalist thought, from Realism to Liberalism/Idealism, fail to 
fully conceptualise the state, which is subsequently either assumed or dismissed as a 
unit of analysis. However, it is possible to glean an image of the state as a legally based 
organization of people on a territorial basis, which constitutes a unique actor on the 
international stage. It is unique because it alone possesses the capability to decide the 
life and death of its and its neighbours' population. Moreover, the possession by the 
state of sovereignty further sets aside the state as a unique actor in international 
relations. Sovereignty is commonly defined as `supreme legitimate authority within a 
territory' and recognition of such authority by similarly endowed entities. As such 
sovereignty constitutes a dual faceted concept, with implications both for the internal 
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workings of the state and for the international states system. Differences of opinion 
emerge, however, in the debate over the extent to which `supreme authority' can be 
delegated or even shared among states before it is effectively lost. It is this 
controversy, when applied to relationship of EU member states to the EU itself, 
which injects sovereignty with its current potency in the field of European 
integration. 
However, the status of the state as the most important and powerful international actor 
is increasingly challenged by the effects of globalisation, which make national 
regulation increasingly problematic, and by the rise of international and supranational 
institutions, of which the EU is the most sophisticated. Within this context the role and 
structure of the state is being transformed, as is evidenced through an analysis of 
contemporary discourses on security. Conventionally defined as 'a condition of the 
state, to be achieved by the state through the instrumentality of state military power, ' 
(McSweeney 1999, p. 36) security has traditionally been conceived as a highly state- 
centric concept. However, particularly since the end of the Cold War the nature of 
security is perceived to have changed both in terms of the security agenda and, 
perhaps most significantly, the assumption that the state is the primary referent object 
of security. These two processes are related; as economic, social, environmental and 
demographic issues come to be viewed increasingly in terms of posing a threat that 
needs to be addressed, so the unit for addressing these issues is also redefined, 
downwards towards the individual and society, and upwards to the regional and 
global level. This posses a fundamental challenge to the conceptualisation of 
security as primarily guarding 'the state against those objective threats that could 
undermine its stability and threaten its survival' through the utilisation of its 
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monopoly over the legitimate use of force. (Lipshutz 1995 p. 5) Moreover, it is 
necessary to recognise that the changing perception of security reflects not only the 
transformation of the international system, precipitated by the end of the Cold War 
and the spread of globalisation but also, potentially, a fundamental shift in the nature 
and role of the state (Clark 1998) and therefore, by extension, perceptions of the 
evolution of the EU. The EU may thus be alternatively viewed as an emerging new 
state that needs to be made secure in the traditional national security sense, as simply 
a variant of classic liberal collective security or as the product of changing concepts 
of security. Similar issues are confronted when considering foreign policy, another 
overtly statist concept, which is challenged by globalisation's blurring of the 
distinction between the domestic and the foreign and the increasing salience of 
economic, cultural, social and environmental issues on the global agenda. 
The second chapter will evaluate some traditional IR theories of integration as a 
means to assess how the EU could be regarded as evolving state-like qualities. 
Integration may be conceived of as a condition, whereby hitherto separate units have 
become inexorably linked within a system of mutual interdependence (Deutsch, 
1968) or as a process whereby economic, social and political activities under national 
control are voluntarily surrendered to be tackled as common problems at a `supra- 
national' level (Haas, 1968). Beyond such definitions there is little consensus 
concerning abiding or universal properties attributable either to the internal dynamics 
or end state of integration. There is no key dependent variable; integration is a 
variable condition. These continual `paradigmatic shifts' (O'Neill, 1996) provide the 
basis for political inquiry. 
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Amongst the key theories those of particular interest include functionalism (Mitrany), 
neo-functionalism (Haas, Schmitter, Hoffman & Nye), and federalism (Wheare, Riker, 
Burgess). Such an analysis will in itself add little to the integration debate. It is 
therefore necessary to apply and adapt these, and other, theoretical approaches to 
include an analysis of the process whereby foreign and security policy is being 
incorporated into the EU in the possible anticipation of the emergence of a European 
state. 
Since the origins of the European enterprise member states have sought to increase 
their weight on the international arena through increased co-operation and a co- 
ordination of foreign policy. Foreign, security and even defence policy have been on 
the European agenda since the institutional construction of Europe began in the late 
1940s, culminating in the defeat of the European Defence Community in 1954. This 
failure has been identified as marking the end of the post-war `federalist' phase of 
European integration (Taylor 1975), thus demonstrating the significance of foreign 
and security/defence policy making within the emerging European Community. 
Foreign policy returned to the European agenda in 1970 with the introduction of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), an inter-governmental framework for policy 
coordination that remained outside the Community treaties until the Single European 
Act in 1986. As a result EPC provided an alternative to functional/neo-functional or 
federal integration, contributing to the political unity of the EC while preserving the 
national independence of the member states in foreign and security policy (Ifestos 
1987). 
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However, with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, the whole nature of security in Europe changed. As Waever (1995) 
observes, during the Cold War security ceased to be an issue between the member 
states, while the United States and NATO provided defence against any threat from the 
Soviet Union and its allies. With the collapse of the bipolar system integration once 
again became a security issue, as the alternative, fragmentation, re-entered the agenda 
(Weaver 1995). Moreover, as the US reduced its forces and NATO reformed, the 
political pressure for Europe to deal with crises and threats to security on its own 
borders mounted. Political Union, including a common foreign and security policy, 
was therefore a major priority of the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). 
Indeed, the Treaty of Maastricht proclaims, `A common foreign and security policy is 
hereby established. '(Article. J) and anticipates `... the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. '(Art. J. 4,1) However, 
CFSP remains outside the European Community Treaties, constructed instead as a 
second `pillar' of European Union. Nevertheless an analysis of the political debate 
surrounding the construction and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty provides both a 
test of contemporary integrationist pressures and an assessment of the significance of 
foreign and security/defence policy. 
A mark of the difficulties encountered at Maastricht in reaching an agreement was 
the intention, written into the Treaty, to hold a further IGC in 1996. CFSP, in 
particular the future of the WEU as the `defence arm' of the Union, was expected to 
dominate the agenda. However, in the wake of the difficulties encountered with the 
ratification of Maastricht only limited reforms were possible under the ensuing 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Nevertheless, an investigation into the inputs and outputs of 
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the Reflection Group, formed to provide an open forum for debate, and the process 
of negotiation leading to the second treaty on European Union provide an interesting, 
if not encouraging barometer of integrationist trends. 
In addition to the analysis of CFSP the thesis will assess the probability of the inclusion 
of defence within the `pillared' structure of European Union, as the ultimate mark of the 
security state, capable of deploying military force to protect and project its interests. 
This will require an examination of the relationship between the EU and NATO, in 
particular the role of the Western European Union, and the national positions of key 
member states. The Treaty of Maastricht establishes that the WEU will `elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications. '(ArtJ. 4.2). The 1996 IGC failed to move entrenched national positions, 
most notably the British, beyond the Maastricht compromise. However, the British 
position appeared to change dramatically in December 1998 with the Anglo-French 
declaration at St. Malo, with the result that member states were able, at the Helsinki 
European Council Summit in December 1999, to agree terms for the inclusion of WEU 
functions into the second pillar. Meanwhile, at the operational or functional level, 
increased European co-ordination has developed as of necessity to deal with peace 
keeping and humanitarian tasks incorporated, from the WEU, into the Amsterdam 
Treaty. 
Having considered concepts of the state and security, undertaken an investigation of 
integration theories and analysed the progress made in developing the EU's foreign 
and security policy, the thesis will conclude by assessing the impact of contemporary 
epistemological trends on the conceptualisation of the nature of the EU as an 
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international actor. In particular the continuing utility of traditional IR tools in 
assessing the institutional development of the EU will be considered, together with 
an attempt to apply contemporary approaches to the state and security to the EU as it 
evolves a security (and defence) identity. Finally, an attempt will be made to 
characterise the relationship between foreign policy, security, defence and the state in 
Western Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century and ultimately to determine 
whether the EU is moving towards a structure that might be defined in terms of 
statehood. 
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The Security State: From Security provider to consumer (? ) 
If, as Hedley Bull asserts, 'The starting point of international relations is the 
existence of states... ' (1977, p. 8) then the evolving function and structure of such 
entities or actors is of crucial importance to the discipline as a whole. Even if the 
aim of much contemporary research is to establish the transcendence of state borders 
and authority, it must first be established exactly what it is that is being transformed 
and the extent of that transformation. So, what distinguishes the state from other 
institutions? What are its core functions? Could alternative actors accomplish these? 
Is, in fact, the Westphalian state, as a historical construct, being replaced by an 
entirely new form of governance at the local, regional or global level? Or is the state 
merely undergoing a functional review, devolving authority upwards and 
downwards, in an attempt to cope with international and domestic change? Such 
general questions hardly provide the sound basis of a thesis but they do at least 
provide a point of departure - that the centrality of the state in international relations 
is being fundamentally challenged. 
Of all the areas of state activity the one function perhaps most closely associated 
with state power is security; as Michael Zürn observes, 'that the principle function of 
the state is to provide security against external forces can hardly be contested' (1995, 
p. 151). Indeed, such is the overwhelming presence of the state in security discourse 
that is difficult to develop a concept of security that does not equate to 'national' 
security (Buzan 1991, Lipshutz 1995, McSweeney 1999)1. However, particularly 
since the end of the Cold War, the nature of security, or at least the perception of 
1 Although it is a general fault of traditional security studies to omit any developed concept of the 
state. 
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what amounts to a security issue, appears to be undergoing a transmutation. Global 
forces or 'globalisation'2 is viewed as impinging upon the state by transforming the 
security environment, both internally and externally, diminishing the state's capacity 
to produce security (Clark 1999). Consequently, the basic contract between the 
individual and the state, i. e. the provision of security, is challenged. As states lose 
their ability to produce security so instances of inter-state conflict also decline, and 
with it the 'original backbone of the nation state is turning to jelly' (Mann 1999, 
p. 257). Meanwhile, by challenging the nature of security itself, broadening the range 
of security issues to include the economic, environmental, cultural and demographic, 
globalisation itself could be regarded as presenting a threat to (national) security. 
Moreover, through the blurring or transcendence of state borders, the traditional, but 
arguably always tenuous, distinction between high and low politics is also 
challenged, and with it the notion that foreign policy forms a distinct and especially 
sensitive realm of government. 
However, the proposition that globalisation is leading or will lead to the complete 
transformation of the international states system is not universally accepted or indeed 
totally proven. In the realm of security studies it is questionable whether 
globalisation implies anything new. Advances in military technology and the 
inability of most states to deploy the full range of military capabilities have long 
since led to the 'internationalisation' of security through organisations such as NATO 
and increasingly, and most significantly from the perspective of this thesis, the 
European Union (Guehenno 1998-99). 
2 Originally conceived in economic terms as the interconnectedness of capital, production, ideas and 
cultures, the globalising process, whereby state borders are transcended and governments by-passed, 
has lent weight to the idea that the state has become obsolete. This process has profound implications 
for the study of security as traditionally defined in terms of state or national interests. 
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This leads to the central proposition of the thesis - that the acquisition, on the part of 
the European Union, of a foreign and security policy would lead to a fundamental 
metamorphosis in the nature of the Union, into something approximating a 
supranational European state. In setting out on such an exercise it should not, 
however, be ontologically assumed that the EU would inevitably develop into a 
`state'. As John Ruggie (1993) points out, we may be wrong `to visualise long-term 
challenges to the system of states only in terms of entities that are institutionally 
substitutable for the state' (p. 143). And that, in fact, the Union `may constitute 
nothing less than the emergence of the first truly post-modern international political 
form' (p. 140). However, it would be impossible to judge whether the EU goes, 
potentially, beyond the state, without first having some concept of the state itself, in 
particular, the relationship between state and the provision of security. 
The Origins of the State and the need for Security 
The relationship between the state and the provision of security can be traced back to 
the early evolution of the modern state in Europe. As the feudal order in Europe 
evolved towns and cities began to grow as centres of trade and manufacturing, 
together with the rise of a wealthy commercial class. This commerce required order 
and security, an authority to provide roads, commerce and a bureaucracy. 
Meanwhile, the kings challenged the authority of the Catholic Church above them 
and nobles beneath, requiring the accumulation of military manpower and resources. 
A reciprocal relationship subsequently developed whereby the government provided 
the secure environment in which commerce could flourish, which in turn, provided 
the means and the finance for wars of expansion. Thus `direct connections can be 
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traced between a growth in the requirement for the means of waging war, an 
expansion in processes of extraction, and a concomitant formation of state executives 
and administrative offices to organise and control these changes. ' (Hoffmann 1995, 
p. 56, see also Tilly 1990, p. 15) As the scale of war and the pace of technological 
innovation escalated, so the most successful states in warfare became those able to 
mobilise their resources most effectively. However, as the state came to rely more 
upon its population for the means of its military strength, so it became necessary to 
reward the people for their sacrifices with a share in government. (Dahl 1989, p. 247) 
The requirements of war, therefore, acted as a significant, though not the exclusive, 
factor in the evolution of the democratic state. 
The first coherent theories of the state began to appear as the modern state emerged 
from the collapsing of the feudal order in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
These were turbulent times during which the establishment of structures capable of 
providing individual and state security were a primary concern. Indeed, the need to 
provide order, both internally and externally, were primary motivating factors behind 
the whole process of state-building. This was reflected in the philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes. Writing at the time of the English Civil War, Hobbes's primary concern 
was with the establishment and maintenance of order. According to Hobbes men are 
naturally egotistical and competitive, consequent pursuit of their own interests 
therefore naturally leads to conflict. This is the rather gloomy state of nature, 
characterised by `a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceathest 
only in death. ' (Hobbes 1968, p. 161) 
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However, this state of nature, or anarchy, clearly does not exist in the best interests 
of men who realise the need to create some over-arching authority. Men therefore 
agree to sacrifice their right of self-government in return for the establishment of 
order. This is to be achieved through the enactment of a `covenant' by which a 
single ruling authority, `Leviathan', is given the right to govern those that have 
consented to the covenant. Men thus accept limits upon their own freedom of action 
in return for an assurance that their own life and property is protected. In so doing 
the state is accorded unlimited, unchecked power, otherwise it would be incapable of 
fulfilling its roll; `Covenants without swords are but words, and of no strength to 
secure a man at all. ' (Hobbes 1968, p. 223) 
The main implications of Hobbes's thought apply to the internal workings of a state, 
however, as Smith (1994) observes, public power is essential to analysis of the state 
on the international arena: `The notion of rule, and its association with the right or 
power to enforce the state's will, is central to not only to the state as domestic actor 
but also to the notion of foreign policy' (Smith 1994, p. 23). Consequently, the 
ability of a state to enforce its will at home will impact upon its effectiveness as an 
international actor (ibid. ). The importance of internal order and security is 
underlined by Weber's concept of the state, as formed around four interdependent 
elements - monopoly, territory, legitimacy and force. Weber defines the state thus: 
`It processes an administrative and legal order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organised corporate activity of the administrative 
staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is oriented. This system of order 
claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, 
most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large 
extent, over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a 
compulsory association with a territorial basis. Furthermore, to-day, the use 
of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the 
state or prescribed by it... The claim of the modern state to monopolise the use 
29 
of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction. ' 
(Weber, 1966 p. 156) 
No one of these elements can exist without the other three and visa versa. This gives 
the definition its coherence (Hoffmann 1995, p. 35). Of the four elements it is the 
exclusive right to use force which alone distinguishes the state (Gerth & Mills 1991, 
p78). Indeed, Weber quotes Lenin with approval in his observation at Brest -Litovsk 
that `Every state is founded on force. ' (ibid. ). As Hoffmann observes; `Force (it 
might be said) provides the conceptual `glue' which renders the interrelated attributes 
coherent and thus constitutes the basic element of a structured and thus coherent 
definition of the state. ' (Hoffmann 1995, p. 37). The monopoly of coercive power is 
a means to an end that is specific to the state, namely the imposition of a certain 
`kind of order on society which no other institution is capable of doing. ' (Hoffmann 
1995, p. 70) The state is not the only organisation to claim a legitimate monopoly to 
the use of force; indeed the state itself makes such a claim because it finds itself 
challenged. (ibid. p. 75) Once a state loses its monopoly of the means of coercion, it 
is unable to retain the other elements of statehood and will cease to exist. 
The concepts of the state outlined above provide a useful, dual basis from which to 
commence an investigation of key theories of the state and security in international 
relations as might be applied to the EU and CSFP. Firstly, they introduce the 
concept of the sovereign state that enjoys `supreme legitimate authority within a 
territory. ' (Philpott 1995, p. 357) Secondly, they provide the epistemological basis of 
traditional thinking about inter-state politics, as a discourse between territorially 
defined actors, each free from the interference of other such entities and denying the 
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existence of any over-riding governing authority. Sovereignty is therefore, as Bull 
points out a duel-faceted concept: 
`On the one hand, states assert, in relation to its territory and population, what 
might be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other 
authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert 
what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy 
but independence of outside authority. ' (1983, p. 8). 
Consequently Hobbes's vision of an anarchic international system is, potentially, 
given substance as the existence of sovereignty precludes the possibility of an 
international form of governance above the state. However, it may also be possible 
to view sovereignty in institutional terms as providing a `constitution' for 
international relations whereby the `norms of sovereignty', entailing mutual respect 
and non-interference provide commonly agreed upon rules that define the holders of 
sovereignty and their prerogatives (Philpott 1995, p. 358). International anarchy, 
therefore, 'does not mean the absence of government per se, but rather that 
government resides in the units of the system. ' That these units all claim sovereignty 
'automatically denies recognition of any higher political authority, [therefore] a 
system of sovereign states is by definition politically structured as an anarchy. ' 
(Buzan 1991, p. 21) 
It is, however, increasingly difficult to maintain the distinction between internal and 
external sovereignty, in analytical let alone practical terms (Camilleri & Falk 1992, 
p. 139). The proliferation of issues over which the state, as a result of the pressures of 
globalisation and interdependence, has little control, even within its own borders, 
throws some doubt upon the continuing relevance of a concept such as sovereignty, 
with its emphasis on the supremacy of the state. The existence of trans- or multi- 
national companies, the global enforcement of human rights, international law and 
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international organisations further exacerbate this situation, through the emergence 
of non-state forms of authority in world politics. Consequently, it is no longer 
possible to talk about sovereignty, internal or external, in absolute terms. Therefore, 
in order to judge the significance of the transfer of authority over foreign and 
security policy, it is necessary to determine what exactly is meant by sovereignty, 
and whether it is possible to define it in terms allowing for a certain degree of 
bargaining and pooling. 
In considering what it is that makes a state sovereign, and therefore recognised as 
such by other states, Alan James (1986) provides four examples of the perspectives 
from which sovereignty might be analysed: political, legal, jurisdictional and moral 
(the first three will be considered below). In an attempt to avoid the conclusion that 
sovereignty is simply what states say it is, James also formulates his own definition 
of sovereignty, as `constitutional independence'. It is `constitutional independence' 
that `automatically gives it (the sovereign state), so far as other states are concerned, 
full international capacity, whereas the international activity of a non-sovereign state 
is based on the specific grant or permission of its sovereign superior' (James 1986, 
p. 27). 3 
Sovereignty, viewed as political independence, recognises the constraints imposed 
upon the actions of states in an anarchic system; `external sovereignty... means 
freedom to conduct an entirely successful foreign policy... Theoretically this freedom 
is absolute but an international system consisting of fully sovereign states is 
unthinkable. ' (Frankel 1969, p. 38). Sovereignty is, therefore, seen essentially as a 
3 For the most part the EU exercises `sovereignty' at the behest of member states, even if perceived as 
deviating from the original agreement. 
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matter of the power to enact certain foreign policy options. It can never be complete 
or total and is apparently quantifiable. Consequently it is easily lost, for example, 
through the membership of an international organisation which will inevitably place 
restrictions on a state's freedom of action. However, problems soon arise in making 
sovereignty synonymous with power, not least of which is the possession of power, 
or political independence, by units other than states. (James 1986, p. 188-90) 
Moreover, a state may find its political independence or ability to act severely 
restricted; yet it will still be considered sovereign because it still processes 
constitutional independence. 
To consider sovereignty as a legal freedom is to suggest that every state is free to 
decide the extent of its legal obligations. States, therefore, should only enter into 
international agreements and be bound by international law if they specifically agree 
to do so. However, once a state is the member of an international organisation or 
subject to international law it has, de facto, agreed to accept a limit on its legal 
freedom and therefore its sovereignty. Moreover, such is the acceptance of 
international law by the majority of states that those who do not subscribe to it will 
nevertheless be bound by it. Consequently, James concludes, `it cannot be said that 
any state is sovereign in the sense of being in total control of the extent of its legal 
obligation' (ibid. p. 219). 
Jurisdictional sovereignty refers to the exclusive right of the state to make and 
enforce the law within its own territory. It `requires the denial of any higher political 
authority, and the claiming by the state of supreme decision-making authority both 
within its territory and over its citizens. ' (Buzan 1991, p. 67) This precondition is 
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qualified by the right of citizens to appeal to the International Court of Human 
Rights, even if there is very little the Court or United Nations will or can do against 
the intransigent state. However, it is the EU that provides perhaps the greatest 
challenge to jurisdictional sovereignty. 
The EU with its common policies, the supremacy of the European Court of Justice 
within the realms of its jurisdiction and the principle of aquis communautaire, mean 
that the members of the EU can no longer claim a monopoly of legitimate law- 
making, and enforcing powers. If, therefore, sovereignty, defined as jurisdictional, is 
to be considered an absolute, the members of the EU clearly can no longer claim to 
be sovereign. Yet despite this they remain full members of the international league 
of states, moreover, a `special lesser, category of membership has not been created to 
accommodate those who have fallen somewhat from grace by accepting 
supranationalism. ' (James 1986, p. 249). The EU does not, at its current level of 
development, amount to a constitutionally superior system of government, member 
states therefore remain `constitutionally independent'. The EU's realm of superiority 
is restricted to those areas specified under the treaties, as agreed, unanimously, by the 
member states. It does not, as the German Federal Court ruled in 1995, have the 
right to initiate its own areas of competence. 
The issue of sovereignty in the EU leads to the further debate as to the divisibility of 
sovereignty. As Geoffrey Howe explains `Sovereignty is not virginity, which you 
either have or you don't' (1991, p. 679). It can, in other words, be traded in return for 
influence over other states and organisations. Buzan, on the other hand, claims that it 
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is only possible to divide sovereignty 'among states, but not within them. ' (Buzan 
1991, p. 67) But, as Waltz points out; 
`To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please... 
To be sovereign and dependent are not contradictory conditions. To say that 
a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its 
internal and external problems... It is no more contradictory to say that 
sovereign states are always constrained than it is to say that individuals often 
make decisions under heavy pressure of events. ' (Waltz 1979, p. 98) 
The members of the EU can not therefore be considered as either more or less 
sovereign than if they were not members of the Union. The fact that they are no 
longer the supreme legitimate authority in certain areas of government policy, simply 
means they are no sovereign in that particular sphere. The scope of state sovereignty 
has changed but not the sovereignty of the states themselves. Hence Britain remains 
the sovereign authority in matters of foreign policy while the EU is sovereign in 
cases of trade policy. (Philpott 1995, pp357-8). The distinction is identified by 
Janice Thompson (1995) as that between authority, defined as `the claim to the 
exclusive right to make rules, ' and control, defined as `the capacity of enforcing that 
claim' (p. 223). Authority depends upon the recognition of other sovereign entities, 
while control requires `concrete capabilities to monitor and enforce compliance' 
(ibid. ). State control has always `waxed and waned' but `meta-political authority' 
has continued to reside in the state, which empowers or authorises it to decide what 
is `political' and therefore under its authority. Ultimately, authority depends on the 
state's ability to enforce its will, therefore `coercion is key to sovereignty' (ibid. 
p. 225). However, as Thomson recognises, it is impossible to identify the point at 
which `erosion of control translates into an irreversible decline in the capacity to 
make authoritative decisions' (ibid. p. 217). 
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Such arguments remain, however, somewhat unsatisfactory in their attempt to mould 
a four hundred year old concept, and its associated vocabulary, around an essentially 
contemporary phenomenon. It may, therefore, be useful to conceptualise a more 
sophisticated, yet essentially straightforward concept of sovereignty and the state. 
Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson (1995) provide one such alternative. 
According to Holm and Sorenson it is possible to distinguish between three 
categories of state and, subsequently, three categories of sovereignty. The first type 
of state, the pre-modern state, enjoys only negative sovereignty i. e. freedom from 
interference (Jackson 1990, p. 11). It is a quasi-state whose economy is 
underdeveloped and its institutions are weak, lacking a monopoly of the means of 
violence, e. g. Somalia, Angola. The second category of state is the modern state that 
enjoys positive sovereignty i. e. the means to provide political goods (Jackson 1990, 
p. 9). This comes closest to fulfilling the ideal type in international relations. Its 
economy is industrially advanced and nationally organised. It possess a highly 
developed form of government which is endowed with a monopoly of legitimate 
control over the means of internal and external violence, within its clearly 
demarcated boundaries, e. g. USA, Japan. The third category of state is the post- 
modern state where sovereignty is `operational' e. g. members of the EU. In the post- 
modern state interference in domestic affairs is tolerated in the expectation of gaining 
influence at the supranational level of governance; a necessity born of the erosion of 
positive sovereignty through globalisation and interdependence. `The notion of state 
power loses relevance in a system of post-modern states because power is 
increasingly diffused to different levels, different types of resources and different 
actors. ' (Holm & Sorenson 1995, p. 204) 
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Robert Keohane (1995) takes a similar approach to Holm and Sorenson, dividing the 
world roughly into two zones, one of peace and one of conflict. In the zone of 
conflict the traditional concept of sovereignty remains valid. However, in the zone 
of peace, inhabited by modem, pluralist democracies, the traditional Hobbesian 
concept of sovereignty, based on territorial integrity is of decreasing relevance. Here 
sovereignty would be more usefully defined as a legal commodity which states are 
willing to bargain with in order to gain influence over other states and international 
regimes, as the only way to gain some control over an environment dominated by 
complex interdependence: 
`Sovereignty no longer enables states to exert effective supremacy over what 
occurs within their territories. Decisions are made by firms on a global basis, 
and other states' policies have major impacts within one's own boundaries... 
What sovereignty does confer on states under conditions of complex 
interdependence is legal authority that can either be exercised to the detriment 
of other states' interests or bargained away in return for influence over 
others' policies and greater gains from exchange... ' (p. 176-7) 
Keohane also observes that within the zone of peace military solutions are no longer 
considered as a means of resolving disputes, although they still exist as an option in 
relations with states within the zone of conflict. 
If sovereignty is thus conceived of as a commodity or asset with which to bargain, 
the post-modern state could, if interests are defined as power, be considered 
strengthened by the pooling or sharing of an essentially intangible asset, in return for 
the power or ability to influence factors otherwise beyond its control: 
`Although the traditional model of sovereignty is clearly obsolete, the nation- 
state today survives even though some of its powers have to be pooled with 
others, and even though many apparently sovereign decisions are seriously 
constrained, or made ineffective, by the decisions of others as well as by 
economic trends uncontrolled by anyone. International regimes help the state 
survive, by providing a modicum of predictability and a variety of rewards... 
The EEC regime is unique... and it has served not only to preserve the nation- 
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state, but also paradoxically to regenerate them... In all these ways, and 
despite its internal flaws, the EEC regime has strengthened the nation-state's 
capacity to act at home and abroad. ' (Hoffmann 1995, p. 223-24) 
One could, therefore, conclude that the state, which accepts de jure limitations on its 
independence and authority, is actually, de facto, more powerful in the sense of being 
able to influence others, than the absolute sovereign state envisaged by Hobbes in a 
hostile anarchic system. The EU therefore, rather than being conceived of as a rival 
sovereign entity, could in fact be seen as strengthening the sovereignty and security 
of its member states, never (probably) to become sovereign itself. 4 The EU, 
therefore, `emerges as something more than a pure instrument of the states... without 
contesting state sovereignty' (Waever 1995, p. 431). The over all affect is, therefore, 
to enhance member states' capacity to provide basic political goods, including 
security. 
The State and Security in International Relations 
The main 'rationalist' traditions of International Relations thought, from realism to 
liberalism, fail to fully conceptualise the state, which is subsequently either assumed 
or dismissed as a unit for analysis (Hobson 2000). Realism and structural or neo- 
realism are unequivocally statist in their approach to the study of international 
phenomena, yet the concept of the state itself `is treated as an ontological given -a 
primitive concept which does not require further explanation. ' (Buzan, Jones & Little 
1993, p. 114) According to Keohane, political realism is based upon three key 
assumptions about state behaviour, whose origins can be traced back to Thucydides: 
'I) States are the key units of action; 
2) They seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; 
4 See Alan Milward on `The European Rescue of the Nation-State' (1992) 
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3) they behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore 
comprehensible to outsiders. 
(Keohane 1986, p. 7) 
Thinking about International Relations in this way leads to assumptions about the 
centrality of security and the significance of military power, and therefore by 
extension the emphasis on the EU's acquisition of a foreign and security policy. 
The key concept in understanding state behaviour is therefore the pursuit of power or 
what Morgenthau defines as `interests defined in terms of power' (Morgenthau & 
Thomson 1995, p. 115). This principle is based on an understanding of human nature 
akin to that envisaged by Hobbes in his state of nature. Men are conceived as 
instinctively self-interested and competitive, with a tendency to resort to force in 
conflicts over the allocation of resources, particularly power. Morgenthau fails, 
however, to differentiate sufficiently between power in quantitative or qualitative 
terms, i. e. between power as a resource simply to be amassed and power as the 
ability to influence others. (Keohane 1986, p. 10) Moreover, through the emphasis 
upon the more negative aspects of human nature, transposed onto the international 
arena, such a perspective fails to account for periods of prolonged peace or co- 
operation, beyond the establishment of short term issue (or enemy) specific alliances. 
The structural or neo-realist variant, as most notably developed by Kenneth Waltz 
(1959,1979), differs from classical realism in concentrating its analysis on the 
systemic level of analysis. Emphasis is therefore placed upon the nature of the 
international system and the exigencies of interstate competition. According to 
Waltz, the state system, lacking any central order creating authority, resembles the 
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anarchy of Hobbes's state of nature in which states find themselves in a continuous 
`posture of war' as; 
`in all times, kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their 
Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of 
gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one 
another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their 
Kingdoms; and continual spyies upon their neighbours. ' (1968, pp. 187-8) 
The threat of war is therefore constant. In the absence of any alternative means of 
conflict resolution force provides the ultimate `means of achieving the external ends 
of the state. ' (Waltz 1959, p. 238) This is not to imply that war is continually 
occurring but rather that `with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use 
force, war may break out at any time.... Among men as among states, anarchy, or the 
absence of government is associated with the occurrence of violence. ' (Waltz 1979, 
p. 102) Consequently, the constant threat of war makes security the principle 
function of the state. All states will therefore, by necessity, act to enhance their 
strategic, military and economic strength vis-a-vis its rivals. This constant quest for 
supremacy, however, leads inevitably to the `security dilemma, ' a situation in which 
one state's increased security leads to another's insecurity resulting in a vicious 
circle of preparation for war and insecurity. 
An additional consequence of the quest for security is the monolithic character of the 
state. Viewed from the outside most states appear sovereign, exercising their, 
theoretically unchallenged, authority over their territory and population and 
recognising the rights of other such entities to do likewise. (Buzan 1991, p. 102) 
Moreover, because the primary purpose of the state is the provision of security all 
states will be `functionally undifferentiated'. The only manner in which states differ 
is in the distribution of power or capabilities; `States are alike in the tasks that they 
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face, though not in their ability to perform them. ' (Waltz 1979, p. 98) Waltz is 
therefore critical of `reductionists' who attempt to explain the relations between 
states through the analysis of internal politics, denying the impact of democratic or 
autocratic government, ideology, religious beliefs, all of which become more 
important as the line between domestic and foreign policy becomes increasingly hard 
to draw. Waltz does not deny entirely the utility of such unit level approaches but 
nevertheless regards such considerations as outside the framework of his theory. 
A by-product of the functional similarity among states is the tendency for them to 
reproduce themselves. As units interact on the international stage they are required 
to keep up with and emulate each other. It is for this reason that Waltz finds it 
unnecessary to differentiate between states, city-states and empires. (Buzan, Jones & 
Little 1993, p. 117) This presents some interesting considerations in regards to the 
question of the significance of CFSP in the state-like ambitions of the EU. Clearly if 
the EU were to survive as a state in an essentially anarchic system, in which military 
power remains the ultimate guarantor of security, it would require its own, effective 
foreign and security policy and means of defence. Two further hypotheses, 
concerning the future development of the EU, can be derived from the realist/neo- 
realism paradigm. Firstly, states are the basic units of the international system; they 
are self-interested and competitive. Therefore, they are unlikely to surrender their 
power and authority to a new supranational body. Secondly, although less likely, 
should the EU become a significant international actor, the tendency of units active 
in the international system to reproduce themselves, to become functionally 
undifferentiated, will necessitate the EU taking on the characteristics of the dominant 
unit i. e. the state. 
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Neither classical realists nor neo-realists anticipate extensive inter-state co-operation. 
Loose alliances may be formed for mutual benefit but will be abandoned as soon as 
losses or other states' gains out weigh its utility: `States do not willingly place 
themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system 
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest. ' (Waltz 
1979, p. 107) Waltz does, however, recognise the unique conditions surrounding the 
existence of the EEC. According to Waltz the nations of the EEC lost control over 
their own security during the Cold War. Security was thus effectively removed from 
the agenda. This allowed for the 'up-grading of common interests' as it was 
recognised that an advantage to one state within the Community would not be 
translated into military force: 
`Living in the superpowers' shadow Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
quickly saw that war among them would be fruitless and soon began to 
believe it impossible. Because the security of all of them came to depend 
ultimately on the policies of the others, rather than their own, unity could 
effectively be worked for, although not easily achieved. ' (Waltz 1979, p. 70- 
71) 
None of this is to deny that fundamental conflicts of interest persist, but any 
differences will be resolved peacefully, through intensive bargaining, rather than 
through resort to force. Unfortunately, however, Waltz's explanation of European 
integration is dependent upon the removal of (military) security from the Union's 
agenda, through the bipolar structure of the Cold War international system. The 
return to a multi-polar system, in which security is once more an issue among, 
although not between, the member states, therefore provides a harsh test of realist 
and neo-realist analysis. Ole Waever provides a similar argument: during the Cold 
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War relations among West European states became `de-securitized' because `they 
had been shielded from the colder winds of international security by the bipolar 
conflict. ' With the end of the Cold War, relations among West European states have 
again become `securitized' (Waever 1995). According to Waever, integration itself 
is therefore a security issue as the alternative is fragmentation and ultimately conflict 
(ibid. ). 
A further, fundamental, flaw in Waltz's thesis is his failure to adequately account for 
the effect of economic interdependence, globalisation, international law and 
international organisations, on state behaviour. Waltz dismisses such phenomenon, 
which are nothing new in the history of the state, as reducible to the unit level of 
analysis and therefore outside his framework. 5 In contrast Keohane & Nye (1979) 
attempt to assess the significance of domestic and international society, 
interdependence, international institutions and other transnational or multinational 
groups other than the state. They employ the concept of `complex interdependence' 
to describe `a situation among a number of countries in which multiple channels of 
contact connect societies (that is, states do not monopolise these contacts); there is no 
hierarchy of issues [in which military security is the dominant issue]; and military 
force is not used by governments towards each other. ' (1989 p. 249) They do not, 
however, abandon the realist preoccupation with power but redefine it in such a way 
as to identify `asymmetrical interdependence' as a potential means of gaining 
influence. Moreover, military power is recognised as dominating `economic power 
in the sense that economic means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious 
use of military force. ' The use of military force is qualified as it is increasingly 
5 This is reflected in the failure of neo-realism to account for the end of Cold War, e. g. John 
Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, ' International Security 
15(1) 1990. 
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costly, and its success is not ensured. As a result military solutions will not be 
pursued between governments within a region, or on issues where complex 
interdependence prevails. Nevertheless, outside this sphere military force could still 
be utilised if the stakes are high enough (Ibid. pp. 16-17,25). 
The works of Keohane and Nye, like that of Waltz, Morgenthau and Mearsheimer 
fail to provide a comprehensive theory of the state. They do however present an 
image of the state as a legally based organisation of people, on a territorial basis, 
which constitutes a unique actor upon the international stage. It is unique because it 
alone possesses the military capability to decide the life and death of its, and its 
neighbours', population. It is driven by the need to preserve and promote its interests 
and in so doing it creates a system in which insecurity is rife. This does not preclude 
the possibility of co-operation and peaceful coexistence where common interests 
exist. 6 Nevertheless, it is this impression of the self-interested state, in an anarchic 
international system that has provided the basis for the conceptualisation of security, 
into which the EU's evolving security identity must be slotted. 
6 The more overtly liberal accounts of international co-operation provide the basis of the next chapter 
concerning theories of integration. 
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Beyond State Security? 
Through out the above commentary on the state in international relations, the need 
for and the provision of security has been presented as both a key function of, and 
raison d'etre for the state, hence its implied significance with regard to the 
development of CFSP and CESDP. This is also reflected in classical Strategic 
Studies, in which the `centrality of the state-as-an-actor is assumed, ' and the 
`meaning of security is thus determined by a prior theoretical assumption of the 
primacy of the state. '(McSweeney 1999, p. 15) Security is, therefore, 'a condition of 
the state, to be achieved by the state through the instrumentality of state military 
power. ' (ibid, p. 36) 'Security' as a concept remains underdeveloped, seen primarily 
in terms of something to be aspired to by states in an anarchic international system. 
(Buzan 1991) However, since the 1980s, particularly since the end of the Cold War, 
the nature of security is perceived to have changed both in terms of the security 
agenda and, perhaps most significantly, the assumption that the state is the primary 
referent object of security. These two processes are related; as economic, social, 
environmental and demographic issues come to be viewed increasingly in terms of 
posing a threat that needs to be addressed, so the unit for addressing these issues is 
also redefined, downwards towards the individual and society, and upwards to the 
regional and global level. This posses a fundamental challenge to the 
7 It would be useful here to distinguish between what is meant by `security' and `defence', as the 
conceptual difference goes to the heart of the debate into the EU's acquisition of a defence capability. 
Security is a broad, highly contested concept (as will be illustrated below) referring to the 
independence and well being of a nation or organisation from external danger or interference. Such 
protection may therefore be afforded through economic measures such as tariffs or political methods 
such as diplomacy. Defence, however, is more specifically defined as `a matter relating to the actual 
or potential deployment of military forces. ' (Hurd, 1994 p. 426) As such its essential relationship to 
national sovereignty remains largely unchallenged both in theory and in practice. In the context of 
European integration a further distinction can also be made between common defence policy, i. e. the 
formulation of a common policy on the use of armed forces, and common defence, i. e. the 
organisation of military forces in common (White 2001, p. 144). The later of these arrangements, 
which is stated as a possibility by the Maastricht Treaty (Article B), would require the transfer of 
authority for defence from member states to the EU, potentially transforming the EU into a federal- 
type defence organisation. 
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conceptualisation of security as primarily guarding 'the state against those objective 
threats that could undermine its stability and threaten its survival' through the 
utilisation of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. (Lipshutz 1995 p. 5) 
Moreover, it is necessary to recognise that the changing perception of security 
reflects not only the transformation of the international system, precipitated by the 
end of the Cold War and the spread of globalisation but also, potentially, a 
fundamental shift in the nature and role of the state (Clark 1998) and therefore, by 
extension, perceptions of the evolution of the EU. 
To challenge the conventional understanding of security is, in fact, to contest the 
basis of rationalist thought through the application of a sociological and 
constructivist approach. (Wendt 1992, Lipschutz 1995, Waever 1995a, McSweeney 
1999) In setting out his constructivist approach to international relations, Wendt 
attempts to contest the underlying assumptions regarding agent and structure that 
form the basis of realist/neo-realist and liberal theory. Both assume the self- 
interested state in an anarchic international system as their starting point. For the 
realist/neo-realist this leads to the self-help system in which states are constantly 
presented with and held prisoner by the security dilemma. For liberals, the anarchic 
system can be overcome through co-operative behaviour, which has the potential to 
modify but not to transform national interests. In arguing against a logical or causal 
link between self-help power politics and anarchy Wendt substitutes what he terms a 
`form of systemic theory in which identities and interests are the dependent variable. ' 
(Wendt 1992, p. 394) Rather than being exogenously given interests, and the 
identities upon which they are built, are recognised as being socially constructed. 
Once formed, a set of identities and interests will constitute an `institution. ' This 
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may involve the formalisation of rules and norms, but it is the `socialisation to and 
participation in collective knowledge, ' that really counts (ibid. p. 399). `Self-help and 
power politics' are therefore institutions created as a result of the interests and 
identities of their constituent units. It cannot be predetermined that anarchy creates 
such a system that is, therefore, only possible through social interaction: `Anarchy is 
what states make of it. ' (ibid. p. 395) States will behave differently towards friends 
than enemies, defining their interests based upon different understandings and 
expectations, which cannot be accounted for simply by reference to the existence of 
anarchy. If a self-help system does evolve it is because state `practices made it that 
way. Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that 
constitutes the system. ' (ibid. p. 407) Sovereignty provides a similar example, 
constituting an institution that provides the basis for a community based on mutual 
recognition, which in turn increases individual security, reducing the perceived need 
for military security. (ibid. p. 412-15) 
Following from this perspective, national interests can not be assumed as 
exogenously given. Security, therefore, is `socially constructed' by policy makers 
who `define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, 
plausible enemies, and possible scenarios. ' This will be achieved by drawing upon 
`the specific history and social context of a particular country and some 
understanding of what is "out there". ' (Lipschutz 1995, p. 9) Once identified it will 
not be possible for these interests, enemies and scenarios to exist independently from 
their subjective origins. In effect `we choose our security problems as we choose the 
interests and identity which accompany them. ' (McSweeney 1999, p. 12) 
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So, how is security to be defined in contemporary Europe? During the Cold War 
security had become highly militarised, in order to meet the major threat to Western 
security - the Soviet Union (Waever 1995a, p. 59). Since the collapse of the Soviet 
threat the security agenda has undergone a dual transformation, becoming both 
broader and less militarily orientated. Advanced states `have now to worry not just 
about their military strength and the security of their ruling families, but also about 
the competitiveness of their economies, the reproduction of their cultures, the 
welfare, health and education of their citizens, the stability of their ecologies, and 
their command of knowledge and technology. ' (Buzan 1995, p. 191) Consequently, 
economic, demographic, welfare, environmental and technological issues have 
become `securitized, ' to the extent that any threat in these areas could conceivably 
challenge the stability and prosperity of the state. Thus these previously benign 
issues are exposed to a discourse that still 'evokes an image of threat defence, 
allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. ' (ibid, p. 47) This raises a 
number of practical and conceptual difficulties. Firstly, the broadened agenda risks 
devaluing the concept of security to the extent that it becomes 'a synonym for 
everything that is politically good or desirable' (ibid. ) and thus of limited analytical 
use. Moreover, once an issue is identified as posing a risk to security so a state 
becomes justified in using more extreme measures in pursuit of its aims, leading, 
potentially, to greater insecurity -a new security dilemma whereby almost anything 
can be defined as a potential threat to national well-being. These difficulties provide 
the basis for Waever's concept of `security as a speech act'. Something simply 
becomes a security issue when institutional `elites declare it to be so. '8 (Waever 
1995a. p. 54) By `uttering the word "security, " a state-representative moves a 
8 Within a state the identification of such elites is unproblematic, however, if it is a society that is to be 
secured it could be more difficult to determine a legitimate representative to speak on its behalf. 
48 
particular development into a specific area and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block it. ' (ibid, p. 55) As such security remains an 
essentially negative concept, `when there is no security problem, we do not 
conceptualise our situation in terms of security. ' (ibid)9 An alternative, more 
positive, perspective might be to follow McSweeney's definition of `secure' in terms 
of enabling or making something possible. Moving away from the material towards 
a cognitive approach, security can thus be viewed as a relationship, as between a 
mother and child, rather than simply a commodity. (McSweeney 1999. p. 15) 
Moreover, while Waever identifies a process of `resecuritization' in Europe, the state 
or states are no longer the referent object; `this crystallizes at two other levels: 
Europe (integration in order to avoid fragmentation) and nations (defending 
themselves against integration). ' (Waever 1998, p. 91) Thus the state becomes 
increasingly detached from the concept of security, with the later level in particular 
reflecting a growing concern for `identity, "° directed more towards cultural and 
societal units. (Mc Sweeney 1999) Waever makes clear the distinction, defining 
political (state) security as `the organisational stability of states, systems of 
government and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy. ' 
Whereas societal security protects `the self-conception of communities, and those 
individuals who identify themselves as members of a particular community. ' Both 
ultimately entail survival, for the state this means sovereignty, for society it means 
identity. (Waever 1995a p. 66-67) Arguably, it is the later of these that provides the 
9 Or to put it another way, `security is like sex and money; we only miss it when we don't have it! ' 
(Deighton, Britannia Lecture, Britannia Royal Naval College, December 15th 2000) 
10 Simply put, identity implies the use of the word 'we' to define a particular group of people or 
society: 'A 'we' identity can vary across a wide spectrum in terms of the size of the group to which 
it 
applies, the intensity with which it is felt, and the reasons that create a sense of 
belonging, ' Waever 
1993, p. 17) 
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most interesting departure for the study of security, challenging the assumption that it 
is the state that needs to be made secure. Indeed, the separation of state and society, 
assumed in traditional strategic studies, excludes the consideration of society as a 
referent object of security I1 
However, with the apparent decoupling between the state and nation, particularly 
within Western Europe, the state is loosing the ability (or simply lacks the 
appropriate tools) to respond to threats to identity, such as those posed by 
immigration or global culture. The process of integration further illustrates this. At 
one level, the submersion of previously independent identities, enjoying a close if not 
precise relationship with the state structures that represented them, within a larger, 
heterogeneous and more distant regional superstructure could be perceived as a threat 
to national identity. Certainly, the public misgivings about integration in the wake of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, particularly in countries such as Britain, Denmark and 
France, can be viewed partially as a nationalist backlash against Europeanisation. 
Moreover, the larger the entity, the potentially less sensitive it is likely to be towards 
the security needs of the smaller, constituent units. Consequently, the `more actors at 
every level retain some control over their security, the more stable the system will 
be... ' (Buzan 1991, p. 379) 
However, such a perspective fails to acknowledge the `cognitive' nature of identity 
formation within a security community. (Adler 1997) As originally conceived by 
Deutsch et al, a security community exists where 'there is real assurance that the 
members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their 
" Here lies an inherent contradiction in assuming the primacy of the state in that the individual or 
society is excluded from the conceptualisation of security at the state level 'only to 
be reinstated as its 
basic rational. ' (McSweeney 1999, p. 16) 
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disputes in some other way' (Deutsch et al, 1957 p. 5) In order to achieve this 
condition there must exist, among other things, a sense of "we-feeling, " based upon 
'trust and mutual consideration, ' leading to a 'perpetual dynamic process of mutual 
attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of 
decision-making. ' (ibid, p. 36) The EU can certainly be considered a `security 
community' in that `participant states do not prepare for, expect or fear the use of 
military force in their relations with each other. ' (Sorenson 1997, p. 265; see also 
Adler 1997; Waever 1998). Moreover, it is possible for the experience of co- 
operation in the peaceful resolution of disputes to transform identities into `a 
collective "European identity" in terms of which states [and societies] increasingly 
define their "self' interests. ' (Wendt 1992, p. 417) This is not to assume the 
replacement of national identities by one `big over-riding we - we "Europeans". ' 
(Waever 1998, p. 93) But rather an `additional layer of identification, ' adding a 
`European flavour to being French, German and so on. ' (ibid. p. 94) Indeed, it is 
feasible for members of a security community to maintain their sovereign 
independence. Deutsch et al differentiate between amalgamated and pluralistic 
communities; the former requiring 'the formal merger of two or more previously 
independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common 
government... ' while the latter 'retains the legal independence of separate 
governments. ' (Deutsch et al, 1957 p. 6) 12 Within such a setting the referent object of 
security becomes the continued success of integration, the alternative, fragmentation 
or Balkanisation, providing the basis upon which to legitimise `international order 
without a named enemy. ' (Waever 1995a, p. 72) The greatest potential `enemy' to 
12 It would therefore follow that a security community can exist among members of the EU without 
leading to full amalgamation. Nevertheless, many of the conditions for amalgamation do exist within 
the EU (Deutsch et al, 1957, pp. 117-161) 
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European security, therefore, becomes the prospect of a return to Europe's war-prone 
past. (Waever 1998, p. 90) 
Globalisation and the Security State 
Many of the trends identified above have been associated with the challenge to the 
Westphalian state system as presented by globalisation. Within this process `the 
spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, ' are transformed, `generating 
transcontinental or inter-regional networks of interaction and the exercise of power. ' 
Consequently, `overlapping networks and constellations of power' develop to `cut 
across territorial and political boundaries, ' thus challenging the basis of the 
sovereign, territorially based state and the international system that has grown around 
it. (Held & McGrew 1998, p. 220) As such globalisation alters both the structure 
(multi-national, trans-national, non-governmental actors) and scope (financial, 
ecological, social issues) of the international system and, moreover, restricts the 
ability of the state to impose its own security agenda internally or externally. 
However, the extent to which this poses a revolutionary challenge to the state and 
state system is deeply contested between `the proponents of state redundancy and the 
champions of continuing state potency, ' for whom globalisation is essentially 
generated by the external actions of states themselves. (Clark 1998, p. 479) Indeed, 
in the realm of security studies it could be argued that after a century of two world 
wars and the invention of missiles of mass destruction on a global scale, the 
implications of globalisation are hardly new. (Guehenno 1998-99, p. 5) The aim 
here is not to provide either a globalist or sceptic's concept of globalisation but 
merely to identify those characteristics associated with globalisation which impact 
upon the nature of the state, security and the relationship between the two, so as to 
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further understanding of the significance of the EU acquiring a foreign and security 
policy. 
Clark (1999) identifies four ways in which globalisation is changing concepts of 
security: `the detachment of security from territoriality; the enmeshment of security 
in global networks; the creation by globalisation of a new security agenda; and the 
diminished capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens. ' (Clark 1999, 
p. 114) The implications of an expanded security agenda have already been 
discussed. The transformation of national defence industries into a global network 
remains underdeveloped in comparison to the civilian sector, nevertheless a 
combination of the increasing costs of high technology, privatisation of defence 
industries and the trend towards multinational security arrangements further erode 
sovereign independence. One of the key characteristics of globalisation is what 
Ruggie describes as the `unbundling' of territoriality, through which `various types 
of functional regimes, common markets, political communities and the like, ' provide 
`the means of situating and dealing with those dimensions of collective existence that 
territorial rulers recognise to be irreducibly transterritorial in character. ' (Ruggie 
1993, p. 165) Security issues are no exception to this rule, thus the ability of the state 
to provide purely `national' security is clearly contested. This is reflected in the 
increasing trend towards the `institutionalisation of cooperative defence (and 
security) and the global regulation of military power. ' (Held & McGrew 1998, 
p. 227) Nevertheless, while, for example, NATO has extended its roles and expanded 
its membership, and international arms limitation regimes have grown, NATO itself 
and international arms control agreements pre-date the essentially post-Cold War 
phenomenon of globalisation. States faced with the security dilemma have long 
53 
since engaged in the practice of collective security13 when faced with a common 
enemy or threat to peace that they are unable to deal with unilaterally. Indeed, it 
could be argued that since the collapse of the bipolar system global security has 
become more rather than less fragmented. 
However, the challenge of globalisation goes beyond such state-centric concepts as 
collective security. As the borders between states have been transcended and diluted 
in pursuit of a new security agenda, so the always-dubious distinction between 
domestic and international politics, what is defined as `inside or outside, ' has also 
been eroded. Consequently, it is not just the international state system that is being 
transformed but the nature of the state itself comes under attack from different levels 
of governance. The state is thus perceived as `no longer in command of its territory, 
governments have mostly lost control of the national economy and their policies to 
promote wealth creation and social protection are destined to be ineffective. ' (Weiss 
1999, p. 60) As such globalisation has become `synonymous with state power 
erosion. ' (ibid, p. 64) Such a viewpoint risks overestimating the degree to which 
states are unable to deal with the forces of international capitalism and by which 
international organisations and regimes are shaped by as well as shape national 
interests. Indeed, a fundamental flaw of the both sides of the globalisation debate is, 
as Clark (1998) argues, to overlook the `middle ground, ' of the argument whereby 
the state is `both shaped by and formative of the process of globalisation. ' (Clark 
1998, p. 479) 
13 A system whereby 'states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability, and when 
necessary, band together to stop aggression. ' (Bayliss 1999, p. 203) 
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Consequently, it is not so much the state, as a particular form of state - the welfare, 
Westaphalian, territorially based state, which is challenged rather than the state itself, 
which will continue to exist in some altered form as part of a system of multi-level 
global governance. However, one of the key characteristics of the old Westphalian 
order was that it was `driven by military and political considerations. ' (Buzan & 
Little 1999, p. 90) As this order mutates the dominance of military-political or high 
politics issues declines, transforming the state-security bargain. Under conditions of 
increasing interdependence and globalisation the incentives for war should be 
reduced as the costs of such conflict become greater and the means of unilateral 
action constrained. Moreover, as the nature of insecurity changes so the requirement 
for the state to mobilise its society for its defence is also reduced, thus breaking the 
traditional trade off between political, social and economic rights and military 
service. (Clark 1999, p. 122) According to Clark, the severing of this link, together 
with the inability of the state to provide for its citizens security, requires the 
`reconfiguration' of social compacts `on a multilateral or transnational basis, ' as `the 
state is less entitled to legitimise violence on its own account. ' (ibid, p. 123) Such a 
suggestion is, arguably, supported by recent military operations, in which `armed 
forces are increasingly assigned tasks which have nothing to do with national 
defence in the traditional sense. ' (Sorensen 1997, p. 267) For example, NATO 
operations against Yugoslavia appeared to have been `based more on humanitarian 
than on either extractive or power rivalry motives. ' 14 (Buzan & Little 1999, p. 92) 
Indeed, the democratic peace thesis suggests that total war between developed, 
14 At the time of NATO air strikes against Belgrade Mr Blair explained the Allies' motives in an 
interview: 'In this conflict we are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new internationalism 
where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated. ' (Newsweek April 19, 
1999) 
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capitalist, democratic states has become obsolete. ' 5 (Mendelbaum 1998-99, see also 
Layne 1994, Cohen 1994) As a result, `the traditional military role of the state, the 
foundation of its claim to political primacy, has shrunk to marginal status. ' (Buzan & 
Little 1999) Thus if the EU is in the process of acquiring state-like attributes in 
security, it is arguably of lesser importance now than it might have been half a 
century earlier. However, this trend towards `debellicisation' (Mendelbaum 1998- 
99, p. 21) is by no means universal. Since the end of the Cold War, it is possible to 
characterise international security by its fragmentation into a series of regional 
`security complexes, ' composed of `a group of states whose primary security 
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another. ' (Buzan 1991, p. 190) Such 
complexes can be benign, such as the EU or South East Asia, or malign, such as in 
the Balkans or the Indian sub-continent. The result is the `structural bifurcation' of 
global security, between zones of peace and conflict. (Held & McGrew 1998, p. 222) 
States in the zone of peace will inevitably find themselves involved in zones of 
conflict, particularly when involving neighbouring states, such as EU and NATO 
states in the Balkans, or vital economic interests, such as the US in the Middle East. 
Military security therefore remains an important function of the state under 
globalisation, not least because the impact of globalisation is far from even, with 
states such as Iraq and Yugoslavia under Milosevic apparently less affected. Indeed, 
the current strategic environment bares the hallmarks of a transitional and potentially 
unstable period, combining `classic balance of power calculations with elements of a 
different world, in which security is built on a balance of dependence and in which 
15 Colin Gray dismisses the democratic peace theory as a `probable myth, ' that cannot be historically 
substantiated against humans' desire to kill (Gray 1999) 
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the boundaries between communities are blurred and power diluted. ' (Guehenno 
1998-99, p. 15) 
So what does the future hold for the security state? Buzan (1991) suggests that while 
the individual, regional and international levels are all important, states remain `the 
principal referent object of security because they are the framework of order and the 
highest source of governing authority. ' (Buzan 1991, p. 22) However, the nature of 
the state and its position in the international system are changing as a result of the 
forces of globalisation that have flourished since the end of the Cold War. In a 
`strong' state, where society freely engages in trans-border activities, the provision of 
security could be viewed as the only function left for the state to perform. (Buzan 
1995) Therefore the `doctrine of national security remains one of the essential 
defining principles of modern statehood... ' However, increasingly `it acts more as a 
simplified representation or legitimising devise than a reflection of the actual 
behaviour of states. ' (Held & McGrew 1998, p. 226) Once security and the state 
become separable then the provision of security need no longer be seen exclusively 
in terms of `national' security. Thus leading to the possibility that foreign and 
security policy, while different, can be integrated as with any other area of public 
policy. 
Foreign Policy 
Security and foreign policy are, by their very nature, both empirically and 
conceptually entwined. The maintenance of national security, however broadly 
defined, is the ultimate objective of any foreign policy. Moreover, any concept of 
foreign policy is overtly statist, implying as it does 'the existence of a central 
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governing authority and by extension, the existence of a state. ' (Hill 1994a, p. 454) 
For example, Kegley & Wittkopf (1997) define foreign policy as 'purposive actions 
undertaken by states towards actors outside their boundaries to achieve the states' 
goals on an international basis. ' (p. 532). Ultimately this implies 'the ability to deploy 
military forces and, if appropriate, the use of force. ' (Hill 1994a, p. 454) As such 
foreign policy activity becomes a necessity for any state actively engaged in an 
international system composed of other state and non-state actors. 
Such a concept of foreign policy presents two problems. Firstly, the EU is not a 
state. Moreover, it currently lacks the will or means to use effective military force in 
support of its external interests. 16 Nevertheless, the Union `indisputably has 
international presence and international effects. ' (Hill 1994a, p. 454) As a result, 
Hill suggests that it might be necessary to look beyond traditional notions of 
international actors defined as states towards a' "mixed actor" version of the 
international arena, ' with its alternative emphasis, away from sovereignty, 
recognition and territorality, towards attributes of `autonomy, representation and 
influence. ' (Hill 1994a, p. 456) By breaking away from the 'rather narrow, state- 
related criteria of actorness, ' it becomes possible to 'look afresh at the character of all 
actors and their role in world politics. ' (Hocking & Smith 1990, p. 71) By accepting 
that different actors will aspire to different goals, with varying scopes, utilising a 
number of structures and resources, across national, sub-national, and supranational 
levels, it becomes possible to revise concepts of international actorness to reflect the 
wide variety of organisations and networks that constitute the contemporary 
international system. 
16 Because of this discrepancy the analysis of CFSP presents a particular problem for traditional state- 
centric approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis (White 1998). Hence the tendency to approach CFSP 
from a more institutionalist perspective (Brown 1997). 
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Within such a multi-actor environment, Hill suggests that foreign policy should be 
reconceptualised as the `building of networks for action, which may or may not 
coincide with national boundaries. ' (Hill 1994a, p. 456) Such an approach risks 
devaluing the concept to the level of any inter-institutional relations at the global 
level. Nevertheless, by stripping foreign policy of its overtly statist ontology it does 
then become possible to characterise EU activity on the international stage as foreign 
policy, to the extent that it is an attempt to project EU power and influence in pursuit 
of collective Union interests. Moreover, the challenge to the traditional primacy of 
the Westphalian concept of the state would also appear to be furthered (sic). 
However, while the capacity for foreign relations may not then be considered the 
exclusive preserve of states, the requirement for a 'central governing authority, ' as 
identified by Hill (1994a, p. 454), continues to hamper EU-level foreign policy 
decision making. The lack of collective political will (as the chapter on CFSP will 
demonstrate) serves as a major constraint on effective policy. Part of this problem is 
because, Waever et al observe, the EU is attempting to formulate a common foreign 
policy 'at a time when its internal processes are still in part foreign policy for the 
individual member states. ' (Waever et al 1993, p. 8) Governance at the EU level 
remains insufficiently centralised/institutionalised at the level of foreign policy 
decision making to produce focused unitary policy output. 17 
The second difficulty encountered when conceptualising foreign policy is the break 
down of the distinction between foreign and domestic policy in the wake of growing 
interdependence and globalisation. All government policy represents an attempt to 
17 This would suggest that while 'institutional fixes' cannot by themselves create political will, 
institutions do matter. 
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achieve a synthesis between ends and means. In the case of foreign policy ends are 
defined in terms of national, as opposed to particular, interests and means by the 
power and capabilities of the state. (Collombis & Wolfe 1990, p. 114) State frontiers 
are regarded as conceptual as well as territorial boundaries, separating `foreign' from 
`domestic' policy accordingly. Foreign Policy is therefore formulated within the 
state but is directed and must be implemented in the external environment, which is 
decentralised and anarchic, in contrast to the domestic arena in which the state, 
theoretically, enjoys a monopoly over the instruments of social order. (White 1989, 
p. 5-6) Globalisation challenges both these assumptions, blurring the line between 
the domestic and the foreign, as both political and predominately non-political 
transnational phenomena defy territorial, political and jurisdictional boundaries. As 
a result, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between a domestic and 
foreign policy issue, with the additional consequence of challenging the normative 
primacy of the later. As low political issues become of increasing saliency so the 
value of accretion of territory and population dwindles - economic growth, education 
and technology promising the most effective means of accumulating and maintaining 
wealth and welfare. Moreover, as low political issues take precedence so 
governments become more prone towards building transnational structures to achieve 
both international and domestic functional goals. ' 8 
This reconfiguration of foreign policy has implications for the analysis of the EU as 
an international actor. As the distinction between external relations and foreign 
policy is eroded, with the former taking on increasing salience, so the international 
`weight' and `presence' of the EU (Allen & Smith 1990) can be more broadly 
18 This is not to rule out the possibility of states reverting to some form of mercantile economic policy 
but it is unlikely that such policies could be maintained by individual states (as opposed to regional 
blocs) within the capitalist core where globalisation is most advanced. 
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understood, drawing upon the Union's identity as a significant civilian power. 
However, to do so risks overlooking the lingering need for/relevance of high political 
issues and the provision and projection of military security. Moreover, it denies the 
opportunity to consider the unique impact of the acquisition by the EU of a foreign 
and security policy on patterns of global governance. 
The European Polity, Security and Foreign Policy 
If governance is understood to be characterised by collective problem solving; 
government by institutions and agents; the state by permanent structures of 
governance and rule over society, then the EU could clearly be regarded as `an 
international structure of governance. ' (Caporaso 1996, p. 32) Moreover, with 'the 
ongoing economic and political relations between Member States mediated by the 
institutions of the EU, ' it arguably already constitutes an 'international state' 
(Caporaso 1996, p. 33). But this is far from the traditional Westphalian state, 
characterised by a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states. (Montevideo Convention, Article 1 
in Wallace 1992, p. 60) One alternative is the post-modern state, identified as a non- 
territorially or functionally based `set of spatially detached activities, diffused across 
the Member States but reflecting no principled - let alone constitutional - 
considerations. ' (Caporaso 1996, p. 45) Member states accept Union interference in 
their domestic affairs, the division between foreign and domestic policy having been 
substantially eroded, viewing sovereignty more in terms of a 'bargaining chip'. 
(Sorensen 1997, p. 262) Consequently, contemporary Europe could be compared 
with 'the kind of universal political order that existed in Western Christendom in the 
Middle Ages, ' when states and their rulers shared political authority with the nobles 
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beneath them and the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor above. (Bull 1977, p. 254) 
Under this 'new medieval' model 'authority, loyalty and identity are diffused away 
from the monolithic structure of the sovereign state to supra and sub-state entities, 
within a shared framework of values and rules. '19 (W. Wallace, 1999, p. 218) States 
remain the 'central actors' for 'big bang decision-making' such as negotiating 
framework treaties (Sorensen 1997 p. 263) but day-to-day governance is shared 
across overlapping elites at all levels. The result therefore goes beyond a 
conventional international regime, forming a 'collective political system, ' or be it one 
that continues to lie outside 'the framework of the state. ' (W. Wallace 2000, p. 530) 
Wallace employs a number of terms to describe this condition, such as 'government 
without statehood, ' and 'post-sovereign politics, ' suggesting a new but fluid system 
that is continuing to evolve beyond traditional structures, towards an as yet 
undecided conclusion. Under such transitory conditions the adoption of common 
foreign and defence policies, for which the main initiators are member states (unlike 
regulatory policy in the 1980s), could serve as much to boost states' authority within 
the overall plain of European governance, as lead to the emergence of a 
supranational state (ibid. ). 
A further alternative is provided by Majone's (1996) regulatory state, characterised 
by a division of labour between the member states, focusing on redistribution of 
wealth and macro-economic stability and the EU, concentrating on regulatory policy. 
Consequently `the European regulatory state of the future may be less a state in the 
traditional sense than a web of national and supranational regulatory institutions held 
together by shared values and objectives, and by a common style of policy-making' 
19 As has been reflected in alternative discourses on security. 
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(Majone 1996, p. 276). Within such a system foreign and security policy might be 
expected to remain the preserve of the member states who `strive to preserve the 
greatest possible degree of sovereignty and policy-making autonomy' (ibid. p. 265). 
However, as Majone argues, member states were willing to delegate authority over 
regulatory policy in order to benefit from the associated increase in international 
credibility (ibid. p. 269). 
The danger here is to over estimate the degree to which the state system in Europe is 
being transformed, as opposed to merely adapting to meet the challenges imposed by 
interdependence and globalisation. Hence the realist counter-argument (Moravcsik 
1998, Gray 1999, Milward 1992) that the increasing intensity of multilateral relations 
reflects a change of style rather than principle, pointing to the continuing resilience 
of states. Indeed, Milward argues that the process of European integration has been 
can integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an organisational concept, ' 
(1992, p. 2) providing the basis for a new political consensus upon which states were 
able to rebuild themselves after the Second World War. In reality the current order 
in Europe reflects the continuing significance of both intergovernmental and 
multilateral bargaining. Under such circumstances it is difficult to apply a stable 
concept of governance to capture the essence of the EU or its member states. To 
properly asses the implications for European statehood of the EU developing a 
common or single foreign and security policy requires an investigation of the policy 
procedures and output so far constituted in these areas; this is the task of the 
empirical chapters of the thesis. 
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Conclusion 
By considering the state, security and foreign policy it was intended to draw together 
those aspects of the three concepts that link them together. Historically the provision 
of security, internally and externally, has constituted a key function of the state, 
without which the very existence of the state might in fact be challenged. States 
unable to provide for their security unilaterally have entered into alliances and 
developed systems of collective security but ultimate decision-making, or be it under 
server restrictions, has remained with the state. Similarly, foreign policy has been 
characterised as the attempted projection of state interests onto the international 
arena. However, as concepts of the state have been modified to reflect increasing 
transnationalism, so conventional concepts of foreign policy and security have also 
been re-evaluated. As the state has `withered' so its centrality in international 
relations and as the referent object of security has also been challenged, from below 
by society and above at the regional and global level. Within such a context the 
development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy could be viewed 
as essentially an expression of this process, whereby states, no longer able to provide 
for their own security, are obliged to seek it from other sources, created by 
themselves but ultimately greater than the constituent units. Consequently, the 
relationship between the state and security is transformed into one where the state 
goes from being the principal security provider in the international system, to a 
consumer of security from alternative sources. As the provision of security becomes 
conceptually and practically detached from the state, the prospect of opening it up to 
integrative forces is enhanced. The degree to which this transformation has/is/will 
occur in relation to the EU and its member states therefore provides a important 
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insight to both to the institutional development of the EU and the evolution of the 
state in world politics. 
Global processes alone, however, fail to fully explain why a common security and 
defence policy should develop among members of the EU (and by association non- 
EU members of NATO) as opposed to other states. Consequently, it is also 
necessary to investigate the internal integrative forces at work within the Union 
through a study of theories of integration. 
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Chapter Two 
Theories of Integration 
Having established the possibility, in the light of globalisation and the re- 
concetualisation of the security state, that foreign, security and even defence policy 
could be susceptible to transnational forces it is necessary to consider the theoretical 
tools available to conduct an analysis of such processes. Moreover, the development of 
European state structures and the process of integration provide two sides of the same 
question, going `to the heart of political science's elemental concerns about the nature 
of political man and the most likely sources of governance. ' (O'Neil 1996, p. 3) Since 
its origins as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 the European 
Union (EU) has provided the principle focus for those International Relations theorists 
involved in the study of integration within the international system. The concept of 
integration has been widely applied and consequently is subject to differing 
interpretations. As a result it is conceived as both a condition, whereby hitherto 
separate units have become inexorably linked within a system of mutual 
interdependence, (Deutsch 1968, p. 159) or as a process in which certain activities under 
national control are voluntarily surrendered to be tackled as common problems at a 
`supra-national' level (Haas 1968, p. 11). There is consensus that integration involves 
the merger of separate institutions and communities within a specific geographical 
region into a larger unit. However, differences occur over the significance of elite and 
political influence, public support, the role of institutions and formal contracts. An 
analysis of such differences would in itself add little to the integration debate. It is 
therefore necessary to apply and adapt these theoretical approaches through their 
application to an analysis of the process whereby foreign and security policy is being 
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incorporated into the EU, in the possible anticipation of the emergence of European 
state. 2° 
Federalism 
No review of European integration would be complete without some consideration of 
federalism as a means to the creation of a federal European state, particularly as it is 
often assumed that an EU with its own security policy and defence forces would 
constitute a federal state (e. g. White 2001, p. 38). The hey-day of federalism 
followed the end of the Second World War, culminating in the disappointing, for 
those who believed in a federal solution, collapse of the European Defence 
Community (EDC) and its attendant European Political Community, in 1954. From 
the mid-1950s onwards the 'community method' of integration, or neo-functionalism, 
became the favoured strategy for bringing about a united Europe, emphasising a 
gradualist approach to sectoral integration. Nevertheless, as Burgess points out, 
'federal ideas, influences and strategies have been an ever-present, indeed integral 
part of the European Community's continuous political and constitutional 
development. ' (Burgess 1989, p. 1) Indeed, the importance of the federal ideal could 
not be made more explicit than in the Schuman Declaration, which provided the 
genesis for functional integration; '... this proposal will build the first concrete 
foundation of a European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of 
peace. ' (Schumann Declaration, Financial Times 10/5/1950) 
20 To this must be added the qualification that, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the nature of 
statehood is profoundly challenged in the light of globalisation, a process that post-dates the origins of 
integration theory. However, epistemologically the majority of these theories are based on the 
assumption that individual (European) states are unable to deal with transnational issues on a 
unilateral basis. 
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The primary motivation behind the federalist approach to integration is the provision 
of peace and security through 'the abolition or drastic modification of the current 
international system' (Pentland 1973, p. 155) and its replacement with a federal 
system. The Second World War provided ample evidence that the international state 
system was failing to provide the most basic security requirements of its citizens, 
finding itself at war with other such entities at regular intervals. An alternative 
system was clearly required if such disasters were to be avoided in the future. 
European resistance leaders, therefore, turned their attention to drawing up methods 
for organising global peace. The answer appeared to be the founding of some sort of 
world government that would have the same authority to police the international 
system that national governments had internally. The most popular model for such a 
government was a federal one, drawing particularly upon the model of the United 
States of America, by which nation states either globally or regionally would draw 
up constitutions as the basis of an international federation. (Mutimer 1994, p. 15) 
The idea of a federal solution to peace was not new to the 1940s. A number of peace 
plans for Europe, involving some sort of pan-European political organisation, were 
devised during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Kant's `Thoughts on 
Perpetual Peace' (1795), while the American constitution provided an empirical 
example of how an ideal federation could be constituted and organised. Indeed the 
American model provided the bench mark of post war federal schemes in Europe: for 
example, the Council of Europe was originally conceived of as a constituent 
assembly that would draw up a constitution for a United States of Europe. The 
major difficulty with attempting to apply the American model, or indeed other 
examples such as Switzerland, Germany, Canada or Australia, to European 
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integration is that never before has a federation been built out of historically 
independent sovereign states. Nevertheless, as Mutimer points out this is 'precisely 
the federalist approach to international integration. ' (Mutimer 1994, p. 17). This 
raises a question mark over the utility of the federalist model when applied to the 
European Union. 
More than any other integration theory federalism emphasises ends, i. e. the creation 
of a federal state, over means, i. e. how and why is a federal state is established 
(Mutimer 1994, p. 17). Yet it is the means to integration that is of overriding concern 
of this theoretical review. Murray Forsyth defines federalism as 'the process by 
which a number of separate states raise themselves by contract to the threshold of 
being one state. ' (Forsyth 1981, p. 2) It is the 'contract' which defines the nature of 
the federation and which distinguishes it from a unitary state. The underlying 
'federal principle', as identified by K. C. Wheare, is a division of powers 'so that the 
general and regional governments are, each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and 
independent. ' (Wheare 1946, p. 11). The constituent units are not, therefore, to be 
totally engulfed by the new supranational government, they maintain a degree of 
self-government, but this is restricted to certain 'spheres' of government. The new 
federal authority is also similarly restricted. However, both levels of government, 
federal and regional, 'should operate directly upon the people, ' (Wheare 1946, p. 15) 
thus distinguishing it from a confederal model where the central government is 
subordinated to the regional government; or a unitary state where the powers of local 
authorities is directed by central government. The 'federal test', therefore, is; 'Does a 
system of government embody predominately a division of powers between general 
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and regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the 
others and independent of them? ' (Wheare 1946, p. 35). 
W. H. Riker also identifies a two tier system of government as elementary to a 
federal system, whereby; 'A set of constituent governments acknowledge that a 
federal government has authority over all their territory and people for those 
functions covering the whole territory, while they retain for themselves those 
functions related just to their own territories. ' (Riker 1996, p. 9). However, as Riker 
acknowledges, most governments will consist of at least two tiers. Where a 
federation differs is in the agreement about the division of functions amongst the 
tiers themselves. A 'bargain' is concluded whereby each unit agrees its own and each 
other's independence within certain functional spheres. All must benefit from the 
arrangement, thus providing the incentive for self-regulation. Thus Riker defines 
federalism as 'a constitutionally defined tier structure, ' which cannot be 'arbitrarily 
revised or adjusted. ' (Riker 1996, p. 10). 
The traditional federalism of Wheare and Riker serves to reinforce the apparent 
preoccupation of federalism with 'defining formal outcomes and recommending 
suitable institutional frameworks, ' (O'Neill 1996, p. 22) at the expense of providing 
any real explanation as to why sovereign states should choose to subjugate 
themselves to a supranational federal authority. Wheare identifies a number of 
factors that have lead to federalism in the past; 
'A sense of military insecurity and of consequent need for common defence; a 
desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realisation that only 
through union could independence be secured; a hope of economic advantage 
from union; some political association of the communities prior to their 
federal union... to produce a desire for union among the communities 
involved. ' (Wheare 1946, p. 37) 
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The pull of any one or combination of these factors should be such as to persuade the 
'communities or states concerned' of the need to come together 'under a single 
independent government for some purpose.., ' while at the same time wishing to 
'retain or establish independent regional governments in some matters... ' (Wheare 
1946, p. 35-36). This is a difficult balance to achieve, particularly given the tenacious 
grip that national loyalty continues to exercise. But, as Wheare points out, in his 
survey of federations '... community of language, of race, of religion, or nationality 
have not been listed as likely essential pre-requisites of the desire for union, ' for 
example Switzerland and Canada. (Wheare 1946, p. 38) However, this is to ignore 
the unique conditions pertaining to the proposed union of long established sovereign 
states in Europe, compared to previous examples of federation among previously 
autonomous units. 
Riker identifies the primary motive for federation as 'the aggregation of resources for 
war. ' (Riker 1996, p. 12) This assertion is based upon his analysis of successful and 
unsuccessful federations, concluding that the most resilient have proved to be those 
founded to deal with some kind of military threat; 'initially, there must be a 
compelling reason to aggregate resources, and this compulsion has until now been 
military... ' (Riker 1996, p. 14). In exceptional cases the original military purpose has 
been superceded by the generation of national loyalties to the federation itself, e. g. 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, Switzerland, but these are the 
exceptions rather than the rule. (Riker 1996, p. 16-17) Against the military 
prerogative, the economic motive for federation has been of secondary significance. 
Riker therefore, remains sceptical of prospects for a European federation based upon 
trade (Riker 1996 p. 23-24). Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright, in replying to 
71 
Riker, question the need for a military threat, particularly in the case of a European 
Federation, and indeed the value of historical analysis for predicting the future. 
Moreover, they point to the significance of concerns for defence in the emergence of 
states in general, rather than as leading to a specifically federal solution. (Hesse & 
Wright 1996, p. 376). 2' 
To summarise federalism as a process of integration. A number of formerly 
sovereign states, sharing a number of interests, political, economic and military, 
decide that they would all benefit from pooling together their resources and 
subjecting themselves to the control of a central government which has authority 
over them. At the same time the constituent states retain authority for themselves in 
one or more sphere of government. This division of power is preserved by a federal 
constitution, devised by a constituent assembly, representing the states and the 
people of the emerging federation. The defining feature of the federation is the 
division of powers between central and regional government, each capable of 
defining and implementing its own legislation, directly upon the people within its 
jurisdiction. As a process, therefore, federalism appears very simple, consisting of a 
single constitutive act. But in the absence of such a sweeping act, how can an 
appreciation of federalism facilitate an understanding of the on going process of 
European integration? 
Arguably, federalism had its best chance in Europe in the immediate post World War 
Two years and missed it. Conditions were certainly favourable in continental 
western Europe - the collapse of state structures during the war, their economic and 
21 As emphasised in the previous chapter, the nature of any future security risks in Western Europe is 
likely to be of a very different nature to the kind of territorial threat posed in the past, focusing on 
international rights, the environment, social and cultural threats. 
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moral bankruptcy; support for the federal idea amongst key elites; a common 
external threat from Soviet Communism; the need to contain and harness German 
power; the necessity of economic reconstruction; US support for European 
integration. There are also many reasons why it failed - national state structures 
were rebuilt and indeed expanded to accommodate the increasing demand for social 
welfare; elites consequently refocused their national interests. Security from both the 
USSR and Germany came to be provided by NATO, under US leadership. The 
economic reconstruction not possible internally was dealt with in the limited 
functional integration of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
European Economic Community (EEC), whose infringement of national sovereignty 
were more limited and therefore easier to bare. The absence of Britain, the strongest 
European power at the time, from the federalist camp undoubtedly also weakened the 
chances of a European federation, while those who did support federalism were 
divided amongst themselves as to the best strategy to achieve their goal (O'Neil, 
1996). 
Nevertheless, traditional federalism does provide some interesting insights into the 
integration process in Europe, the level of integration achieved and, in particular, the 
possible end result, something which functionalist/neo-functionalist theories have 
avoided. Forsyth (1996) argues that the 'older doctrines of federalism' are essential 
to a proper appreciation of European integration, particularly in relation to what he 
perceives as the tension between the 'technical-functional ideas' which have 
dominated 'the structures and processes of integration, ' and the subsequent growth of 
a 'federal-constitutional reality, ' insufficiently accommodated by functionalist/neo- 
functionalist theory (Forsyth 1996, p. 25). It is useful in two ways; firstly it enables 
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the observer to look beyond the 'action-plan philosophy' and see how, 'almost in spite 
of itself, ' functional integration has 'precipitated or deposited a rudimentary federal 
system'. Secondly, federalism helps explain how and why such constitutional 
developments 'should be rendered coherent and explicit. ' (Forsyth 1996, p. 37). 
Moreover, by recognising that federalism may be more than just a one stop event, it 
becomes possible to gauge the federal character of EU institutions as part of a 
"process, ' 'continuum' or 'spectrum. " (Forsyth 1981, p. 6). This spectrum ranges from 
the existence of separate independent governments, to traditional alliances, federal 
union, federal state, and finally unitary state. (Forsyth 1981, p. 7; Riker 1996, p. 11). 
The defining feature of each of these stages is the degree of centralisation amongst 
the constituent units. 
Federal union or `confederation' occupies the 'spectrum' which, defined in terms of 
the relations among constituent states, falls between interstate and intrastate 
relations, or between international relations and domestic federal relations. It is the 
development of this stage which needs to be further developed in order to explain not 
only the 'federal end, ' but also the 'federalising process' of the EU (Pinder 1986, 
p. 51). The confederal model fulfils two diagnostic roles. On the negative side, the 
confederal label has been applied to the EC during the period of Eurosclerosis in the 
1970s and early 1980s, to denote the evolution of some sort of hybrid 
intergovernmental regime, `stuck between sovereignty and integration' (Wallace 
1982, p. 67; see also Taylor 1975, O'Neill 1996). On the more positive side, as Alex 
Warleigh points out, the confederal model as proposed by Forsyth, captures the 
dynamic processes of integration in `a union of previously sovereign states created 
by Treaty, which may or may not develop into a federation... ' (Warleigh 1998, 
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p. 15). A confederation is clearly not a state; nor is it a union of individuals. It is a 
union of states, which goes beyond a conventional international organisation or 
alliance. (Forsyth 1981, p. 7) A confederation can therefore be said to exist when 'a 
certain threshold of intensity has been reached in the relationship between states, ' 
which makes it possible to draw a distinct line 'between 'us' and 'them'. ' (Forsyth 
1996, p. 37) In the case of the EU this has been achieved in the economic sphere 
through the creation of the single market, the common external tariff, and Economic 
and Monetary Union but has yet to be fully achieved in CFSP. 
A further prerequisite of federal union is a set of permanent institutions to represent 
the union both internally and externally. Such institutions do not act merely as 
technical agencies but give 'political personality' to the union. This does not require 
the abolition of constituent units but true to the federalist paradigm creates a new tier 
of government with its own reserved powers. (Forsyth 1996, p. 38) The EU Treaties 
establish a number of permanent bodies. These institutions have the ability to make 
directly binding laws within limited sectors. The European Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction above some aspects of national law; the Commission initiates and 
formulates policy; the directly elected Parliament has limited budgetary and co- 
legislative powers; even the Council of Ministers fulfils 'an authentic federal 
principle' as representative of the member states. (Forsyth 1996. p. 40) 
Consequently, it is possible to define the EU as federal union in the following terms; 
1a permanent linking together of states to form a corporate entity with a distinct 
boundary vis-a-vis the outside world [i. e. international `presence'], and possessed of 
two co-existent structures of government, one at the centre, and one at the level of 
the Member States. ' (Forsyth 1996. p. 40). 
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John Pinder (1986,1995), also applies the term federal union to describe the EU. 
However, he is less convinced than Forsyth as to federal credentials of European 
institutions and suggests a number of necessary reforms. Amongst the necessary 
adjustments would be to give the European Parliament co-legislative powers with the 
Council, where majority voting would become the norm, and to give the Commission 
full executive powers while making it responsible to Parliament. Thus the Council 
and Parliament would become a bicameral legislature and the Commission would be 
transformed into the Union's government. With these reforms in place the EU would 
constitute a 'federal economic union. ' Additional responsibility for foreign and 
security policy and justice and home affairs would expand the scope of the union, 
however, a federal state would not emerge 'unless the union were given 
responsibility for the armed forces. ' (Pinder 1995, p. 22). Precisely how this might be 
achieved is not elaborated upon; an all too common feature of federalism. 
Nevertheless, Pinder does offer what he calls neo-federalism as an alternative to the 
'great leap' approach, which 'inhibits practical thought about further steps in a federal 
direction... ' (Pinder 1986, p. 53). Through a 'synthesis of the federalist and the neo- 
functionalist approaches' he recognises the importance of the step by step approach 
to integration but is more conscious than neo-funtionalists of an explicitly federal 
outcome. (Pinder 1995, p. 240-241) 
Application of the confederal model to European integration has also contributed to 
the surge in interest in EU studies amongst scholars of comparative politics, who 
view the Union as constituting a polity in its own right (Warleigh 1998, p. 1). W. 
Wessels (1985) and R. Pryce (1989) adopt such an approach. Co-operative 
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federalism does away with defining a clear separation of powers, for a system 
whereby authority is shared between levels of government; 'Neither by itself has 
either the material instruments or the legal competence to deal adequately with a 
range of problems: they each supplement the other. ' (Pryce 1989, p. 13) Such a brand 
of federalism, while sitting uneasily with classic definitions of federalism, 
corresponds not only to some of the institutional arrangements of the EU but also to 
German federalism. In Germany, as F. W. Scharpf (1988) illustrates, authority is 
shared between the federal government and the regional Länder. Unlike the 
constituent states of America, the Länder governments are represented themselves at 
the federal level (Bundesrat), not through direct elections as for the US senate. All 
important legislation requires a majority in both the federal legislature (Bundestag) 
and the Bundesrat, and therefore is reliant upon the consent of the Länder 
governments. The Länder governments are also responsible for implementing most 
federal legislation, although their freedom to act is constrained by federal taxation. 
Thus, there are some obvious parallels with the EU set up where, with varying 
degrees of in put from the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, 
representing the member states, remains the centre of power and the member states 
themselves are responsible for implementing Community legislation. (Scharpf 1988, 
p. 242-243) However, Scharpf cautions against using the German example as a 
model for a European federation, given the cultural and economic uniformity of 
Germany compared to the diversities across the EU. 22 (Scharpf 1996, p. 366) 
Moreover, there is a danger that in failing to define a precise division of power the 
'expansionary logic' of the internal market could lead, unchecked, to an 
22 Interestingly, in his inaugural speech to the Bundestag, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called 
for a 'federal order in Europe, ' drawing upon the success of the German federal system. (Daily 
Telegraph, 11/11/1998) 
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'asymmetrical allocation of power' to the centre, at the expense of both democratic 
accountability and national authority. (Scharpf 1996, pp. 368-273) 
Alberta Sbragia (1992) identifies what she calls 'segmented federalism' within the 
EU. The defining features of this federalism are its treaty, as opposed to 
constitutional basis and the 'strength of the territorial dimension, ' which is 
'exceptionally strong on its own as well as being represented by national 
governments. ' Both these factors strengthen the role of national governments. 
Change through treaty provides the opportunity for governments to develop the 
Union to suit their own interests, in contrast to the continuity of constitutional 
amendment. (Sbragia 1992, p. 271) Meanwhile, the territorial claims of the member 
states continue to exercise a powerful hold over their populations. This lack of 
homogeneity does not rule out the possibility of federation, indeed in the absence of 
such cleavages a unitary rather than federal state could be established. Nevertheless, 
because of the centrality of the territorially organised units, 'it is extremely difficult 
to imagine a federal Community, much less a federal type organisation, in which 
territorial politics would not play a central, and most probably dominant role. ' 
(Sbragia 1992, p. 280) In this way a European federation, based around the EU, 
would differ significantly from any other existing federation in the dominant role 
given to its constituent states. 
As a theory of integration federalism remains unsatisfactory in explaining the 
processes at work to bring together the independent sovereign states of Europe. It is 
most helpful when identifying the proto-federal attributes of EU institutions. Part of 
the problem with federalism is that it is 'unquestionably ideological in the sense that 
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it is a prescriptive guide to action... to achieve a federation. ' (Burgess 1986, p. 14). It 
is this ideological component, which sees the replacement of individual national 
states with a federation of states that is the cause of the controversy surrounding the 
'f-word. '23 Yet the attraction to a federal solution in Europe is that it 'allow(s) the 
European nations to pool their resources while retaining their traditional diversities. ' 
(Brugmans 1967, p. 1025) Its emphasis upon a formal constitutional arrangement for 
European governance would serve, if properly constituted, as much to protect the 
authority of member states against unnecessary encroachments from the centre as 
visa versa; an issue which can only become increasingly salient as EU institutions 
continue to expand their competencies. Finally, an area of federalism that has been 
ignored since the failure of the EDC i. e. defence, has crept back onto the European 
integration agenda. Not in the sense of a perceived military threat, as suggested by 
Riker and Wheare, but through the growing recognition among European 
governments of the need for a distinctly European defence capability. The EU is not 
the only institution involved in this debate, which is still in its earliest stages, 
nevertheless, the significance which federalism lends to authority over armed forces 
could provide a useful insight into how the EU might attain a defence identity, and 
the consequences of such an acquisition on the nature of the European Union itself. 
Functionalism 
Functionalism provides the antithesis to federalism in integrationalist thought in that its 
ultimate objective, world peace, precludes the creation of a federal state, which merely 
magnifies the problems created by the existence of states in the international system. 
As such the functionalist approach to integration is best applied to the process of 
23 The very word federalism or federal came to be seen almost as a term of abuse by the British 
government during the Maastricht negotiations in 1991. 
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integration in Europe rather than the ultimate outcome, other than as a critique of 
federalism. Moreover, functionalism provides the basis of the neo-functionalist 
paradigm, which despite attempts at wider application has based its hypotheses on the 
evolution of the EU. 
The functionalist theory, most prolifically espoused by Mitrany (1965,1966,1975), 
grew from the belief that the nation-state was both responsible for the two world wars 
of the century and incapable of fulfilling the task of reconstruction. By contrast an 
international organisation could confront essential welfare tasks through the more 
effective pooling of resources while simultaneously eroding popular support for nation 
states and thus diminishing the perceived threat to world peace posed by nationalism. 
This was not to be achieved, however, through a frontal attack upon sovereignty but 
through the delegation of the proliferating range of technical and supposedly politically 
neutral tasks that governments were increasingly asked to perform, to the international 
level. Integration would be initiated in such non-controversial yet important areas as 
the regulation of international shipping and mail. The organisation would continue to 
build upon pre-existing interdependencies by taking on specific functional tasks for 
economic and welfare co-operation. This would avoid divisive political debate while 
creating a community of interest, which would ultimately render national frontiers 
meaningless. Peace would therefore be assured `not negatively - by keeping states apart 
- but positively by engaging them in co-operative ventures' (Lodge, 1994, p. xix ). 
At the heart of the functionalist theory lies the conviction that `the development of 
international economic and social co-operation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate 
solution of political conflicts and the elimination of war' (Claude 1964, p. 67). This 
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indirect approach to the creation of world peace is based on the assumption that through 
the provision of welfare by international organisations the nation-state will loose its 
position as the focus of individual loyalty. War would become both unnecessary and 
unwageable. 
Built against a background of increasing economic and technological 
interdependencies, the basis for integration will be determined by the `nature' of each 
function, illustrating `the conditions under which it has to operate, and the needs of the 
moment' (Mitrany 1966, p. 70). There is no need for rigid constitutional restraints: the 
dimensions, organs and powers of an organisation will depend upon the requirements of 
a particular function, (Mitrany 1966, p. 73) `form will follow function' (Taylor 1994, 
p. 126). The organisation will therefore remain flexible and dedicated to the 
performance of its specific task rather than being constrained by ideological and 
constitutional dogma. According to Mitrany a peaceful international society is more 
likely to grow through doing things together in the work shops and market place than 
by signing pacts in chancelleries' (Mitrany 1966, p25). 
Security, in Mitrany's view will be treated essentially the same as any other function, it 
is `not something that stands in stern isolation, overriding all the others' (Mitrany 1966, 
p. 76). He does however concede that some `negative' functions such as security or law 
and order, which are of particular political importance, may be treated with a certain 
degree of fixity' (Ibid. p. 71). However, in a world where war has been made obsolete 
the need for integrated security and defence is diminished. 
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The true functionalist therefore disapproves of such treaty based regional organisations 
as the EU. Mitrany observes: 
`There is little promise of peace in the mere change of rivalry of Powers and 
alliances to the rivalry of whole continents, tightly organized and capable of 
achieving a high degree of, if not actual self-sufficiency. Continental unions 
would have a more real chance than individual states to practice the autarchy 
that makes for division' (Mitrany 1966, p. 45). 
What Mitrany envisaged was a rather complex network of international and 
transnational organisations developed at the level, regional, continental or global, best 
suited to the fulfillment of a particular task. Nevertheless functionalism remains 
essential to a comprehensive understanding of European integration. (Harrison 1974, 
p. 23) 
Functionalism is based upon a number of assumptions, the ambiguities of which soon 
become apparent. Primary among these is the conceptual gap within the form follows 
function dictum. To assume that a particular problem could spawn an organisation to 
aid its resolution would be overly simplistic. Functional needs have to be identified 
before they are addressed, therefore, unless some prior consensus is assumed 
`functionalist theory runs the danger of arguing that functional needs are best 
determined by social scientists, experts or, indeed political leaders' (Pentland 1973, 
p85). Naturally it will fall upon the political elites of the nation-states to initiate the 
functional process before it is able to continue its inevitable and organic transformation 
of global society. It is assumed that, unable to control the demands of the modem 
world, governments will delegate certain, non-controversial tasks to the international 
agencies who then share in their costs as well as their authority. However, as Pentland 
observes (1973, p. 82) such action requires a rationality among national elites which 
functionalists would not normally attribute them, otherwise `if governments are 
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naturally co-operative, the problem of world order does not arise, if they are not they 
can hardly be expected to dissolve themselves rationally and incrementally' (Ibid. p83). 
Indeed, they would be far more likely to claim credit for the benefits produced by the 
international organisation, thus strengthening their own position as the focus of their 
citizens' loyalties. (Claude 1964, pp349-355) 
The functionalist argument, however, stresses the important difference between those 
areas of 'low politics' such as economics and welfare, in which governments are 
prepared to relinquish their authority as opposed to areas of 'high politics' such as 
security and defence where national control is of greater significance. The difficulty 
of sustaining such a distinction, as discussed in the previous chapter, is one shared 
with neo-functionalism. In Mitrany°s scheme the somewhat fuzzy line between high 
and low politics will be lowered through a process of education, by which welfare 
issues are conceived in the broadest sense. Eventually, therefore Taylor argues `the 
question of whether or not to hand over responsibility for defence and foreign policy, 
for instance, to a new common institution is bypassed because it has become 
irrelevant' (1990, p. 132). 
However, the possibility of identifying any apparently non-controversial issue, even at 
the lowest possible level is difficult. Whilst the post World War Two international 
system has experienced an increase in interdependence it has also seen governments, 
particularly in the more industrially advanced countries, increasingly involved in 
apparently mundane welfare, economic and even technological matters. As a result 
`their management has made national governments loom larger than ever in the life of 
each of its citizens. ' (Pryce 1989, p. 5) As a result it is difficult to identify a functional 
83 
task that is not seen to touch on the perceived vital interest of a state. The EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides one such example; a functional need 
required the formulation of a Community policy on agriculture, on the surface a largely 
technical matter, yet CAP has proved to be one of the greatest causes of intra-Union 
strife. Moreover, within the international system as a whole conflict has become 
centred upon economic resources rather than the acquisition of territory and military 
might. Indeed, as Archer observes (1993, p. 94), international conflict may in fact 
increase if expectations are raised and especially if significant reallocation of resources 
is required. Given the great disparities of wealth and economic development that exist 
it is perhaps more logical for such matters to be dealt with at the national level. 
In order for functional integration to be successful there must be a shift in individuals' 
loyalties. Functionalists assume that people, being utilitarian, will focus their loyalties 
on those agencies that provide for their welfare. Loyalties must therefore be 
`fractionalized' (Pentland 1973, p. 85), transferable function by function. As for the 
more emotional elements of political loyalty, these are ascribed secondary importance, a 
sign of the `functional inadequacy and political dangerousness' of the nation state 
(ibid. ). Loyalty will continue to be transferred to the functional agency thus educating 
the population and pressing for more integration. 
None of this, however, is to deny the continued existence of the nation state. Indeed, as 
Mitrany argued, `the functionalist approach does not offend against the sentiment of 
nationality or the pride of sovereignty' (1965, p. 139). Mitrany does not view 
sovereignty as an indivisible whole; `a slice of sovereignty' may be `transferred from 
the old authority to the new, ' (1966, p. 31) or it could be shared. At no point does the 
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state actually loose its sovereignty, sovereignty merely becomes irrelevant. (Taylor 
1990, p. 132) Nevertheless, and despite Mitrany's own misgivings about regional 
organisations, the EU or specifically the ECSC provides `the purest and most self 
conscious application of Mitrany's functional strategy' (Pentland 1973, p. 98). Indeed as 
a regional organisation the EU demonstrates more of the characteristics conducive to 
functionalism - similar levels of economic and technological development, elements of 
a shared culture and history - which provide a possible consensus upon which to build 
functional co-operation. 
Neo-functionalism 
As it stands functionalism fails to satisfactorily explain the dynamics of integration on 
either a European or global basis, nor indeed how or why particular sectors are more or 
less susceptible to integration. It is therefore necessary to turn to neo-functionalism and 
what Pentland terms the `Community method of integration. ' (Pentland 1973) 
Neo-functionalism, as the name suggests, builds upon the functional linkages of 
functionalism to place greater emphasis upon political factors - governmental and 
non-governmental. As Ernst Haas recognized in the second preface to his analysis of 
the development of the ECSC, `Economic reasoning alone was not sufficient, ' for the 
ECSC to expand its tasks because, `Politicians were important in the process. ' (Haas 
1968, p. xix) The founders of the ECSC were explicit in their intentions and strategy: 
`Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. It 
will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto 
solidarity ... The pooling of coal and steel production will 
immediately provide 
for the setting up of a common basis for economic development as a first step in 
the federation of Europe. (Schumann Declaration, Financial Times 10/5/1950) 
As a result it is the neo-functionalist approach that has received the greatest attention as 
both theory and practice. 
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The emphasis placed upon political factors constitutes the primary difference between 
functionalism and neo-functionalism, together with neo-functionalism's approval of 
functional integration on a regional or territorial basis. In neo-functionalist terms 
integration is a process `whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new and 
larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing 
national states. '(Haas 1966, p. 94) It is a period of time over which the transformation 
from customs union to political entity takes place. (Haas 1964, p. 710) 
Neo-functionalism, as first developed by Ernst Haas, is essentially functionalist and 
straight-forward. Converging economic interests, leading to increased trade flows, 
result in sectoral agreements and the creation of a supranational bureaucracy. As the 
volume of trade continues to expand between the same sectors in different countries so 
does the power of the bureaucracy. Interest groups, such as industrialists and trade 
unions, then begin to reorganise in response to the wider scope of their interests; 
eventually this will produce a shift of loyalties away from the nation state towards the 
new power centres. 
In order for this process to take place a number of background conditions must be 
fulfilled. Member units must be compatible in terms of size and power in the relevant 
sector to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic power (such a power has arguably 
evolved in the case of Germany within the EU). There must exist a high rate of 
inter-unit transactions to allow for functional linkages, a degree of social pluralism and 
elite compatibility. (Haas 1964, p. 71 1) Thus the existence of pluralist, liberal 
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democracy is a vital prerequisite for integration. Here pressure groups and political 
parties representing specific interests compete for resources, allocated by the national 
government, against a background of political consensus. It is these pressure groups, 
particularly those representing economic interests (Haas 1964, p. 46), which, according 
to Haas, push national governments towards the integration process, in order to satisfy 
their own needs. (Haas 1968, p. 5) Once the initial integrative step has been taken and a 
new supranational institution established, interest groups would begin to re-direct their 
activities and loyalties towards the new centre. As a result the national political system 
will be transposed to the regional level and with it, as Haas observed; `Group conflict 
[which] is a given and expected form of conduct in the nations under study... a larger 
political community... may well be expected to display the same traits' (Haas 1968, 
p. xxxiv). 
It is debatable, however, whether as Harrison points out, `the orthodox model of the 
pluralist society ever corresponded to an existing reality' (Harrison 1990, p. 148). 
Pressure groups have `not become the great promoters of further integration which 
some of the earlier neo-functionalists expected would be the case' (Pryce 1989, p. 19). 
Certainly pressure groups fail to fulfil their roll as the channel for all legitimate 
interests. Some are very much bigger and more powerful than others, enabling them to 
gain greater influence on the government. 24 Many of the groups themselves are 
oligarchies from which the mass membership is remote in terms of both involvement 
and commitment. These disparities are exacerbated by the institutionalisation of 
group/government consultation. The result is that pressure group leaders are 
themselves `part of a national leadership complex, ' and therefore less likely to find 
24 There is little significant pressure group activity in CFSP. The military could be regarded as an 
epistemic community, influencing government policy in pursuit of sectoral interests, 
but on the whole 
they are constitutionally limited and perform a task more akin to civilian civil servants. 
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much in common with their counterparts in other countries (Harrison 1990, p. 147). 
Moreover, where reorganisation has occurred at a European level, the gulf between 
mass membership and leadership has widened (Hix 1994, p. 13) while their involvement 
in policy making has been limited (Moravcsik 1991, p. 65). The neo-functionalist 
concept of pressure group activity also fails, like functionalism, to account for 
non-rational, ideological or nationalistic behaviour. In such instances as Pentland 
observes, it is possible that `individuals or groups are acting contrary to what observers 
perceive as their real interests' (Pentland 1973, p. 125). 
This emphasis on interest group activity does not depend initially upon mass support. 
(Harrison 1990, p. 141) Neo-functionalism views integration as an essentially elitist 
operation. Nor does it require that all those participating in the process possess identical 
aims. Referring to the ECSC, which he argues `was initially accepted because it offered 
a multitude of different advantages to different groups, ' Haas states that `the initiation 
of a deliberate scheme of political unification, to be accepted by the key groups that 
make up society, does not require absolute majority support, nor does it rest on identical 
aims on the part of all participants' (Haas 1968, p. xxxiii). `Compatibility rather than 
coincidence of group interests, ' (Harrison 1990, p. 141) is therefore required, 
particularly amongst elites involved, to be based upon ideological and cultural 
consensus developed through system wide interaction and socialisation at the 
supranational level (Pentland 1973, p. 120). Integration therefore occurs as a result of 
the convergent interests of government, interest group and party elites. Indeed, as Pryce 
observes the `elites of the original Six have supplied the major motive force of the 
Community' (Pryce 1989, p. 18) - not by challenging national authority but through 
coalitions of interest, allied to those in power (Ibid. p. 24). The limitations imposed 
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upon the integration process through the concentration on elite preferences and, as a 
consequence, bureaucratic governance, have resulted in a perceived democratic deficit 
which leaves individuals under represented in, and remote from, the supranational 
organisation. This was clearly demonstrated within the EU when the Maastricht Treaty 
was initially rejected by the Danish electorate and only narrowly accepted by the French 
people. 
Central to the neo-functionalist paradigm is the concept of 'spillover'. Spillover refers 
to the process whereby `imbalances created by the functional interdependence or 
inherent linkages of tasks... '(Nye 1980, p. 289) causes `members of an integration 
scheme - agreed on some collective goals - attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either 
by resorting to collaboration in another related sector (expanding the scope of mutual 
commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the 
level of mutual commitment) or both' (Schmitter 1969, p. 162). In order for spillover to 
work the sector to be integrated must be carefully selected. To involve governmental 
and group elites the sector must be of some importance and contain a degree of 
controversy although it should not be so controversial that states feel their vital interests 
threatened, hence the choice of the coal and steel industry as the foundation for 
European unity. Moreover the sector should be `inherently expansive' so that `strains 
and distortions' (Harrison 1974, p. 76) are felt in related sectors which are then remedied 
by further integrative measures. Such a process, it was asserted by Haas and Schmitter 
would be automatic as a result of the self-interest inspired decision-makers' `desire to 
adapt integrationalist lessons learnt in one context to a new (related) situation' (Haas 
1964, p. 45). 
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Critical to this process is the roll played by the new central institutions. In complete 
contrast to the functionalist dismissal of institutions neo-functionalism places great faith 
in their ability to further expand the integration process. As Lindberg observes, `the 
ability of any of the Six to achieve major policy goals is dependent upon the attainment 
by the others of their policy goals. In such a situation, the role of the central institutions 
in helping to define the terms of the final agreement is crucial' (1963, p. 288). The 
institution, through its role as policy initiator, must therefore play a progressive rather 
than passive role as it `will affect political integration meaningfully only if it is willing 
to follow policies giving rise to expectations and for more - or fewer - federal measures' 
(Haas 1968, p. xxxiii). It is unclear, however, exactly how institutions will be able to 
play such a creative role lacking, as Archer points out, `the day-to-day political 
resources available to the national political actors' (Archer 1993, p. 101). Either, as 
Pentland suggests, they are attributed sufficient resources from the outset, in which 
case, how are they obtained? Or is it left for the states to work out problems for 
themselves? (Pentland 1973, p. 126). It would appear that decisive central action would 
remain dependent upon its constituent units. 
The automatic nature of spillover failed to be born out by events within the EU during 
the 1960s and 1970s, causing neo-functionalists to retreat from their original assertions. 
Schmitter therefore redefined automaticity as `a (theoretically) high probability that 
spillover ... will occur' as 
`conflict between national actors ... is likely to be resolved 
by expanding the scope or level of central institutions' although `there is no guarantee 
they will always be successful' (Schmitter 1969, p. 164). Haas also granted that 
progress based upon `pragmatic interests' such as he had advocated is in fact `bound to 
be a frail process, susceptible to reversal, ' should states decide their vital interests are at 
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stake (Haas 1967, p. 315). Moreover, as Haas observed in 1976, at a time of 
`turbulence' when discussion and negotiation is dominated by confusion, national 
actors will attempt to maximize the opportunities open to them. Consequently it is 
highly probable that purely national options or those involving third parties will be 
preferred to the constraints of the regional unit. (Haas 1976) 
Joseph Nye outlines three alternative measures that might accompany a rise in the level 
of transactions: an attempt to reduce the volume of transaction; resort to national 
solutions; an increase in the capacity of existing institutions without increasing the 
scope of tasks (Nye 1980, p. 289). Ultimately if a lack of political will exists, over 
burdening of the central institutions could lead to the collapse of the integration process. 
Nye, however, suggests the most likely outcome will be a kind of equilibrium in which 
`most political decision makers will opt for the status quo at any level as long as the 
process forces or popular pressures are not strong enough to make this choice 
unbearable for them' (Nye 1980, p. 299). Integration is then seen `not as automatic but 
as contingent' as a result of which, in Pentland's opinion, neo-functionalism `becomes 
considerably less useful, restricting as it does to issues of less political importance' 
(Pentland 1973, p. 110) 
Nevertheless neo-functionalism does predict a process of politicisation. This is the 
process whereby `national political actors find themselves gradually embroiled in ever 
more salient or controversial areas of policy-making. ' As a result more people are 
effected by integration, leading to a shift in expectations and loyalties towards the 
centre. (Schmitter 1969, p. 166) It also implies that actors will automatically refer to 
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the centre in resolution of common problems, a projection subject to similar limitations 
as those concerning spillover. 
The culmination of politicisation is political union. This is the condition under which 
`existing member-states cease to act as autonomous decision-making units with respect 
to an important range of policies, ' and where actors `bestow a significant portion of 
their loyalties' upon the new regional entity (Haas & Schmitter 1964, p. 709-10). In 
practice it is difficult to establish exactly when an entity progresses from purely 
economic to political union. Politicisation can be said to have occurred on a global 
scale in that issues that may appear of a purely technical or economic nature have 
become `controversial' and therefore political in nature. For example economic 
sanctions can not only be effective in causing hardship, but can also send clear 
messages of political intent, for example, EC sanctions against Argentina during the 
Falklands War in 1982. 
The above example also serves to illustrate a further process involved in the 
neo-functionalist hypothesis - externalisation. Collective action within a functional 
field is bound to effect outsiders so as to produce either positive or negative reactions 
which themselves require reciprocation from members of a unit. As a result `the 
participants will find themselves compelled - regardless of their original intentions - to 
adopt common policies vis-a-vis non-participant third parties. Members will be forced 
to hammer out a collective external position (and in the process are likely to rely 
increasingly on the new central institutions to do it). ' This will eventually result in `the 
elaboration of a common foreign policy' (Schmitter 1969, p. 165) suggesting that 
integrated foreign policy is more likely to be achieved as a result of external pressures 
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than internal spillover. Nye, however, is less optimistic believing `the sense of reduced 
alternatives and the precipitation of larger crises will probably fail to have an integration 
effect the closer the issues come to the security and identity areas that are of greatest 
concern to popular political leaders' (Nye 1980, p. 298). Indeed, as during a period of 
turbulence, member states choice to react to international pressure by increased policy 
co-ordination within the unit cannot be predicted. The utility of Schmitter's hypothesis 
also depends on a definition of foreign policy, whether referring strictly to the pursuit of 
common political and strategic interests or to broader socio-economic external relations. 
Both politicisation and externalisation assume the existence of a `continuum, ' similar to 
that envisaged by functionalists, in which economics and politics are inextricably 
linked. However, Stanley Hoffinann, perhaps one of neo-functionalism's most 
conspicuous critics, has argued for the salience of the distinction between high and low 
politics. Under the heading of `low politics' lie issues of economic welfare that could 
produce clear gains and losses for the populous whilst infringing little upon the vital 
interests of nation states. However, when dealing with major issues of foreign policy 
and defence `nations prefer the certainty, or self-controlled uncertainty, of national 
self-reliance' to any commitment to supranational mechanisms (Hoffmann 1966, 
p. 882). The distinction between high and low politics can be conveniently applied, in 
theory, to the EU which can be said to have external relations through its existence as 
an economic bloc and major world trading partner. These relations, covered in the 
Treaty of Rome, 1957, include such `low politics' issues as trade relations and the 
imposition of sanctions. However, as it is impossible to produce a definitive definition 
of economic and political issues and hence of `low' and `high' politics. Moreover, `The 
same issue may shift on the spectrum between `low' and `high' (a) according to specific 
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circumstances, (b) within time, and (c) between different countries. Hence no clear 
lines can be drawn either according to issues or attitudes alone' (Kaiser 1967, p. 401-2). 
The many weaknesses in the neo-functionalist argument, highlighted by the inability of 
integration to progress from the mid-1960s, led to its marginalisation as an explanation 
of patterns of integration by the 1970s. However, just as the EU was rejuvenated by the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, so neo-functionalism and integration theories in 
general enjoyed a renaissance. Since the late 1980s the functional linkages inherent in 
neo-functionalism have been combined with more realistic images of the state and 
analysis of domestic politics in order to explain the stop-go nature of European 
integration. 
In posing the question; 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? ' Tranholm- 
Mikkelsen argues that the 'renewed dynamism' of the EC following the SEA 'reveals 
important elements of the neo-functionalist logic, ' which 'should lead to renewed 
research along neo-functionalist lines. ' (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, p. 2). Primary 
amongst these is, as David Mutimer suggests (1989, p. 78), the concept of spillover with 
its emphasis on functional economic integration, leading eventually to political 
integration. However, unlike early neo-functionalist prescriptions Tranholm-Mikkelsen 
and Mutimer strip spillover of its deterministic character. Consequently by denying the 
automatic nature of spillover the prerequisite of political will favourable to, or at least 
not diametrically opposed to, further integration, is recognised. As Mutimer observers; 
'Regardless of the pressures for increased centralization within the Community, the 
position of states is still sufficiently strong that substantial transfers of authority will 
depend upon the will of the governments involved. ' (1989, p. 80). Such a caveat is 
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required given the level of development achieved by the Community since the SEA. 
Traditional neo-functionalism was developed during, and indeed best describes, a 
period of initial integration, when sectors becoming subject to supranational governance 
were essentially non-controversial and central institutions weak. (Mutimer 1989, p. 82). 
As Community institutions have matured to achieve that ambiguous status between 
international organisation and federal state, the politicalisation of integration, 
anticipated by neo-functionalists, has created tension between the expanding central 
institutions and the contracting, though still dominating, member states. However, if 
the logic of unrestrained spillover is unsustainable, the underlying logic behind spillover 
remains, as Mutimer and Tranholm-Mikkelsen maintain, a useful analytical tool in 
identifying 'informative and illustrative suggestions as to the possible course of 
European politics rather than as hypothesis grounded in a potentially general law. ' 
(Mutimer 1989, p. 82). 
Mutimer identifies a number of aspects of the SEA which sustain this modified version 
of neo-functionalism. He demonstrates how the apparently technical requirements for 
completing the Single Market have 'hidden' political implications which provide the 
potential for spillover (1989 p. 86). For example, the removal of internal borders creates 
pressures which are best resolved through centralised policies for immigration and gun 
control, thus strengthening the power of central institutions over contentious political 
issues. However, as Mutimer emphasises, such an extension of the spillover logic 
requires the support/consent of member states. Indeed the inclusion of such issues into 
the third, intergovernmental, pillar of the Maastricht Treaty would appear to confirm the 
co-existence of two apparently contradictory impulses, between communautairisation 
and nationalisation. Or as Tranholm-Mikkelsen observes, the 'twin forces between a 
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'logic of integration' and a 'logic of disintegration' (1991, p. 18); a trend apparently 
confirmed by the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. These two opposing forces 
encompass both the logic of spillover and the continued resilience of the nation-state. 
To recognise such fails to fit neatly into any theoretical camp, but it does highlight the 
key dialectic that any understanding of the EU must embrace. 
A further significant innovation of the SEA, with neo-functionalist undertones, is the 
introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) for legislation required to implement 
the provisions of the act. According to Mutimer, the acceptance of QMV by the 
member states is indicative of their recognition of the need to strengthen the central 
authority for the sake of further integration, which they perceive to be in their interests. 
By accepting the principle that their own decisions can be over ruled in the Council, 
member states effectively accept what amounts to 'a clear encroachment' on their 
sovereignty (Mutimer 1989, p. 84) However, this does not amount to a 'transfer of that 
sovereignty to a federal authority. It results rather in what in `the pooling of 
sovereignty' (Mutimer 1989, p. 97). In addition to supporting the neo-functionalist 
thesis regarding the advance of political integration, the mechanisms of QMV also 
serve to `institutionalise' the requirement for agreement based upon 'generally similar, 
rather [than] convergent or identical interests among sovereign states' (Mutimer 1989, 
p. 84). Not only does this improve the chances of further integration taking place but 
also leads to the possibility that common positions will reflect a balance of national 
positions rather than merely the lowest common denominator. 
However, while accepting a 're-emergence of the neo-functional logic' (Tranholm- 
Mikkelsen 1991, p. 16) there remain a number of limitations. Firstly, while explaining 
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the conditions that lead to integration, neo-functionalism fails to explain why, over 
significant periods, integration has failed to take place. Tranholm-Mikkelsen points to 
the co-incidence of strategies of economic liberalisation coupled with legally binding 
mechanisms, during the two most proactive periods of integration i. e. 1950s to early 
1960s, and the mid-1980s to early 1990s, as appearing particularly conducive to 
functional and political spillover (1991 p. 16). Neo-functionalism also fails to take 
account of and accommodate the negative impact of strong personalities such as 
Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher. It also underestimates the significance of 
popular support and the diversity of member states. (Ibid. p. 16-17) 
In an attempt to account for these discrepancies, Corby suggests the process of 
`dialectical functionalism, ' by which spillover remains the motor of integration, 
although at a different pace than originally conceived. According to this hypothesis 
integration in one sector encourages governments to actually increase the level of their 
intervention in adjacent policy areas, to increase competitiveness and compensate for 
autonomy lost in the integrated sector. For example, completion of the common market 
in 1968 led governments to increase the application of non-tariff barriers. Interest 
groups will also reorganise - partly at the European level and partly in adjacent areas. 
This process will take place in all member states until the strength of pressure group 
activity in these sectors becomes uncomfortable for governments. Combined with the 
increasingly self-defeating consequences of inter-state competition this will lead 
governments to seek a European solution. Hence by the early 1980s it had become 
clear that a fragmented market was a major obstacle to international competitiveness. 
Vested interests, however, were against the removal of national subsidies - Europe 
provided the necessary scapegoat. 
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The stop-go nature of integration is therefore accounted for as initially `functional 
linkages are reacted to nationally' (Corby 1995, p. 264): states attempt to resist the logic 
of spillover while subconsciously creating the very conditions for it to be effective. The 
apparent `crisis' of integration following the Maastricht Treaty is therefore, Corby 
suggests, merely that period of stagnation during which `member states have always 
protected their sovereignty in adjacent areas' (Ibid. p. 231). Dialectical functionalism 
fails, however, to provide an explanation for the initial decision to integrate when states 
so clearly feel it necessary to safeguard their own sovereignty. Integration, based on 
functional linkages, is initiated by preference convergence among the key national 
actors; pressures for further integration are resisted by national governments who 
remain the dominant policy-making units. Once established the EU, acting as an 
advanced regime, affects the domestic policy choices available to governments. Should 
decision-makers in the key member states wish to expand Union competencies this will 
occur, but at a lower level than that encouraged by the Community institutions. 
The main contribution of neo-functionalism to the integrationalist debate is the 
suggestion that economic integration should create pressures - spillover, politicisation, 
externalisation - leading integration to the political level and thus to encompass foreign 
and security policy. That European Political Co-operation was formalised within the 
EC by the SEA, to then form the basis of the second pillar of the Union at Maastricht, 
suggests that such a logic, while not itself deterministic, does in fact exist and may be 
exploited when conditions in the international system and national policies allow. 
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Intergovernmental Approaches 
The renewed vigour of the EC after 1985 has not been confined to the reappraisal of 
neo-functionalism. In his analysis of the negotiating of the SEA Andrew Moravcsik 
advances an approach he terms `intergovernmental institutionalism' (or liberal- 
institutionalism, as it has come to be known) (Moravcsik 1991, p. 46). This is based 
upon three principles: `intergovernmentalism, lowest common-denominator bargaining 
and strict limits on future transfers' (Ibid. ). The EU is treated as a sophisticated regime 
which provides `sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision 
-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations' thus facilitating agreement by allowing short-term interests to be 
sacrificed in the expectation of reciprocation in the future (Krasner 1982, p. 97-8). 
Integration, according to Moravcsik, occurs as a result of interstate bargains in the 
Council of Ministers and European Council that is limited by states' need to safeguard 
their interests and preserve their sovereignty. It is made possible as a result of a 
`meeting of minds' (Haas 1964, p. 712) among government leaders of the largest 
member states i. e. Germany, Britain and France. In the case of the SEA German 
enthusiasm for integration, British desire for deregulation and liberalization of the 
internal market and the French government's economic U-turn in 1983, combined with 
the failure of national economic solutions to the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 
1980s to provide the basis for integration. The key actors and initiators are the `heads 
of government, backed by a small group of ministers and advisers' (Moravcsik 1991, 
p. 47). Other elites, interest groups and the European Commission are of secondary 
importance, `mobilized by the emerging consensus for reform, rather than the reverse' 
(Ibid, p. 68). 
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Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) also emphasize the importance of domestic politics in 
facilitating a Europe wide response to changes in the international economic system, 
including the relative decline of the United States, the rise of Japan and a lack of 
European competitiveness. In contrast to Moravcsik, but in line with traditional 
neo-functionalist thinking, Sandholtz and Zysman prescribe the role of initiators to 
business elites and the `entrepreneurship' of the European Commission who were then 
`able to mobilize a coalition of governmental elites that favoured the overall objective 
of market unification' (Sandhaltz & Zysman 1989, p. 96). 
Integration is then perceived as a `hierarchy of bargains' between political elites in 
which `the Commission proposes and persuades' and important business coalitions 
exercise indispensable influence on government' (Ibid. p. 128). Moravcsik on the other 
hand contests that the Commission `acted on the margins' while `the broader 
outlines... were proposed, negotiated, and approved, often in advance of Commission 
initiatives, by the heads of government themselves' (Moravcsik 1991, p. 65). Both 
agree, however, that `governments are receptive because of changes in the world 
economy and shifts in the domestic political context' (Sandhaltz & Zysman 1989, 
p. 128). What each fails to explain satisfactorily is why a convergence of domestic 
policies did not occur earlier and why further integration was chosen rather than purely 
intergovernmental arrangements? 
Keohane and Hoffman combine the preference-convergence hypothesis approach of 
Moravcsik and Sandhaltz & Zysman with a refined definition of the neo-functionalist 
faithful, spillover [and supranationality] whereby; 
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`. .. expansion of 
Community tasks depends ultimately on the bargains 
between major governments; but that after such a bargain has been made, 
Community tasks can be expanded as a result of linkages among sectors, as 
envisaged by the theory' (Keohane & Hoffmann 1990a, p. 227). 
Applying this principle it is therefore possible to conceive the SEA as partly resulting 
from a spillover, not between economic sectors but `from one institutional dimension to 
another' (Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, p. 21). Hence the decision to enlarge the 
Community in 1973 and 1982 created a situation of `institutional stalemate' (Ibid. p. 22) 
in which arrangements made to accommodate six, and based upon the Luxembourg 
principle of national vetoes were making effective decision-making impossible. The 
decision to enlarge the Community therefore rather than impeding further integration, 
led to such distortions and imbalances as to force members to introduce new 
institutional arrangements, including the limited introduction of qualified majority 
voting, in order to carry through policies they perceived to be in their interests. 
The SEA also appeared to stimulate spillover, Keohane & Hoffmann point to the so 
called `Delors Package' to increase the size of the EU's budget in order to finance a 
redistribution of wealth within the newly created internal market. However, as 
Lindberg realised spillover could in fact lead to stress (Lindberg 1966, p. 254) 
particularly if it required a degree of sacrifice among the members of an integrative 
scheme. Indeed this occurred during the debates concerning reform of the EU's budget 
as negotiations split between net contributors and beneficiaries. 
Keohane and Hoffmann therefore remain sceptical believing `the 1992 program was 
much more strongly affected by the world economy outside of Europe.. . than 
it was 
driven by the internal logic of spillover' (Keohane & Hoffmann 1991, p. 19). 
Nevertheless they do attribute the success of the SEA to a combination of factors 
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including spillover, changes in the international political economy and 
`intergovernmental bargains made possible by the convergence of preferences of major 
European states' (Ibid. p. 25). 
Conclusion 
Throughout much of the above discussion, the inclusion of foreign and security/defence 
issues in the integrationist project have appeared peripheral to the EU's primarily 
economic functions. Nevertheless, the neo-functionalist concept of an 
economic/political continuum, appears to offer a useful basis for the possible inclusion 
of foreign and security policy into the integration process (Mutimer 1989). However, 
by accepting that neo-functionalism is useful in explaining periods of integration, while 
an intergovernmental interpretation accounts for periods of stasis, one could be accused 
of an ontological distortion which renders any coherent theory of integration invalid 
(Moens 1996). Indeed Moens argues that the only basis upon which security policy can 
become truly `functionally integrated, ' is through the creation of a single market for 
defence procurement. Although Moens bases his thesis on a very narrow definition of 
economic spillover, there is clearly scope for further investigation into this area. 25 In 
the mean time it remains both important and instructive to understand the integrationist 
pressure excerpted by the very process of integration itself. Empirical research may 
prove that the need to deal collectively with external problems provides the major 
impetus for integration, a need created in part by the external `presence' of the Union 
that has evolved as a result of essentially economic integration. However, it is through 
intergovernmental bargaining that integration is `allowed' to proceed, in what remains a 
member state dominated sector. In order to assess such a prognosis it is necessary to 
25 See De Vestel 1995, 
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place the CFSP within the historical context of European integration, and the processes 
and pressures that have led to the development of the second pillar of the European 
Union. This is the task of the following chapters. 
103 
Chapter Three 
Historical Background: From EDC to EPC 
In order to assess the significance and integrationalist potential of foreign and 
security policy in European integration it is instructive to look at the historical 
relationship between the Community and this sector of integration. Foreign, security 
and even defence policy have been on the European agenda since the institutional 
construction of Europe began in the late 1940s, culminating in the defeat of the 
European Defence Community (EDC), in 1954. This failure has been identified as 
marking the end of the post-war `federalist phase' of European integration (Taylor, 
1975). From this point on federalist dreams were forced, on the whole, to be content 
that the functionalist approach to integration would gradually lead to the federal goal. 
Eventually, it was hoped, national sensitivities concerning foreign and security 
policy would be overwhelmed by the logic of spillover and that external expectations 
of a concerted European action would become irresistible. Foreign policy returned 
properly to the European agenda in 1970 with the introduction of European Political 
Co-operation (EPC). This intergovernmental framework, which remained outside the 
Communities until the Single European Act in 1987, provided an alternative to 
supranational integration for policy co-ordination in this most sensitive sphere of 
state activity. 
European Defence Community 
The issue of security struck at the heart of European integration from the beginning. 
Faced with a Europe divided between two hostile superpowers, West European 
governments sought to construct an organisational structure that would unite its 
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members to the extent that war between them would be impossible and, through their 
collective effort, provide a safeguard against external threats. Consequently, in 1947, 
Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk, providing a mutual security 
guarantee in the event of a resurgence of German military power. The following 
year, in the face of Soviet efforts to increase their control of Eastern Europe, Britain 
and France were joined by the Benelux countries as signatories of the Brussels 
Treaty on Economic, Social, Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defence. 
This laid the foundations for the joint command structure of the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation (BTO), charged with providing common defence, should one of its 
members be the victim of armed attack. It also succeeded in demonstrating to the 
United States that West Europeans were serious about collective defence, with the 
effect of helping to bring the US and Canada into the talks which led to the signing 
of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on April 4th, 1949. With the subsequent 
establishment of political and military structures under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the appointment of General Eisenhower as the first 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the military organisation of the 
BTO was merged into that of NATO; thus institutionalising the military dependence 
of Western Europe on the United States for the next forty years. 
Meanwhile, the construction of purely European structures continued apace as the 
Schuman Plan initiative for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) took 
shape. The implications of this association of coal and steel producers for the future 
security of Europe were made explicit from the outset. As Jean Monnet explained, 
coal and steel had provided both a source of rivalry and the means for war between 
France and Germany in the past, therefore to `pool them across frontiers would 
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reduce their malign prestige and turn them instead into a guarantee of peace'. 
(Monnet 1978, p. 293) Moreover, the longer-term expectation that the ECSC would 
provide the basis for the future federation of Europe opened the possibility of 
harnessing German economic power and allowing Europe to resume its proper 
influence in the affairs of the Cold War world. However, within days of the 
convening of the conference to draw up the Treaty of the ECSC, the Communist 
North Koreans invaded the South of the country. This combined with Soviet 
intransigence in Berlin and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, convinced the 
American government that Soviet expansion had to be contained. In order for this to 
be achieved, not just in Europe but throughout the world, Europeans would have to 
take on more responsibility for their own defence. Consequently, it would be 
necessary for West Germany to rearm. 
Coming just five years after the end of the Second World War the very idea of a 
revived German army horrified Europeans, including many Germans themselves. 
(Monnet 1978, p. 337) Under intense pressure from the US the only acceptable 
solution to both the French and Germans was to provide for German rearmament 
within `a European Army under the authority of the political institutions of a united 
Europe. ' (Monnet's draft proposals for EDC, given to French Prime Minister Pleven, 
quoted in Monnet, 1978 p. 347) However, for the so called `Pleven Plan' to take 
shape it would be necessary for the federation of Europe `to become an immediate 
objective, ' with the political structures in place for a European minister of defence, 
responsible to a council of ministers and a common assembly (Monnet 1978, p. 343, 
347). This was recognised by the ardent federalist Alterio Spinelli who in turn 
persuaded the Italian government, who persuaded the other five governments of the 
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Coal and Steel Community, to task the High Authority of the ECSC to draw up a 
treaty for a European Political Community to complement the EDC. 
Having been ratified by West Germany and the Benelux countries, and with the 
Italians waiting for the conclusion of French ratification, the EDC Treaty collapsed. 
In August 1954 a majority in the French National Assembly, consisting mainly of 
Communists and nationalist Gaullists, voted against the EDC Treaty and the Treaty 
was abandoned. Monnet's doubts about integration through defence and the non- 
viability of a direct assault on national sovereignty in the first instance, had proved 
well founded as the EDC/EPC was defeated by those who had most to lose in a 
supranational government (Monnet 1978, p. 338). The `federal phase' of European 
integration had ended in failure. Indeed, as Pinder points out, with the defeat of the 
EDC Treaty `many doubted whether the federal idea could recover from this 
apparently decisive defeat. ' (Pinder 1995, p. 7) Henceforth it was recognised that 
`Western Europe could approach political union only indirectly, starting with 
economic and energy policies and leaving such central issues of sovereignty for the 
far distant future. ' (Menon et al 1992, p. 100) 
The failure of the federal method of integration in Europe also had important 
repercussions for the future of European security. The problem of how to manage 
German rearmament remained but the defeat of the French plan gave the British 
government the initiative. Britain had not been party to the EDC Treaty, remaining 
staunchly anti-federalist and committed to the trans-Atlantic alliance; both these 
factors were reflected in the proposed solution of British Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Anthony Eden (Monnet 1978, p. 398). At a special conference held in London in 
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September 1954, West Germany and Italy were invited to join the existing Brussels 
Treaty powers to join a revised organisation called the Western European Union 
(WEU). Under the Paris Accords which followed West Germany and Italy became 
members of the WEU and NATO. Germany was allowed to rearm, monitored by the 
WEU and restricted to military activity within the Alliance. As for the WEU, 
beyond its monitoring duties, most of its security functions were taken over by 
NATO to which it was formally subordinate on military matters. For the next thirty 
years the WEU fell into virtual disuse, other than as a forum for British co-ordination 
with EEC members, following the French vetoes on Britain's entry into the 
Community. Consequently, what Menon identifies as `the two dominant parameters 
of European security, ' during the Cold War were established: `the pre-eminence of 
NATO and the clear separation of defence issues from the institutions of European 
integration. ' (Menon 1996, p. 265) This recognition lay in direct conflict with the 
`implicit and, on occasion explicit recognition of the fact that European integration 
could not be complete without a security dimension... ' (Duke 1996, p. 169). As 
Hedley Bull pointed out; `The first business of any community is to provide for its 
own security, ' (Bull 1982, p. 156). 
European Political Co-operation 
This dichotomy was to continue throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, foreign 
policy had far from left the agenda. In 1960 French President Charles de Gaulle 
attempted to launch an intergovernmental alternative to the Community method of 
integration, the basis of which was be a common foreign policy (Piening 1997, p. 32). 
However the plan, named after French diplomat Christian Fouchet, was rejected by 
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the other member states because it was perceived as too intergovernmental and 
possibly undermining the position of the US in Europe (Nuttall 1992, p. 3). 
By the end of the 1960s, however, national, Community and international changes 
were combining to create `an accumulation of political will, ' that became `translated 
into widespread readiness to take steps towards `strengthening' and `deepening' 
European integration' (Ifestos 1987, p. 151). The end of the de Gaulle era in France 
removed the major national obstacle to further integration and enlargement. The 
other member states were willing to accept French preferences for an 
intergovernmental form of Political Co-operation in return for British membership of 
the Community. The prospect of enlargement also created pressure for steps to take 
integration forwards. Internationally, the Cold War was moving towards detente 
with the status of the US apparently undermined by nuclear parity with the Soviet 
Union and its disastrous war in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Community, through the 
establishment of the Common External Tariff, Common Commercial Policy and 
authority to make association agreements, had become `a major international actor 
with extensive involvement in international trade, international organisations (UN, 
OECD) and multilateral arrangements' (Lodge 1989, p. 227). EPC was, therefore, 
can attempt to fill the vacuum between internal and external unity and to respond to 
third parties' needs for a `European' `political' interlocutor. ' (Ifestos 1987, p. 137) 
As such EPC could be regarded as the outcome of a process of 'externalisation, ' or be 
it manifest in a structure that falls short of the supranational vision of the neo- 
functionalists, such as Schmitter (1969). 
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The declaration of the 1969 Hague Summit of the Heads of Government or State, 
proclaimed that it was necessary for a `united Europe' to assume `its responsibilities 
in the world of tomorrow' and to `make a contribution commensurate with its 
traditions and mission' (Hague Summit Declaration in Lodge 1989, p. 228). The 
means for achieving this were to be determined by a committee of political directors, 
under the chairmanship of the Belgian political director, Etienne Davignon. The 
subsequent Davignon Report was approved by foreign ministers at their summit in 
Luxembourg in October 1970. The mechanisms introduced were entirely 
intergovernmental, based upon regular meetings of foreign ministers and/or their 
political directors, with no legal obligation to reach a common position. As such 
EPC was `indicative of a change in orientation, away from the dream of achieving 
European union in the near future and towards co-operative frameworks 
characterised by pragmatism and the preponderance of nation-states' (Ifestos 1987, 
p. 137-8). Nevertheless, by apparently recognising the limits of supranational 
integration, EPC did allow co-operation between member states on issues upon 
which there was sufficient consensus and where third states expected a `European' 
response, such as the Middle East, Southern Africa and Eastern Europe. It also 
facilitated the development of a `co-operation reflex, ' where-by consultation and the 
exchange of information became a habit among officials (Nuttall 1992, p. 311-12). 
As Douglas Hurd observed when Foreign Office Minister: 
`From the top to the bottom of the Foreign Office it has become automatic for 
anyone considering a new problem, a new situation or a possible new policy 
to ask themselves what will be the attitude of the other European countries 
and how can they best be consulted' (Hurd 1981, p. 384). 
Nevertheless, the purely intergovernmental nature of Political Co-operation with the 
reluctance of certain member states to delegate authority and the need for consensus, 
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led to the continued criticism that EPC often reflected the `lowest common 
denominator, ' with `more emphasis on procedures than substance' (Tsakaloyannis 
1991, p. 37). But as Nuttall contends, the maintenance of consensus was (and still is) 
`essential for preserving confidence that the system will not develop into an effective 
competitor' to national policies (Nuttall 1992, p. 313). Moreover, Nuttall disputes the 
production of a lowest common denominator rather a `median line' is produced 
reflecting some mid-point on a sliding scale of national positions, reached as a result 
of member states adjusting their stances in order to produce a generally acceptable 
compromise. Such a process is made possible by the `club atmosphere and the 
predisposition of diplomats to regard a failure to agree as the worst of outcomes' 
(Nuttall 1992, p. 314). 
However, such decision-making mechanisms failed to produce a pro-active European 
foreign policy, being more suited to developing common policies where national 
interests happened to coincide, for example, regulations for companies operating in 
South Africa and the Venice Declaration on the Middle East. They were poorly 
suited to reacting swiftly to international crises, such as the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland. The Community's inability 
to respond effectively to these crises provided a major motivation for the reform of 
EPC, leading to the Single European Act (SEA). It was also becoming increasingly 
difficult to maintain the artificial divide between `high' and `low' politics, as 
translated into the distinction between the Community and Political Co-operation. In 
practice the Commission soon became increasingly involved in EPC business as first 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process, then the 
Euro-Arab dialogue required the employment of political and economic instruments. 
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By 1981, in the London Report, the Commission was recognised as being fully 
associated, at all levels, with EPC. 
Overall, the institutional development of EPC throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
`commenced as a trial-and-error process' (Reglesberger et al 1997, p. 3). It was not 
until the Single European Act, necessitated by the perceived need to give the process 
of integration further impetus, that EPC came formally within the EC framework, 
with its inclusion under Title III. Under Article 30, the `High Contracting Parties, ' as 
opposed to the `EC Member States' as under Titles I and II, agreed to `endeavour 
jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy' (Article 30.1). The 
Commission was confirmed as being `fully associated' with EPC (Article 30.3b). 
The European Parliament was recognised as being `closely associated, ' with the right 
to be `regularly informed... of the foreign policy issues, ' with the assurance that `the 
views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration' (Article 30.6). 
The Commission and Presidency were to share responsibility for ensuring 
consistency between EPC and Community policy (Article 30.5). For the first time 
the `political' as well as the `economic aspects of security' were mentioned (Article 
30.6a), although it did not go as far as to include the defence aspects of security 
which were left to the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance (Article 30.6c). Nevertheless, 
considering that the mere mention of security had been a `taboo for such a long time, 
the explicit reference to security co-operation in the EC is a big step forward' 
(Kirchnir 1989, p. 14). 
The most significant institutional provision of the SEA, however, was the 
establishment of a permanent Secretariat in Brussels, to `assist the Presidency in 
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preparing and implementing the activities of European Political Co-operation in 
administrative matters' (Article 30.1Og). However, although housed in the Council 
building the new Secretariat was kept separate from the Council of Ministers to 
prevent contamination from the Community (Bretherton & Vogler 1999, p. 175). 
Other than this the SEA amounted to `little more than a codification of the 
procedures previously agreed by the twelve. But elevated to legal status' (Dehouse 
& Weiler 1991, p. 188). As a result, `it left unchanged its character, its working 
methods and its legal and institutional separation from the EEC' (Ifestos 1987, 
p. 358). Indeed, overall the SEA reinforced `the assumption that European Political 
Co-operation is co-operation among sovereign states' (Pijpers et al 1998, p. 261). 
That this was sustained was, to some extent, a consequence of EPC's success in 
uniting `the participants behind a common position sufficiently loosely defined to 
allow each to add his own interpretation, so producing some forward movement 
without confronting the major obstacles ahead' (Wallace 1983, p. 6). In other words, 
it allowed for co-operation when convenient, while avoiding the need for 
supranational integration. 
EPC and Integration 
The real value of the SEA was that it `recognised EPC as an essential element of the 
process towards establishing a European Union' (Regelsberger et al 1988, p. 91). 
Indeed, by the end of the 1980s, EPC represented `a working model of 
intergovernmental co-operation without formal integration' (Wallace & Wallace 
1996, p. 417). As such it suited those states for whom EPC was perceived as a useful 
extension of their own foreign policy, i. e. principally Britain and France. From a 
federalist or integrationist perspective, however, EPC could be interpreted as a 
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disappointment, producing intergovernmental or at best confederal structures for 
foreign policy. At worst, EPC could be depicted as `malintegrative, ' stemming the 
expansion of Community-style integration (Ifestos 1987, p. 207). Certainly, EPC had 
failed either to provide a substitute for EC affairs or to supersede national foreign 
policies. But arguably the real motivation behind EPC's creation had been to `save' 
national foreign policies through a mix of co-operation and integration (Allen 1996, 
p. 289). By 1989, therefore, EPC had come to `represent a permanent feature of 
multi-level and multi-dimensional foreign policy activity in Western Europe, ' which 
combined national foreign policies, bilateral and transatlantic relations, EC external 
affairs, and Political Co-operation (ibid. ). 
However, the significance of EPC for the process of European integration should not 
be dismissed. It had, after all, been conceived in 1970 as `a pragmatic way of 
achieving a foreign policy identity alongside the economic identities of the 
Communities, avoiding the institutional quarrels which had brought to nothing earlier 
attempts' (Nuttall 1992, p. 1). Thus EPC provided a useful mechanism for promoting 
at least some degree of `unity' among the member states on the international stage, if 
falling short of actual `union' (Ifestos 1987, p. 244). As Etienne Davignon himself 
observed of EPC: `It may be so that it did not create a major impetus [towards 
integration], it did not profess to lead towards European union, but it is no less true 
that political co-operation contributed genuinely and positively to greater unity' 
(preface to Ifestos 1987, p. xiii). 
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Conclusion 
If EPC cannot, therefore, be equated to an integrative process in itself, it can at least 
be classified as a facilitator of integration by `creating the preconditions for 
integrative change' (Ifestos 1987, p. 210). Moreover, the intergovernmental 
paradigm alone fails to explain such aspects of EPC as the `co-operation reflex' and 
the (limited) involvement of the Commission (Bulmer 1991, p. 71). Indeed, EPC 
derived `much of its force from the fact that the Community appears as a single actor 
in trade negotiations, in its many association agreements and in discussions on aid... ' 
(Hurd 1981, p. 392). As a result EPC came to be characterised by the `coexistence of 
intergovernmental structures and integrative processes, ' (Ohrgaard 1997, p. 3) 
reflecting the limited pressures for integration beyond the economic sphere (Ifestos 
1987, p. 563). However, by the end of 1989, events on the EC's borders were 
conspiring to transform the post 1945 world order, under which EPC had been able 
to flourish. With the retreat of Communism and the prospect of a reunified Germany 
in a Europe no longer divided, EPC was to face its greatest challenges (in the Gulf 
and Balkans) while simultaneously undergoing the transformation into a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. 
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Chapter Four 
A Common Foreign Policy for Europe 
The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy is of dual significance in 
contributing to an understanding of the nature and development of the European 
Union, as both a sector of integration and as foreign policy per se. As such these two 
elements both contradict and enforce each other. In terms of the overall process of 
integration, `the relationship between foreign policy and the EU's internal dynamic is 
fundamental and conditional on the wider federal-intergovernmental debate, ' 
(Holland 1995a, p. 556). Consequently, federal union would be considered the 
ultimate outcome of an EU foreign policy at one end of the spectrum (Pinder 1995) 
with entrenched intergovernmentalism at the other. Unfortunately, there exists a 
tendency among those who espouse a European Foreign Policy as `a symbol of 
integration, ' to overlook `its substance and effectiveness' (Allen 1998, p. 42). Thus 
the dichotomy between CFSP as integration and as foreign policy is revealed. 
Despite the undoubted significance of non-state international actors, foreign policy is 
still `regarded as essentially an act of government and therefore exclusive to states' 
(Ibid. p. 43; Clarke & White 1989). The EU is not a state although it is state-like 
(Smith 1996a, p. 247) and through its extensive external relations is involved in much 
of what constitutes `the bread and butter of international relations' (Piening 1997, 
p. 44). 26 In broadening its relations with the outside world into the field of foreign 
policy proper i. e. into the realm of `high politics, ' the EU and its member states need 
to balance the desire for further integration (if it exists! ), with the creation of an 
effective foreign policy, that will serve to enhance rather than undermine the EU's 
26 See also Smith (1998) on the increasing significance of the EU/EC's external economic relations. 
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international standing. The Treaty on European Union is an attempt to resolve this 
dilemma, whilst also protecting the national interests of member states. Thus 
producing a further tension in the fundamental contradiction between seeking to 
maximise the external influence of the European Union and seeking to maintain 
national competence and authority in foreign policy. 
The Road to Maastricht - The rush to European Political Union 
The negotiations leading to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provide an insight 
to the factors determining the evolution of CFSP. The internal integrationalist 
dynamics of the Community, the domestic political concerns of member states, 
dramatic international events and the expectations of third countries, all combined to 
push political integration. The difficulties subsequently encountered, and the manner 
in which they were resolved, provide an insight both to the extent of integrationalist 
pressures within the EC and among its member states, and the evolving nature of 
perceived risks to security in the emerging post-Cold War world order. 
The Single European Act (1986) had stipulated a review of the provisions for 
European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1992. However, in 1989 as the Berlin 
Wall tumbled and revolution swept through Eastern Europe, over turning the Cold 
War order, the member states of the European Community (EC) found themselves 
compelled to reconsider foreign and security policy co-operation (Piening, 1997 
p. 38). The Common Foreign and Security Policy was therefore meant to represent 
`a qualitative leap forward, ' equipping the Community and its member states with 
the means to rise to the challenges and opportunities presented by the end of the Cold 
War (Eliassen, 1998 p. 44). Unfortunately, the task of formulating an effective, 
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coherent policy was to become immediately complicated by the coincidence of the 
Gulf War and the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia, with the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) established to discuss European Political Union (EPU). The 
member states therefore found themselves embarking on arguably the most 
momentous stage of European integration since the Treaty of Rome while 
simultaneously dealing with two major crises, both of which seemed to cry out for 
unified Community response. The Presidency was thus inevitably distracted by the 
urgency of immediate events at the expense of formulating detailed, coherent 
proposals that would meet both the requirements of national governments and the 
aspirations of the EC. 
The French and German governments once again provided the main impetus behind 
the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the decision to 
eventually frame a common defence policy. Proof that what ever else had changed 
the case remained, as Etienne Davignon, a former EC Commissioner observed, that 
`Nothing happens in the Community without a Paris-Bonn agreement' (Time, 
22/4/1991). However, each member government offered a different perspective on 
the desirable substance and procedural nature of a CFSP, with rarely two 
governments sharing exactly the same aspirations. German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl 
and French President, Francois Mitterrrand failed to agree on such issues as 
institutional framework and the future role of NATO and the United States. 
Moreover, all this had to be achieved within a time scale of less than two years, 
compared to the four years during which Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was 
debated and developed. 
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A further element for consideration was the position of the United States. The US 
constituted a continual presence outside the EC through out the IGC, encouraging 
both caution and progress. Western Europe had relied upon the US for security for 
over forty years and would continue to do so for many years to come. However, as 
Europeans attempted to take more responsibility for the political and even, somewhat 
tentatively, military aspects of their own security, the future of the US commitment 
to Europe and NATO was a vital consideration, if more vital to some than others. 
Internal pressures for political union pre-dated the collapse of Communism in 
Eastern Europe. The great imbalance between the Community's economic and 
political weight on the international stage was an age-old contradiction that both 
weakened the international weight of the EC and baffled governments outside the 
Community, while the distinction between external relations and foreign policy was 
itself difficult to maintain, as demonstrated by the Community's quick response to 
the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, through the provision of economic 
assistance. The decision to embark on EMU in 1988 also led the Germans, who 
found themselves paying for economic convergence while sacrificing the 
Deutschmark, to demand compensation in the political sphere. (Petersen 1993, p. 15) 
The process of spillover could therefore be identified as producing some impetuous 
towards political integration. However, it was arguably the wider, systemic changes, 
wrought by the collapse of Communism and the reunification of Germany that 
proved decisive in leading the Community further towards political union (Laursen 
1992, p. 240). The nature of that union, particularly regarding CFSP, would be 
largely determined by the policy preferences of the member states and therefore 
shaped by their domestic economic and political interests (Moravcsik, 1999a). 
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The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe had a twofold impact on the 
Community, propelling it towards a security role and disturbing the internal balance 
of member states. The removal of the traditional Soviet threat to security released 
Europe from the artificial divide of the `Iron Curtain' and increased the likelihood of 
a substantial withdrawal of American troops and military hardware from the 
continent. The emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe subsequently 
turned towards the EC for political and economic support, as the Belgian government 
recognised in its memorandum of March 1990, the Community was 'generally 
thought' to have 'special responsibility' for 'seeking solutions to the problems of 
Central and Eastern Europe' (Belgium Memorandum, 19/3/1990, reproduced in 
Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 269-275). This was illustrated by the decision of 
the Summit of the G7, meeting in Paris in July 1989, to request the EC to co-ordinate 
aid on behalf of the western industrialised nations (known as the G24), to Hungary 
and Poland. Thus the Community would require 'a capacity to take effective and 
consistent action, ' (Belgium Memorandum, 19/3/1990, reproduced in Laursen & 
Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 269-275) de facto endowing it with a security role as 
`Europe's `anchor of stability. "(Petersen 1993, p. 15) Secondly, the unforeseen 
collapse of the Berlin Wall brought the reality of German reunification on to the 
political agenda, for the first time since the late 1940s. The prospect of an enlarged 
and further empowered Germany caused concern throughout the Community, but 
particularly in France. President Mitterrand was alarmed at the speed and 
independence with which Chancellor Kohl executed the dream of every post-war 
German chancellor. The overriding aim of the French, therefore, was to anchor a 
united Germany firmly into a united Europe. This hardly marked a shift in French 
120 
policy but it did increase the urgency with which Mitterrand was willing to bend to 
the wishes of his German counter-part, who shared the desire to keep a reunified 
Germany embedded in a European political union (Martial 1992). 
The first to react to the transformed security environment and its implications for the 
EC were the Community institutions themselves. Jacques Delors, President of the 
European Commission, aired the suggestion that an IGC on political union be 
established either as part of or in parallel to the one on EMU. In a speech in Bruges 
in October 1989, one month before the Berlin Wall fell, Delors told his audience, 
`history is speeding up, and so must we' (Agence Europe, 19/10/1989). He 
suggested economic and political integration should be stepped up to include the 
formulation of a `common strategy' and the inclusion of a security policy (Agence 
Europe, 18/1/1990,23/2/1990). The European Parliament, in the two `Martin 
Reports', also called for European Political Co-operation (EPC), which lay outside 
the legal framework of the EC, to be integrated with the rest of the Community, with 
the subsequent increase in powers for the Community institutions that this would 
imply ('Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference in the Context of the 
Parliament's Strategy for European Union' Official Journal No. C96,17/4/1990). 
However, if the institutions took the initiative in suggesting reform, the real impetus 
for action came from the member states. The first governmental call for political 
integration came in the form of a memorandum from the highly federalist Belgian 
government on March 19th, 1990 (sic). However, the most important initiative 
inevitably came from the French and German governments, in a joint letter sent, on 
April 19th, to Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey, who then held the Presidency of 
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the European Council. The Franco-German letter declared that; `In the light of far 
reaching changes in Europe and in view of the completion of the single market and 
the realisation of economic and monetary union, we consider it necessary to 
accelerate the political construction of the Europe of the Twelve' (Kohl-Mitterrand 
Letter 19/4/1990, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, p. 276). It therefore 
called for the convening of a second IGC, to run parallel to the one on EMU, to 
commence in December at the Rome Summit. This second IGC would deal 
essentially with four issues; reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the 
Community; making Community institutions more effective; ensuring unity and 
cohesion in the economic, monetary and political spheres; and would `define and 
implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy' (ibid. ). The letter received an 
enthusiastic welcome from foreign ministers at a meeting, originally intended to 
discuss German reunification, at a special European Council meeting in Dublin a few 
days later. French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, and his German counter-part, 
Hans-Dietricht Genscher, summed up the general feeling at a press conference when 
they explained the need for a `quantum leap' towards political union; `In the light of 
what is happening in Europe the moment is particularly opportune to advance the 
Community in this direction. ' (Financial Times, 23/4/1990). Chancellor Kohl also 
made explicit the connection between German and European integration; `We are at 
present at a decisive break-through towards European unity. A dream is being 
realised, to see German unity and European unity being built together' (Financial 
Times, 26/4/1990). 
The only cautionary messages came from the British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, who, clearly oblivious to the linkage, urged heads of state to concentrate 
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more upon practical issues such as German reunification, and less on `esoteric' 
things (Financial Times, 20/4/1990). Perhaps more surprising was the cautious note 
sounded by Jacques Delors, who advised that; `The Community's degree of maturity 
is not yet such that political union can be treated the same as monetary union' 
(Financial Times, 27/4/1990). Nevertheless the proposal for a second IGC was 
formally adopted at the Dublin Summit in June, although there was no substantive 
discussion of underlying issues. The difficulty remained, as Dumas had pointed out 
prior to the summit, that while, `Everyone now agrees we now have to make a 
qualitative leap. No country is willing to give up sovereignty on foreign policy and 
security matters... '(Financial Times, 21/5/1990). Thus, external pressure on the 
traditional security concerns of the member states was to exert inexorable pressure 
for political integration, itself a logical extension of economic integration already 
underway with EW. 
Unfortunately for the debate on political union, within weeks of the Italian 
government taking over the presidency from the Irish, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 
August 2 "a. The Community's initial response was swift and united. It adopted 
economic sanctions against Iraq before the United Nations Security Council; 
mobilised the Western European Union (WEU) to co-ordinate military missions in 
the Gulf; refused to close its embassies in Iraq; and through the decision to treat 
hostages as a matter of concern for the Community as a whole de facto introduced 
the principal of European citizenship. Most importantly, however, matters of 
defence and security were, contrary to the provisions of the SEA, discussed within 
the Community framework for the first time. Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De 
Michelis, was in no doubt that the crisis in the Gulf provided the EC with an 
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`exceptional chance to demonstrate unity' (Newsweek, 17/9/1990). However, once 
the crisis moved from the economic-diplomatic to the military-diplomatic phase, the 
consensus soon began to crumble. EC ministers failed to agree to send financial 
assistance to the United Sates' military effort, on the reasonable grounds that burden 
sharing entailed a share in decision making that the US was unwilling to concede. 
Agreement was, however, reached on a multi-billion dollar package of aid to those 
countries most affected by the embargo on Iraq, including Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and 
curtain eastern and central European states. As for the deployment of the EC 
member states' own military forces, the WEU was entrusted with the co-ordination 
of `overall operational concepts and specific guidelines for co-ordination between 
forces in the region, including areas of operation, sharing tasks, logistical support and 
exchange of intelligence' (WEU Communique, Financial Times, 22/8/1990). This 
leadership role, however, failed to materialise, as each country sending troops 
preferred to deal directly and independently with the US. 
British policy-makers instinctively turned towards the United States rather than their 
European partners. In September Britain sent six thousand combat troops to Saudi 
Arabia, without consulting the other eleven, and in direct contradiction with the EC's 
policy of applying pressure on Suddam Hussein through an embargo. In November, 
whilst on a visit to Washington DC, Prime Minister John Major offered his full 
support to the US if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait before the UN imposed 
deadline of January 15th. When war broke out Britain had the second largest force in 
the region, after the US, under the command of American General Swaartzkopf. 
Throughout the crisis Britain supported the US in the UN and opposed any French 
initiative calculated to annoy America. `Thus in the final analysis, the British 
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government believed that its national interests could best be protected by aligning 
itself with the US at the expense of EC solidarity' (Wood, 1993 p. 232) 
The French government, contrary to much of its rhetoric, was also to pursue an 
independent line, loosing interest in EPC mechanisms when it met with opposition to 
its various diplomatic efforts. Mitterrand's policy `was guided by traditional Gaullist 
principles including the protection of French political and economic interests, 
independence from American policies, and a special role of interlocutor between the 
Arab world and the west to support French `grandeur' and `rank'. (Wood, 1992 p. 44) 
If faced with the choice of remaining actively involved in the developing crisis or 
accepting the leadership of the US, the necessity of remaining a key player in the 
Middle East meant Mitterrand was prepared to accept some degree of co-ordination 
with the Americans. Consequently when French troops were sent to the region, 
under `Operation Daguet, ' Mitterrand made it clear that they were under US tactical 
control only and that he alone issued direct orders. On the diplomatic front the 
French preferred the forum of the United Nations where they constantly managed to 
upset the British and American governments with their unilateral attempts to 
negotiate peace with Iraq based upon `linkage' with a wider Middle Eastern 
settlement. 
The German response failed to bode any better for the effectiveness of EPC. 
Shackled by its constitution, which forbade the use of German forces for `defence 
purposes' outside the NATO area, and pacifist public and government opinion, 
Germany was preoccupied with reunification and consolidating its relations with 
Eastern Europe. On August 20th, Kohl announced that the German contribution 
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would be confined to monetary aid and logistical support. This did eventually 
include full use of naval and air bases, the dispatching of troops and aircraft to 
Turkey and billions of $US to front line Arab countries, Britain and the US. 
Ultimately, however, German action or inaction undermined the cohesion of the EC 
and EPC as much as the independent policies of Britain and France. But Germany 
was in a no-win situation; as Karsten Voigt pointed out: `The people who are now 
urging the Germans to participate in the Gulf are the same people who have been 
worrying about Germany's becoming a military power' (Time, 8/10/1990). 
The Gulf War had a dual impact upon the debate on the future of a common foreign 
and security policy; it `constituted a serious question mark for EC ambitions of a 
foreign and security policy, it also provided a rationale for strengthening co- 
operation' (Petersen, 1993 p. 17). John Major, for example, claimed that the Gulf 
War demonstrated that as far as the development of CFSP was concerned, `Europe is 
not ready and we should not be too ambitious when it comes to the 
intergovernmental conference on political union. ' (Financial Times, 2/2/1991) 
Whereas Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's foreign minister, claimed that the lack of co- 
ordination in the Gulf demonstrated `the absolute necessity of giving the EC a 
common foreign and security policy. '(ibid. ) Jacques Delors agreed with Poos's 
analysis that the war had acted as a `catalyst' out of which `awareness of the need for 
a common policy only grew as the crisis unfolded. ' (Time, 22/4/1991) The 
experience of the war also brought the idea of European defence to the fore, as it was 
recognised that a common foreign and security policy would be worthless without 
the means of implementation. As one senior French diplomat observed, `Suddam 
Hussein has helped us to understand that Europe needs defence and not just a strong 
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balance of payments. ' (Financial Times, 22/10/1990) Thus as the IGC on Political 
Union was formally convened in Rome in December there was a broad consensus on 
the need for a common foreign and security policy. However, the summit document 
itself was vague in its reference merely to orientations on security and defence 
policy, suggesting 'gradual extensions' of the Union's common security and 
considering a role in defence, with due regard for the Atlantic Alliance and the 
traditional stance of member states (European Council, Rome, Presidency 
Conclusions, 14-15/12/1990, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 318- 
321). 
By the beginning of February 1991 the foreign ministers of the Twelve had agreed 
that the experiences of the Gulf War made the development of a common foreign and 
security policy more, not less, of an imperative. Even British Foreign Secretary, 
Douglas Hurd, acknowledged the `need to go on towards a more effective common 
foreign policy. ' He accepted in principle the idea of a common security policy, but 
cautioned against any attempt to `catapult' the EC into defence where a consensus 
did not exist (Financial Times, 26/2/1991). Meanwhile, French and German 
ministers put forward a joint plan backed by the Commission and several other 
member states, proposing that the European Council should be given the authority to 
decide, by unanimity, what areas of foreign policy should be made common. 
Foreign ministers could then decide how to implement these decisions by majority 
vote. European defence co-ordination would be left initially to the WEU, to which 
nine of the Twelve belonged, and which would develop steadily closer links with the 
EC 'thus enabling the WEU, with a view to being part of Political Union in course, to 
progressively develop the European common security policy on behalf of the Union. ' 
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(Franco-German Proposals on Political Union: Security policy co-operation in the 
framework of the common foreign and security policy of political Union, February 
1991, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 333-335). 
This joint initiative, however, papered over some significant differences between the 
member states and, not least between France and Germany. Broadly speaking the 
debate centred around two issues: `(1) intergovernmentalism vs. the Community 
method, and, (2) Altanticism vs. Europeanism. ' (Petersen, 1993 p. 23) 
Intergovernmental Federal 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Atlanticist Denmark The Netherlands 
(Ireland)27 
Germany 
Belgium 
European France Luxembourg 
Spain 
Greece 
Intergovernmental vs. Federal and Atlanticist vs. European positions on security among the Twelve 
leading to Maastricht. 
The most conservative position combined the intergovernmental and Atlanticist 
positions, and was held most notably by Great Britain. While accepting the need for 
closer co-ordination of foreign policy the British government felt it unnecessary to 
move far beyond the existing intergovernmental mechanisms of EPC. Majority 
voting in foreign policy was considered an anathema, even to the limited extent 
27 As a neutral Ireland was not a member of NATO but in order to maintain its neutrality preferred the 
status quo, keeping defence out of the Community. 
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proposed by France and Germany; British policy-makers in particular remained 
sceptical about the practicality of the distinction between policy formulation and 
implementation (interview, FCO, 21/8/1997). For example, the decision to send 
troops to a conflict zone would be taken by majority, but would the decision to 
withdraw those troops then be a matter of policy or implementation? Britain also 
preferred the status quo in defence that meant maintaining the primacy of NATO. In 
a letter to the Italian Presidency in December 1990, Hurd accepted that the inevitable 
reduction in US military presence in Europe implied `a greater European 
responsibility' for the defence. But, he also stressed that NATO remained `a vital 
asset which the western democracies must not neglect... European security without 
the US simply does not make sense' (Financial Times, 11/12/1990). Portugal's 
position came close to the British, and for reasons of their own Denmark and Ireland 
also belonged to the more conservative group. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum were those states preferring a more 
communitarian approach to foreign policy-making and the development of a distinct 
European defence identity, within the Atlantic Alliance. These states included the 
most pro-federalist states; Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain and Greece. Germany 
found itself torn between the two camps with its support of the US and NATO on the 
one hand and France and EC on the other28. On the whole, however, Germany 
belonged to the pro-federal revisionist school. France and the Netherlands formed 
cross-categories of their own. For the French, the revolutions in Eastern Europe and 
the impending re-unification of Germany, threatened the very basis upon which the 
Fifth Republic had based its foreign and security policy; primarily the containment of 
28 For example, Van Wijnberg attributes the watering down of the Franco-German defence initiative at 
the NATO Summit in Rome, November 1991, to Chancellor Kohl's attempt to accommodate 
American concerns (Van Wijnberg 1992, p. 52) 
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Germany and the development an intergovernmental, European defence identity. 
Mitterrand therefore continued France's traditional hostility to the American presence 
in Europe, anxious to see NATO replaced by a European alternative, while, in 
contrast to the other Europeanists, preferring a distinctly intergovernmental approach 
to decision-making, focusing on the primacy of the European Council in defining 
foreign and security policy (Martial 1992, pp. 115-116). On the other hand the Dutch 
preferred the Community method where possible, wary of the power of the bigger 
states in the Council; but as strong supporters of the Atlantic Alliance, resisted any 
measure calculated to undermine NATO29. 
The first draft for the Treaty on Political Union was presented by the Luxembourg 
Presidency in the form of a `non-paper' (Agence Europe, 3/5/1991). The draft opted 
for the so-called `temple' structure that separated the intergovernmental CFSP and 
co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs, and the European Community into three 
distinct pillars, which together formed the European Union. It was on the whole `a 
well judged package deal which provided a firm framework for future negotiations 
and determined the shape and much of the content of the eventual Treaty' (Pryce, 
1994 p. 47). Britain, France and Denmark approved of this structure, although not 
necessarily the contents of the draft. But at least seven other states, supported by the 
Commission and the European Parliament were dissatisfied with the temple 
structure, fearing that the intergovernmentalism of CFSP and Justice and Home 
Affairs would spread to the Community, endangering the aquis communautaire. 
29 This was reflected in both of the Dutch Draft Treaties and also helped the Dutch Prime Minister, 
Ruud Lubbers, mediate between federalist and Atlanticist countries (particularly Britain). (Laursen 
1992, p. 244) 
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The second Luxembourg draft presented in mid-June made a number of concessions 
to the majority view (sic). The three-pillared structure was retained but in the 
preamble it affirmed that; `The union shall be served by a single institutional 
framework which shall ensure... consistency and continuity. ' It also referred to `a 
process leading gradually to a union with a federal goal, ' including `the eventual 
framing of a defence policy. ' (Draft Treaty on the Union from the Luxembourg 
Presidency, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 358-406). Both these 
suggestions outraged the British government, who were dissatisfied with the 
provision to review the status of the WEU in 1996 and the proposed introduction of 
limited qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign and security policy. However, a 
clash was avoided at the ensuing Summit in Luxembourg, as other government 
leaders, particularly Chancellor Kohl, were reluctant to add to John Major's domestic 
difficulties, in the hope that a breathing space would allow the British to adopt a 
more positive stance (interview, FCO, 21/8/1997). The end result, one British 
minister admitted, 'pointed in the right direction' (interview, 9/10/1997). Overall, 
however, ministers had found themselves more concerned with dealing with the 
deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia (Agence Europe, 1/8/1991). Consequently no 
agreement on political union was reached at Luxembourg causing the Dutch Prime 
Minister, Ruud Lubbers, on the eve of his own presidency to remark; `I leave 
Luxembourg with the feeling that it will be difficult to get an agreement at 
Maastricht' (The Economist, 1/7/1991) 
Unfortunately for Lubbers and his team the new security order in Europe was already 
proving far from secure. The prospects of an agreement were thus to become further 
complicated from mid-1991 as the disintegration of Yugoslavia led to the outbreak of 
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a bloody civil war, right on the EC's door step. Initially the crisis appeared to 
present the perfect opportunity for the EC to make amends for its poor showing in 
the Gulf. This was a European problem for which there was surely a European 
solution. The initial response of the Twelve was to use traditional EC economic 
measures, threatening to suspend its financial protocol and association agreement 
with the Federal government unless the fighting stopped. When this strategy failed 
to have any affect the Heads of Government decided at the Luxembourg Summit not 
to recognise Croatia and Slovenia's declarations of independence and despatched a 
`troika' of foreign ministers from Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to discuss a 
peace settlement. The objective was clear, as John Major explained; `the first prize 
is to keep the Yugoslav federation together' (Financial Times, 29/6/1991). 
Initially, the diplomatic mission, its task to ensure a united Yugoslavia, democratic 
reforms and an immediate ban on the use of force, appeared to meet with success, 
when, on June 3 0th, the warring sides agreed to cease-fire and a three month 
suspension of the declarations of independence. Jacques Poos was inspired to 
declare: `This is the hour of Europe, not the Americans'. If the Yugoslavs want to 
enter the Europe of the twentieth century, they have to follow our advice. '(Financial 
Times, 1/7/1991) Unfortunately the Yugoslavs themselves were less convinced and 
the cease-fire soon broke down. Nevertheless, two diplomatic missions later and 
following the introduction of an EC arms embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia and 
the suspension of the financial protocols, all sides did agree to sign a joint 
declaration, on the island of Brioni, on July 7th. Under the terms of the Brioni accord 
all participants reaffirmed their commitment to the EC's proposals of June 30th and 
agreed that a fifty-member EC observer mission, as requested by the CSCE, would 
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be sent to monitor the cease-fire in Slovenia and possibly Croatia. The troika had 
succeeded in its mission - fighting had stopped in Slovenia, thanks also to the 
military successes of the Slovenians themselves, and a breathing space had been won 
in which to prepare for a peace conference. (Nuttall, 1994 p. 15) However, no 
progress had been made in finding a lasting solution acceptable to all sides. The 
EC's continued commitment to the retention of a single Yugoslav federation 
effectively gave the Serbs a blank cheque, an impression reinforced by the blanket 
application of the arms embargo that inevitably favoured the Serbs who had access to 
the Yugoslav army's resources. The inability to find a viable solution lead to `a 
deepening of the crisis and the slow breakdown of European consensus on the 
Yugoslav issue. ' (Wood, 1993 p. 234) 
Germany, supported by France and Italy, was keen to build upon Brioni with the 
convening of a peace conference as soon as possible. Britain and the Netherlands 
were more cautious, preferring to wait until a cease-fire had been fully implemented. 
However, under German pressure and after much frantic diplomacy on the part of the 
Dutch, another cease-fire was brokered between the Serbs and Croats at the end of 
August. A conference was called at The Hague on September 7 tß', under the 
chairmanship of Lord Carrington. The conference team was to remain in place after 
the alternation of the EC presidency, thus allowing for a degree of continuity that 
EPC initiatives had previously lacked. Unfortunately it was not to succeed in 
bringing peace to Yugoslavia because, as Simon Nuttall explains, the conference 
relied upon the will of the Yugoslavs themselves to reach a settlement, a will patently 
lacking as the immediate breaches of cease-fires demonstrated (Nuttall 1994, p. 16). 
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The next intra-Community conflict arose over the question of military intervention. 
In July the French and Italians had called for the WEU to consider sending a military 
force to reinforce the observer missions in implementing a cease-fire. Germany 
supported the proposals, although no German troops could actually be assigned to 
any task force. Britain, Spain and Greece opposed the plan. A WEU meeting on 
August 7th therefore agreed merely to `continue its reflections. ' (Wood 1993, p. 235) 
In September the Dutch made similar proposals, which were discussed at consecutive 
meetings of the EC and WEU councils. The plan failed to gain unanimous approval, 
a prerequisite recognised even by the French, and in November the UN Security 
Council was asked to provide a peacekeeping force for the region (Nuttall, 1994 
p. 23). 
The EC lacked two essential resources when it came to dispatching troops -a 
military force to send and the will to send it. Of the two the latter was decisive (ibid. 
p. 22). The EC would have to develop a common or even single foreign policy before 
it could contemplate extending its competence into the defence aspects of security. 
Instead of reviving the EC's international reputation after the debacle of the Gulf 
War, the EC's failure to formulate a solution to a European problem served only to 
highlight the dilemma faced by what Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, 
described as `an economic giant, a political pygmy and a military lava. ' (Time, 
22/4/1991) Recognised by the outside world as possessing the weight through its 
economic might to become involved in negotiations but lacking any central, defining 
authority the Community was incapable of designing and implementing a specific 
strategy beyond the broad desire for peace. Nevertheless an important precedent had 
been set; that of the Community acting independently to intervene politically and 
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diplomatically within its immediate sphere (Holland, 1994 p. 136). As was the case 
with the Gulf War, the Yugoslavian experience `increased the caution with which 
enthusiasts for CFSP approached the Maastricht Treaty and persuaded Atlanticists 
that greater attention to European alternatives was a necessary precaution' (Menon et 
al. 1992, p. 114) 
Meanwhile, the Dutch Presidency also had to contend with the on going IGCs. In an 
ill conceived move the Dutch, principally under the instigation of their ministerial 
negotiator, Piet Dankert, took the opportunity to produce their own federalist non- 
paper radically altering the Luxembourg draft30. The three pillars were abandoned in 
favour of a structure encompassing both CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs within 
a single Community structure, with increased powers for the European Parliament 
and Commission. Those areas of foreign policy upon which the member states 
agreed to act jointly would therefore be subject to QMV and the Commission given 
the `joint' right of initiative, as opposed to the exclusive right of initiative it enjoyed 
in other Community policy-making. On the issue of defence the Atlanticist Dutch 
dropped references to the WEU's eventual submersion into a European union, 
referring instead to `the eventual framing of a defence policy' to be examined by 
1996, and remaining complementary to the `North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and 
the Western European Union, which will continue to contribute in a significant 
30 According to one British official the Dankert Draft seriously jeopardised the prospects of agreement 
at Maastricht: 'When the Dutch took over nothing happened for a long time, no meetings, no 
discussions, no progress. Then in September we began to hear the reason for this which was that the 
Dutch were working on a different unitary text, which they were talking to the Germans about but 
nobody else. They presented this draft, despite the warning signals that this would not be an 
appropriate basis with which to take negotiations forward. They presented it in late December and 
almost everyone ganged up on them. . . with a great deal of obvious reluctance they eventually 
dropped 
it' (interview, FCO, 21/8/1997). 
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fashion to security and stability' (The External Relations Part of the First Dutch Draft 
Treaty, 30/9/1991, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 407-412). 
The result was a complete breakdown in negotiations. Britain, France, Denmark and 
Portugal found the lumping together of everything into one Community abhorrent. 
France, together with Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium, disliked the proposal's 
feebleness on defence (The Economist, 21/9/1991). In the end, following Germany's 
decampment to the French position, only Belgium supported the Dutch draft. With 
just ten weeks remaining before an agreement would have to be reached at 
Maastricht, the Dutch were forced to swallow their pride and, on September 3Oth, 
withdrew their draft. Negotiators therefore returned their attentions to the 
Luxembourg draft for which there was now considerably more enthusiasm than there 
had been in June! 
The debate on foreign policy continued to revolve around the desirability and extent 
of the application of QMV. The British persisted in their argument that foreign 
policy represented a unique area of policy-making, in which states' national interests 
were inexorably linked and could not therefore be compromised. However, despite 
reservations on the applicability of a distinction between policy formation and 
implementation, the British proved ultimately amenable on this issue, in return for 
the removal of any reference to the Community's `federal goal' from the treaty 
preamble. 
In the final stages of negotiations the defence debate focused on two bilateral 
declarations, one from Britain and Italy, the other, somewhat inevitably, from France 
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and Germany. On October 5th Britain and Italy presented their initiative in which 
Britain explicitly recognised for the first time that `political union implies the gradual 
elaboration and implementation of a common foreign policy and a stronger European 
defence identity, with the longer term perspective of a common defence policy... ' 
However, this would remain, at all times `... compatible with the common defence 
policy we already have with our allies in NATO. ' The WEU would fulfil the dual 
task of providing the `defence component' of the EC, which it had assumed de facto 
during the Yugoslav crisis, and `the means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Alliance. ' It would be not, therefore, be subordinate to either organisation, but 
would take action based upon the decisions of both the European and North Atlantic 
councils and work towards `intensified coordination' and complementarity of 
decision-making processes, thus providing a bridge between NATO and the 
European Union. A European Rapid Reaction Force was proposed, which would be 
able to undertake military operations, such as peacekeeping, outside the NATO area 
and employing autonomous planning and political control; there would, therefore, be 
no duplication of, or competition with, NATO. Indeed NATO was to remain `the 
key component in the development of a system of security including the whole of 
Europe' (An Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security and Defence, 
5/10/1991, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 413-414)31 
31 While consistent with the British approach to European defence, this joint initiative was in sharp 
contrast to an earlier Italian proposal that had asserted the need to `extend the competences of the 
Union to all aspects of security without limitations. ' Consequently, the `proposal to transfer the 
competences presently being exercised by WEU would in this respect only be a logical consequence 
of the decision to realise a qualitative improvement in the process of European integration. ' (Italian 
Proposal on Common Foreign and Security Policy, 18/9/1990, reproduced in Laursen & 
Vanhoonacker 1992, p. 292). One possible explanation for this apparent change in orientation is 
provided by a former British Foreign Office minister who suggests that Douglas Hurd approached 
Gianni De Michelis with the idea of presenting the French and Germans with a counter-proposal, thus 
providing the Italians the kind of major policy initiative which they sought in order to assert 
themselves as one of the key big players in Europe (interview, 9/10/1997). From the perspective of 
the Italian government, therefore, it would appear that jostling for position 
in intra-community politics took precedence over issue-specific interests. 
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Not to be out done the French and German governments issued their own set of 
proposals in a letter to the Dutch Presidency. In contrast to the Anglo-Italian 
declaration, this text identified the formation of a common defence as among the 
ambitions of the European Union. The WEU, which forms `an integral part of the 
process of European union, ' would therefore be strengthened as `a full partner in the 
process of European unification, whose goal is union. ' As a result it would be 
necessary to for the EU to `assume increasing responsibility in the area of defence, 
through the `step-by-step building of the WEU as a component of the Union's 
defence. ' The implication was that a common defence policy would eventually be 
elaborated in the EC's institutions rather than in NATO. Moreover, the existing 
Franco-German brigade was to be expanded with the addition of troops from other 
WEU member states to become `the model for closer military co-operation between 
the WEU member states. ' (Franco-German Initiative on Foreign Security and 
Defence Policy, 11/10/1991, reproduced in Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992, pp. 415- 
418) This new `Europe-corps, ' or embryonic European army (Menon et al 1992, 
p. 110), would be operational within, as well as outside, the NATO area, thereby 
potentially duplicating NATO's role and symbolising French ambitions to build a 
European defence completely unencumbered by any American interference. The 
Germans, however, were at pains to assure that these plans would in fact 
`complement rather than compete with NATO' by bringing the French closer to the 
Atlantic Alliance (The Daily Telegraph, 17/10/1991). 
German caution was indicative of the dilemma Germany faced in simultaneously 
promoting its European ambitions, in alliance with the French, while remaining fully 
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committed to NATO and its important relationship with the United States. The main 
conflict over defence integration therefore focused around Britain and France and 
their very different perceptions of the American presence in Europe. Douglas Hurd 
had no doubt that, `when all is considered and debated, the best, cheapest and safest 
way to organise European defence is close alliance with the United States' (The 
Daily Telegraph, 6/11/1991). Indeed the importance of the United States in the 
formulation of any future European security arrangement, made it `an active external 
player throughout the IGC, across the whole of the foreign and security policy 
dossier. ' The success of the parallel negotiations taking place within NATO to 
design the New Strategic Concept also, therefore, became `a precondition for 
successful agreement among the twelve' (Forster & Wallace, 1996 p. 422). This was 
reflected in the communique on defence, issued at the Luxembourg Summit, which 
outlined the immediate task of the IGC as to work out `common guidelines' for the 
NATO summit in November, before it could decide how to strengthen the EC's 
`defence identity. ' (Financial Times, 1/7/1991) 
The American government had always supported the principle of Europeans taking 
more responsibility for their own security, providing NATO remained unchallenged. 
In December 1990, William H. Taft, US Ambassador to NATO, issued a stern 
warning to Europeans: `The US public won't understand any proposal to replace 
NATO with a different mechanism to undertake its fundamental role of deterrence 
and defense' (Wall Street Journal, 18/10/1991). It was a warning Europe could not 
afford to ignore. In the first place American withdrawal from Europe would require 
Europeans to shoulder the full cost of their own defence, something they had 
traditionally been reluctant to do (Allen & Smith, 1991). Moreover, the European 
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allies lacked the military technology and hardware necessary for independence from 
the US. As Dominique Moisi observed, `Europeans are independent in economic 
terms but not yet autonomous as far as security is concerned' (Time, 8/10/1990). 
However, as the debate within the Community progressed US policy-makers, 
witnessing the continued collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact combined 
with domestic pressure to cut defence spending, began to look more favourably on 
the European proposals. As one US official observed, in October 1991; `At first we 
saw competition between NATO and the EC. But the more we've looked at it 
recently, the more we've seen the complementary nature of the two' (Wall Street 
Journal, 18/10/1991) 
However, tensions remained. The US viewed with suspicion the Franco-German 
plan for a Euro-corps, wary that it was intended to supplant, rather than complement 
NATO, preferring instead the Anglo-Italian proposal of a European Rapid Reaction 
Force. Some sharp exchanges ensued at the NATO summit on the 7th-8th November, 
with US President George Bush at one point challenging Europeans to tell him there 
and then if they wished the Americans to leave Europe (Newsweek, 9/12/1991). 
Nevertheless an agreement was reached in which a distinctive European defence 
identity was recognised within the context of NATO's primacy: 
`The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European 
integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of the 
European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. 
The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected 
in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only 
serve the interests of the European states but also reinforces the integrity and 
effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole' (New Strategic Concept, para. 3) 
The WEU was to fulfil the role envisaged for it by the Anglo-Italian plan, forming 
both `the defence component of the process of European unification' and providing 
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`a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance' (Rome Declaration on 
Peace and Co-operation, para. 7). Meanwhile, NATO would continue as `the 
essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on 
policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the 
Washington Treaty' (New Strategic Concept, para. 22). President Bush left Rome 
having declared; `European's long-term security is intertwined with America's, and 
NATO remains the best means to assure it' (Wall Street Journal, 7/11/1991) 
Following on from the NATO summit Britain and France found themselves capable 
of moving slightly closer to agreement. At a meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels 
at the beginning of December, Douglas Hurd agreed to allow ministers to decide, by 
unanimity, to act together on certain foreign policy issues which once agreed would 
be binding on member governments. However he refused to agree to the inclusion in 
the treaty of a list of subjects on which common policies would be obligatory, and 
continued to reject QMV on the implementation of common policies. On defence, 
Hurd accepted that the WEU `should be an integral part of the development of the 
European Union, ' providing a declaration clarifying the WEU's role was attached to 
the treaty at Maastricht. The British could not accept the French desire to 
`subordinate' the WEU to the Community that they feared constituted an attempt to 
undermine NATO. Mr. Dumas indicated that France could accept a closer 
relationship between NATO and the WEU but remained suspicious of British 
opposition to their plans for a Franco-German army. Finally ministers spent five 
hours debating the wording of the Treaty; France and Germany wanted the goal of `a 
common defence, ' while Britain would only accept `common defence policies' (The 
Economist, 7/12/1991). 
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Despite the many differences, when the heads of state and government met at 
Maastricht, there was very little discussion of the substantive issues surrounding 
CFSP, as the participants found themselves concerned with the more contentious 
issues surrounding EMU and social policy. Policy over-load was not a new 
phenomenon but in 1990 and 1991 its level had been unprecedented. The Twelve 
found themselves embarking on a reactive common foreign and security policy 
before they were able to discuss its consequences. It was unfortunate that as the EC 
tried to adapt itself to a new world `order' the old order continued to collapse, 
bringing great uncertainty in the Soviet Union and war in Yugoslavia; a task fraught 
with all the dangers of `changing an axle on a moving train. ' (Howe, 1996 p. 23) 
That the EC failed to co-ordinate a solution to the Yugoslav crisis was not entirely 
due to its own weaknesses, indeed the failure of European foreign policy could be 
attributed as much to the failings of the member states themselves, who came up with 
divergent policies that no institutional structure would have been able to resolve 
(interview, FCO, 21/8/1997). In the interests of Community solidarity the Twelve 
mistakenly pursued the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation, which served 
largely to strengthen the position of the Serbs and put Germany in conflict with the 
majority view over the recognition of the breakaway republics. But if the various 
Yugoslav nationalities themselves were unwilling to reach a settlement, as events 
seemed to suggest, it is doubtful that a more forceful European response would have 
produced a more positive result. In the Gulf War the EC had simply found itself out 
of its depth, causing member states to retreat to their familiar national stances. The 
negotiations leading to the summit at Maastricht inevitably suffered. The proper 
discussion and resolution of national differences was severely hampered by ongoing 
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international crises that demonstrated both the need for and the obstacles to 
developing common policy. By the time Heads of State and Government met at 
Maastricht the overriding aim was to reach an agreement, almost irrespective of what 
that agreement might actually produce. 
Maastricht Provisions on the Common Foreign & Security Policy32 
The Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7th February 1992, boldly 
proclaims that the newly established European Union intends 'to assert its identity on 
the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common 
foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which in time might lead to a common defence. ' (Article B) Such bold treaty 
language could be interpreted as reflecting the supersedence of the state as the focus 
for security in Europe and the shift of emphasis on security wrought by globalisation 
and the end of the Cold War. Inevitably, however, given the vociferous nature of the 
debate prior to Maastricht, the provisions of Title V of the Treaty, which form the 
second pillar of the Union, provide a compromise between the intergovernmentalists 
and the more federally minded member states. Consequently, the federalists were 
able to point to the increased role for the Commission, the introduction of qualified 
majority voting (QMV), and the addition of defence into the treaties. Meanwhile the 
intergovernmentalists stressed the continuing primacy of the Council and Presidency, 
the very limited nature of QMV, and the explicit commitment to the maintenance of 
NATO as the primary organisation for European defence. The political compromise 
involved inevitably coloured the nature of the resulting common policies. The 
Maastricht formula remains far short of the single foreign and security policy that a 
32 See Appendix A for TEU Provisions for CFSP. 
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federal union requires. Whether the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
represents a step in the direction of federation, or marks the beginning of the end of 
post-World War Two attempts build a United States of Europe remains to be proven. 
With CFSP established, its objectives are set out in Article J. 1 to cover 'all areas of 
foreign and security policy. ' This represents a qualitative leap beyond the former 
EPC that limited itself to the political and economic aspects of security. Its 
objectives are broadly defined, concerning traditional 'national' security interests and 
as such contain no surprises: 
" to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union; 
" to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; 
" to preserve peace and security, in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris 
Charter; 
" to promote international co-operation; 
" to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Clearly, there could not be any `disagreement about such anodyne `motherhood and 
apple pie' aims. ' (Cameron 1999, p. 25) 
These objectives are to be fulfilled through traditional co-operation between the 
member states and joint actions in areas of common interest. As under EPC, member 
states are 'to support the Union's external and security policy actively and 
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unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity' while refraining from 'any 
action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its 
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. ' It is the responsibility of 
the Council to ensure that these principles are adhered to (Article J. 1 (4)). Member 
states are also required to support common positions and co-ordinate their action in 
international organisations (Article J. 2 (3)). Member states who belong to 
organisations to which not all EU states belong, are obliged to keep the other states 
fully informed of any matters of common interest and uphold the interests of the 
Union. This includes members of the United Nations Security Council and the 
permanent members of the Security Council, providing this does not conflict with the 
provisions of the UN Charter (Article J. 5 (4)). 
The common position differs little from its EPC predecessor, whereby the Council 
defines a common position which member states must then conform to in their 
national policies (Article J. 2 (2)). However, it is the joint action which provides the 
'most notable shift from a purely intergovernmental form of improved political co- 
operation to an approach commensurate with an embryonic 'communautarized' 
common foreign policy, ' (Holland 1994, p. 127). Exactly what constitutes a joint 
action is nowhere defined, but its adoption is a complicated procedure. The Council 
decides, following general guidelines from the European Council, the scope, 
objectives, duration and means of implementation for a joint action (Article J. 3 (1)). 
Having decided to act the Council may then decide unanimously to apply qualified 
majority voting 'when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its 
development' (Article J. 3 (2)). While superficially appearing to facilitate decision- 
making, the true benefits of such a device to avoid the pit-falls of unanimity are 
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unclear, as a state is unlikely to vote in favour of being outvoted on a matter of any 
great significance. Indeed it is arguable that Declaration 27, attached to the TEU, 
agreeing that member states will 'avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a 
qualified majority exists in favour of that decision, ' combined with peer pressure 
could prove more effective in forcing through a decision (Duff et al. 1994, p. 96). A 
further deterrent against agreement is the commitment of member states to a joint 
action once it is agreed. Amendments can only be made following a change of 
circumstances which have a 'substantial effect' on a joint action, which is then 
reviewed by the Council; if the Council has not acted the joint action remains 
(Article J. 3 (3)). States therefore have to be very sure about a joint action before 
they commit themselves (Lodge 1993, p. 246). If a state does decide to take 
unilateral action it must first consult with the Council (Article J. 3 (5)), although an 
escape clause does, inevitably, exist whereby a member state may claim a case of 
'imperative urgency', of which it must merely inform the Council (Article J. 3 (6)). 
Moreover, should a member state face any major difficulties in implementing a joint 
action it can, in consultation with the Council, exclude itself providing such action 
does not 'run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness, ' 
(Article J. 3 (7)). 
Debate as to what issues would be appropriate for joint action began in the autumn 
of 1990, under the Italian presidency. However, agreement over an initial list - the 
'Asolo list' - proved illusive and the decision was left to the Lisbon European 
Council in June 1992. The subsequent report to the European Council merely set 
out the objectives of joint action as applicable to a limited number of geographical 
areas close to the EUs borders (i. e. Eastern Europe, in particular the Commonwealth 
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of Independent States and the Balkans, the Mediterranean, in particular the 
Maghreb, and the Middle East); and the 'domains within the security dimension' 
which could be objects of joint action, namely; the CSCE process; disarmament and 
arms control in Europe; nuclear non-proliferation issues; economic aspects of 
security. Ironically the Lisbon meeting was almost overshadowed by an example of 
independent foreign policy, made with little regard for Community solidarity, with 
the personal bid of President Mitterrand to 'do something' about Yugoslavia with a 
trip to Sarajevo, without consulting his fellow summiteers (Financial Times, 
29/6/1992). 
The provisions for joint action, therefore, provide the mechanisms, though not the 
substance, for a potentially more pro-active approach to the execution of a common 
foreign policy, if the member states so wish. However, the exclusive role of the 
Council, and hence member states, continues to provide a break on agreement upon 
all but the least controversial of actions. Uncontroversial does not necessarily mean 
unworthy, but the very nature of foreign policy requires a single, easily identifiable 
centre of authority, with which relations can be conducted33. Confusion for third 
parties also remains; the European Union has a common foreign policy but it does 
not extend to the full panoply of international issues. Moreover, not all its member 
states' foreign policy is common, indeed individual member states' policies continue 
to conflict on significant issues. This was swiftly demonstrated less than a week 
after the Maastricht European Council, when Germany decided to unilaterally 
recognise the breakaway Yugoslav republic of Croatia. Following a heated debate 
in the Council of Ministers a compromise was reached whereby recognition would 
33 A condition not necessarily provided by federation (see Hocking, 1993) 
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be granted on fulfilment of certain criteria. The subsequent Badinter report 
suggested that Croatia did not fulfil the criteria, but 'German determination prevailed 
and in the name of Community solidarity all member states recognised Slovenia and 
Croatia on 16 January 1992' (Welsh 1996, p. 122). As the Dutch Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affair observed, it was 'a very unhappy beginning, ' for a common 
foreign and security policy (Financial Times, 16/1/1992). But is was not just the 
mighty Germany that could dictate Community policy, Greece managed to hold up 
recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for over a year, on the 
grounds that the name 'Macedonia' implied a claim on Greek territory. 
Beyond the commitment to support the Union's external policy, therefore, 
Maastricht fails to either 'prevent or significantly discourage' unilateral action by 
member states (Lodge 1993, p. 247). To do otherwise would be to deny member 
states of a significant, even fatal, degree of their sovereignty. That CFSP is a 
significant development beyond the European Political Co-operation (EPC) 
enshrined, in the Single European Act (SEA), is subtlety indicated by its reference to 
'the Union and its Member States', as opposed to the 'High Contracting Parties' of 
Title III of the SEA. This implies that the said Member States were willing to 
accept some loss of sovereignty in foreign and security policy in 1991, which they 
were not prepared to do in 1985 (Lodge 1993, p. 244). However, it remains the 
Union and its Member States, which shall 'define and implement a common foreign 
and security policy, ' (Article J. 1 (1)), a clear indication that foreign and security 
policy retains its predominantly, though no longer exclusively, intergovernmental 
nature (Salmon 1993, p. 264). 
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The division of labour amongst the Union's institutions also illustrates the balance 
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The Council of Ministers is 
the foremost institution. Following the 'principles and general guidelines' defined by 
the European Council (Article J. 8 (1)), the Council is responsible for 'defining and 
implementing' CFSP and ensuring 'the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action 
by the Union. ' (Article J. 8 (2))34. It must also ensure that member states respect the 
interests of the Union in the conduct of their international affairs (Article J. 1 (4)) thus 
providing a self regulating authority for the member states. 
Essentially the Council provides the forum for discussion and decision-making 
among member states when adopting common positions and joint actions. It acts 
unanimously, except as provided for under the mechanisms for adopting a joint 
action or for 'procedural questions' (Article J. 8 (2)). The persistence of the consensus 
principle had frequently been held responsible for the policy sclerosis of EPC 
(Holland 1994, p. 125). Nevertheless, the limited introduction of QMV into CFSP 
had been a major source of controversy in the IGC leading to the TEU. The 
Maastricht solution consequently fell short of a complete abandonment of consensus, 
limiting the use of QMV to second order decisions. Consequently, consensus would 
be retained to decide on the scope and content of common policy while the 
implementation of agreed common policy would be decided by majority. Voting 
then takes place in accordance with the system of weighed voting set out in Article 
148.2 of the Treaty of Rome35. Exactly what constitutes a 'procedural' question, 
34 It shares responsibility with the Commission for ensuring the consistency of the Union's external 
activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development 
policies. (Article C) 
Following the accession to the Union of Austria, Finland and Sweden on January 1 S` 1995, the 
qualified majority necessary for adoption requires at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 
members. 
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however, is not made explicit; for example the decision to send monitors to a crisis 
area would be a matter of policy, to be decided unanimously; but it is unclear 
whether the decision to withdraw would constitute a procedural question, settled by 
QMV or if it would amount to an entirely new policy. Article J. 3 (3) refers to a 
change of circumstances leading to a review of joint actions in the Council, but it 
does not specify under which voting procedure such a review would fall. 
Presumably it would depend upon the extent to which a change in circumstances had 
effected the predetermined course of action, whether such action would need to be 
modified or completely redefined. This undoubtedly remains a grey area that 
requires clarification before CFSP can claim the full confidence of its members and 
respect from those towards whom it is applied. Nevertheless, the mere introduction 
of QMV into the realm of foreign policy undoubtedly enhances the 'communautaire 
nature' of CFSP (Holland 1994, p. 126). Whether it will make it more effective is a 
different issue. Nevertheless federalists are able, therefore, to claim progress, while 
the intergovemmentalist can point to a relatively limited encroachment on the 
primacy of the member states in foreign policy decision-making. 
The Presidency of the Council is given the task of representing the Union on the 
international arena, and implementing common measures (Article J. 5 (1,2)). It is 
assisted in this task by the previous and next member states that hold the Presidency 
thus lending legal recognition to the long-standing troika arrangement under EPC. 
The Commission is 'fully associated in these tasks' (Article J. 5 (4)), a rather 
disappointing result for the Commission which had held ambitions of representing 
the Union itself, building upon its experience and assets developed through its 
conduct of trade policy (Duff et al. 1994, p. 94-5). Nevertheless, the Commission 
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provides the consistency that the rotating Presidency lacks and, therefore, becomes 
essential for operational reasons (Lodge 1993, p. 244). The Commission also gains 
the right, along with member states, to refer questions and submit proposals to the 
Council (Article J. 8 (3). This is not the exclusive right of initiative that the 
Commission enjoys throughout the Community pillar but it does give the 
Commission significant potential to influence CFSP, in addition to providing a 
greater degree of forward planning towards the definition of common interests (Duff 
et al. 1994, p. 101). In response to its legally expanded role the Commission decided, 
at the end of 1992, to reallocate its portfolios, in order to lend greater consistency to 
its international affairs, giving three commissioners responsibility for external 
relations - one responsible for political external relations, with responsibility for 
economic external relations divided between the developed and developing world 
(Duff et al. 1995, p. 95) 
The European Parliament gains rather less. The Presidency is to consult Parliament 
on the 'main aspects and the basic choices' of CFSP, ensuring that its views are 'duly 
taken into consideration'. The Presidency and the Commission are also to keep the 
EP regularly informed of the development of CFSP. Thus while given the potential 
to become involved in CFSP, providing the Presidency and Commission fulfil their 
obligations, the EP lacks the ability shape policy (Holland 1994, p. 128). 
Nevertheless, this does present the EP with greater powers than most national 
parliaments have over national foreign policy, for such is the nature of foreign and 
security policy that it is only reluctantly subjected to democratic control. 
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Unequivocally, the most significant advance in the TEU is the inclusion of defence 
as a sphere of activity for the EU. Article J. 4 states, somewhat tentatively, that: 'The 
common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security 
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which in 
time might lead to a common defence. ' To this end the Western European Union 
(WEU) is recognised as constituting 'an integral part of the development of the 
Union, ' which the Union will 'request' (not instruct, as the French would have 
preferred) to `elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications'36. Theoretically, this link with the WEU `is perhaps the most 
significant advance over EPC, giving the EU access to military force to back up its 
policy decisions. ' (Krupnick 1996, p. 145) Although in reality the WEU's military 
capabilities are limited. Moreover, nothing is to infringe upon 'the specific character 
of the security and defence policy of certain Member States' (e. g. Ireland's neutrality, 
Britain's and France's nuclear and Security Council rolls) or the obligations of NATO 
members, as it is 'compatible with the common security and defence policy 
established within that framework. ' (Article J. 4 (4)). Member states also remain free 
to co-operate either bilaterally, within the WEU or NATO, 'provided such co- 
operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. ' (Article 
J. 4 (5)). No issue with defence implications will be subjected to QMV (Article J. 4 
(3))" 
Concomitantly, the then nine members of the WEU, all of whom were also members 
of the EC, agreed a 'Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its 
36 The Commission remains 'fully associated' with this section but it is unclear how its responsibilities 
relate to those of the WEU. 
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Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. '37 In this they 
agreed on 'the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and 
a greater European responsibility on defence matters. ' Consequently, the 
commitment to a future common defence policy, compatible to NATO, is reiterated. 
A dual role for the WEU is identified as not only the 'defence component of the 
European Union, ' but also as 'a means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. ' Indeed, throughout the declaration mention of a common defence 
or defence component is matched by references to NATO (Duff et al. 1994, p. 91). 
In order to build the WEU as the defence component of the EU, it was proposed that 
the duration and sequence of the respective presidencies be harmonised, WEU/EU 
meetings synchronised, and closer co-operation established between the Council of 
the Union and its General Secretariat, and the Council and Secretariat-General of the 
WEU which would move from London to Brussels. Meanwhile, similar 
arrangements with NATO would serve to 'develop the WEU as a means to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. ' `Transparency' and `complementarity' 
are therefore maintained between the emerging ESDI and the Atlantic Alliance. The 
WEU also commits itself to 'act in conformity with the positions adopted in the 
Atlantic Alliance, ' creating the potential for conflict of interests between conformity 
to NATO and elaborating and implementing the decisions and actions of the EU. 
To enhance the WEU's operational capacity it was agreed to establish a WEU 
planning cell; closer co-operation with NATO in logistics, training and surveillance; 
meetings of Chiefs of Defence Staff; and military units answerable to WEU. It was 
37 See Appendix B. 
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also decided to examine increased co-operation in the field of armaments with the 
aim of creating a European armaments agency. All these arrangements are designed, 
inevitably, to be 'fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure 
the collective defence of all Allies. ' (Declaration on the Western European Union, 
TEU) 
In a further declaration the members of the WEU invited the three non-WEU EU 
states (Denmark, Greece and Ireland) to either join or become observers, and for the 
non-EU European members of NATO (Iceland, Norway and Turkey) to become 
associate members of the WEU. The distinction between full and associate 
membership marks a clear distinction between EU and NATO member states, 
suggestive of an implicit recognition of the importance of WEU as defence arm of 
the EU, over and above its role as European pillar of NATO. However, the 
provisions of both Article J. 4 and the Declarations fail to resolve satisfactorily the 
'Atlantic European defence' versus the 'European European defence' debate (Salmon 
1993, p266). Consequently protagonists of both schools were able to claim the 
ascendancy of their approach, a dichotomy extended to academic analysis (e. g. for 
the Atlanticists - Welsh 1996 p. 136; for the Europeanists - Dinan 1994, p. 472). This 
was inevitable, as the wording had to be 'carefully crafted to maximise agreement 
among the twelve negotiating governments. ' The unfortunate repercussion of such 
compromise is 'ambiguous language, which promises much, but immediately 
delivers little' (Menon et al. 1992, p. 98). In order to overcome some of these short 
falls, it was agreed to hold a review of the provisions of Article J. 4 in 1996, based 
upon 'an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then ' 
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(Article J. 4 (6)), and capitalising on the then impending expiry date of the WEU's 
Brussels Treaty in 1998. 
The fact that it was necessary to postpone crucial decisions at Maastricht is 
symptomatic of the dilemmas faced by member states in negotiating a common 
foreign and security policy. While the political will for increased co-operation and 
co-ordination existed, it was tempered with an equal, if not greater, will to retain 
national autonomy in a sphere that has formed part of the 'central nucleus of the 
nation-state since its appearance at the time of the Renaissance, ' namely defence and 
foreign policy (Baron 1997, p. 91). Therefore, it was necessary to strike a balance 
between an efficient, credible and coherent policy for the EU, as a reflection of its 
values and interests, while also permitting member states to pursue their own 
national interests (Lodge 1993, p. 247). So long as member states retain this ability it 
will be difficult for European foreign and security policy to develop beyond 
'organized co-operation and mutual aid' in which authority is not transferred but 
rather jointly managed at the national and European level (Baron 1997, p. 91). No 
amount of tinkering with sophisticated mechanisms can substitute 'clear policy goals 
and the determination to achieve them' (Welsh 1996, p. 143). Indeed, the 
mechanisms established suggest that states retain traditional national security 
concerns, to which is added recognition of the need to bolster collective action. 
While potentially going some way to providing an alternative security reference in 
Europe, Maastricht Treaty does not represent a fundamental shift in focus beyond the 
state. 
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The CFSP in Action 
Looking back on the Maastricht negotiations, former British Foreign Secretary 
Geoffrey Howe, summed up the general prognosis on CFSP, five years after its 
formulation: 
`... things look rather different. The QMV provisions have never been used. 
Relatively few joint actions have been undertaken. The CFSP budget is 
bogged down in controversy, immobilised between an unwillingness of 
individual countries to fund it, and a reluctance to let the European Union 
fund it for fear of the power which it might give the European Parliament. 
One is reminded of Charles Peguy's comment: `Everything begins in 
mysticism and ends in politics. ' We have certainly been brought down to 
earth. ' (Howe 1996, p. 23) 
The reason for such pessimism is two fold, reflecting the distinction between CFSP 
as foreign policy and CFSP as integration. The latter aspect is manifest in the inter- 
institutional ranglings over finance and division of labour between the institutions; 
between integrationists and intergovernmentalists. The former is illustrated by 
frustration at the inability of the EU to formulate and implement effective foreign 
policy; what Christopher Hill has characterised as a `capabilities-expectations gap' 
(Hill 1994,1996,1998). The cumulative effect of these differences is to further 
illustrate the problems associated with trying to pursue a common foreign policy and 
security identity for the EU. Such an identity appears resolutely attached to the 
member states, although it could be argued that individual national identities 
increasingly encompass a European dimension. 
CFSP as Foreign Policy 
As Neil Winn (1997) observes, `the proof of the pudding is in the eating, ' therefore 
in order to assess the effectiveness of CFSP it is instructive to analyse the practical 
application of joint actions. One should not judge CFSP solely by its joint actions 
but `since common positions and declarations are a continuation of EPC, the joint 
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action concept represents something new and thus worthy of note' (Ginsberg 1997, 
p. 22). The eighty-one joint actions initiated between 1994 and 1998, represent `a 
strange succession of ad hoc operations, ' (Santer 1995, p. 6) many of which are a 
continuation of existing policies under EPC, e. g. monitoring elections in South 
Africa38, support for the Middle East peace process; 39 and have involved a mixture of 
CFSP and Community instruments (Lofthouse & Long 1996). In 1998 half of the 
twenty joint actions concerned the former Yugoslavia or Albania (European 
Commission 1999). Rather than focusing on one single case study this analysis will 
consider three joint actions, each of which met with differing levels of success and 
therefore point to differing characteristics of CFSP: convoying of humanitarian aid to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; the administration of the City of Mostar; and the Stability Pact 
for Eastern Europe. 
As the preceding analysis demonstrated, the crisis in Yugoslavia had more of an 
impact on CFSP in 1991 and 1992 than visa versa (Lofthouse and Long 1996, p. 187). 
Subsequently, Yugoslavia has become the `bete noir' of CFSP, proving an 
unfortunate test case, highlighting the difficulties of co-ordinating fifteen national 
foreign policies on a complex security issue (Piening 1997, p. 44). Fittingly, 
therefore, the first CFSP joint action (8th November 1993) dealt with the provision of 
humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Council decided to co-operate more 
closely with the UN and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), to ensure 
that the convoying of humanitarian aid reached those who really needed it. 
Unfortunately, implementation of the joint action hit an immediate problem in 
38 See Holland 1995, for an extensive analysis of EPC and CFSP in South Africa. 
39 Other joint actions include monitoring elections in Russia, Nigeria and the Congo; extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty; agreement of export guidelines for dual-use goods; control of anti-personnel 
mines; support for the civilian nuclear plant in North Korea. (Cameron 1997, p. 43; Bretherton & 
Vogler, 1999 p. 148). 
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determining whether the operation should be financed from the Community budget 
or by contributions from Member States, about which the TEU had been deliberately 
vague. Four months were subsequently lost while it was decided to split the costs 
fifty-fifty, with the Community budget covering administrative costs and Member 
States other costs, on the basis of a GNP scale. The EP's influence on CFSP 
therefore de facto extended through its powers of scrutiny over the EC budget 
(Edwards 1997, p. 185). By this time, however, the winter had passed and with it the 
urgent need for humanitarian aid. Thus the inability of the CFSP to turn objective 
into reality was exposed, with the commensurate risk that `the contrast between 
intentions and realized policy can easily become an international embarrassment to 
the EU and undermine its credibility. ' (Spence 1998, p. 53) 
The money originally intended for humanitarian aid was subsequently diverted to 
finance a further joint action in the former Yugoslavia. During the war in Bosnia the 
city of Mostar came to represent a microcosm of the war. Known for its ethnic 
diversity, Mostar was torn apart as first the Croats and Bosnian-Muslims fought the 
Serbs, then the Croats and Bosnian Muslims fought each other. By the middle of 
1994 the population of the city was half its pre-war total and was strictly divided 
between the Muslim East and Croat West, the East of the city having suffered the 
greatest destruction (Cameron 1999, p. 51). A cease-fire was eventually reached, 
with the acceptance of an American plan to create a Muslim-Croat Federation, in 
March 1994. This was followed in July 1994 by a EU Council decision to initiate a 
joint action for the administration of Mostar, with the aim of restoring public order 
and overcoming the ethnic division through economic reconstruction and social and 
political integration (Edwards 1997, p. 185). The intended action can best be 
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described as `peace-building; ' a `post-conflict action to identify and support 
structures tending to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a 
return to conflict' (Spence 1998, p. 55). Unfortunately, however, there was little in 
the way of peace to build upon. Serbs continued to shell the city while the Muslims 
and Croats proved reluctant to co-operate. The WEU sent, at the request of the 
Council, a civilian police force to support a unified police force. This represented a 
historic step in terms of the implementation of the TEU, but it too ultimately suffered 
from a lack of co-operation between the EU and local authorities. It was not until the 
arrival of IFOR, in January 1996, that it became possible to organise democratic 
elections, the final goal of the EU operations. 
The Mostar experience, therefore, serves to illustrate the inability of the EU, 
throughout the Yugoslav conflict, to impose its will on a conflict fanned by deep 
inter-ethnic hatred. This is partly attributable to the EU's lack of a military 
enforcement mechanism and the difficulties of maintaining a consistent policy under 
the leadership a six-month rotating Presidency. Proper planning and analysis would 
have revealed that perhaps it should not actually have been there before the 
conditions for peace had been assured (Spence 1998, p. 56). Nevertheless, the EU's 
action in Mostar can be regarded as a qualified success. Although it failed to unite 
the city and had to rely upon the UN and NATO to provide a degree of peace and 
stability, democratic elections did take place and economic reconstruction, 
particularly of the eastern part of the city, was a great success (Cameron 1999, p. 55). 
However, it still failed to stop the fighting, leading interested states to operate outside 
the CFSP, preferring to work through the UN and NATO, bilateral relations with the 
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US and Russia and special ad hoc arrangements such as the Contact Group (Kintis 
1997, p. 167; Edwards 1997, p. 189). 
It is perhaps unfair to judge CFSP by its failure in Yugoslavia. Indeed, as Piening 
points out, individual member states, even Britain and France, did not perform with 
great distinction given the intractable difficulties encountered during the conflict 
(Piening 1997, p. 194). Nevertheless, a number of lessons can be learnt concerning 
both the operation and content of the EU's foreign policy. The TEU mechanisms for 
CFSP proved inadequate in a number of respects. The lack of any planning and 
analysis contributed to the lack of policy direction and the impression (which was 
largely correct) of an essentially reactive approach. The rotating Presidency was 
found to be unhelpful in maintaining a consistent policy, even with the Troika system 
in operation, thus reinforcing the Commission's role as guarantor of consistency 
(Cameron 1999). Confusion over finance proved not only an embarrassment (sic) 
but also served to high-light the practical difficulties encountered in attempting to 
separate the political and economic aspects of external relations, as reinforced 
through the supposed division of labour between pillars one and two (see below). 
Moreover, EU policy tended to be more successful when dealing with the economic 
i. e. Community aspects of policy implementation, than when attempting to impose 
political solutions, as the Mostar experience clearly demonstrates. A difficulty 
compounded by the EU's inability to enforce its decisions militarily. It is, therefore, 
possible to derive contradictory conclusions from the Yugoslav experience for the 
performance of CSFP as foreign policy and integration. From the perspective of 
effective foreign policy, political and economic, it proved difficult to achieve an 
adequate degree of consensus among the member states to produce a truly common 
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foreign policy. However, from the integrationist perspective, the policies that did 
work served to enhance the role of Union institutions, suggesting that common 
policy is best achieved supranationally. The void in between these two 
interpretations is one of interests and identity. Until there is sufficient convergence 
of interests among the member states to produce a Union `identity' it will remain 
difficult to implement a truly common foreign policy. 
The successful implementation of the Stability Pact for Eastern Europe, serves to 
underline these conclusions. In December 1993 the French government presented 
the European Council in Copenhagen with a plan to promote stability in Eastern 
Europe. Initially named after the French Prime Minister, the Balladur Plan was 
intended as a means by which the Union could use its influence in Central and 
Eastern Europe to resolve the kind of border and minority disputes that had led to the 
crisis in Yugoslavia (Cameron 1999, p. 44). Such influence was not inconsiderable in 
the light of the Commission's PHARE programme for technical assistance and the 
implicit understanding that participation in the pact was a necessary prerequisite of 
membership of the Union. The ensuing joint action therefore marked a significant 
`move by the EU towards preventative action as opposed to other joint actions aimed 
at the resolution of existing crises' (Spence 1998, p. 54). This was thus a case where 
the EU could make effective use of international `presence' as a provider of 
economic and social security. 
The Plan did not meet with immediate enthusiasm from either within the EU or those 
countries toward which the Pact was intended. There was some suspicion that it was 
essentially designed as a means of boosting the new French government's position at 
161 
home or as a challenge to CSCE and Council of Europe initiatives. Meanwhile the 
CEECs `harboured reservations, and in some cases resentment' at the suggestion that 
they themselves posed a threat to peace and stability in the region (Cameron 1999, 
p. 45). However, rarely has a diplomatic initiative `evolved so dramatically from 
scepticism to success' (Ueta 1997, p. 92). Following two round table conferences, 
one for the Baltic and one for the CEECs, the final Concluding Conference took 
place in Paris on 20-21 March 1996. Among its most notable achievements was the 
improvement of relations between Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 
The success of the joint action on the Stability Pact can be attributed to a number of 
factors, both internal and external to the EU. Firstly, the issue was uncontroversial 
and clearly stated, thus producing the political will necessary to carry the initiative 
through the changes in Presidency (Cameron 1999, p49-50). Secondly, because it 
was not a matter of crisis management, it was possible to invest appropriate planning 
and analysis into the Plan (Spence 1998, p. 54). Thirdly, it was directed towards a 
region where the Union had significant weight, and was able to utilise those 
instruments it employs best, namely economic aid and the prospect of membership. 
Inevitably, this necessitated a major role for the Commission thus, to some extent, 
breaking down the artificial distinction between foreign policy and external relations 
(Winn 1997, p. 27). Finally, the EU was able to work with, rather than in competition 
with, other European organisations and with the support of the US and Russia 
(Cameron 1999). 
Unfortunately, such favourable conditions for CFSP have been rare. Nevertheless, 
the Stability Pact does confirm that CFSP is most effective when it sticks to what it 
does best i. e. less ambitious, economic diplomacy (Ginsberg 1997, p. 22; Lofthouse 
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& Long 1996, p. 195). Martin Holland reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of 
EPC/CFSP policy towards South Africa. Again this was an issue upon which there 
was, from 1990, a broad internal consensus, which had been on the foreign policy 
agenda since the mid-1970s, was highly topical and necessitated a considerable 
amount of cross-pillar involvement (Holland 1995,1995a, 1997). However, there is 
a danger that `focusing only on soft security can result in criticism when more 
decisive action is needed, ' as in the case of Yugoslavia (Tank 1998, p. 20). 
The Unions' dilemma in this respect is well characterised by Christopher Hill as a 
`capabilities-expectations gap' (Hill 1994,1996,1998): 
`The Community does not have the resources or the political structure to be 
able to respond to the demands which the Commission and certain Member 
States have virtually invited through their bullishness over the pace of 
internal change. The consequential gap which has opened up between 
capabilities and expectations is dangerous... it can lead to excessive risk- 
taking by the supplicant states and/or unrealistic policies on the part of the 
Twelve. ' (Hill 1994, p. 133) 
The breadth of this very real `gap' between what the CFSP claims to provide, and its 
actual ability to formulate and implement policy was exacerbated in the early 1990s 
by unrealistic expectations, characteristic of the optimism that followed the end of 
the Cold War and of the role the EU could play in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, as 
illustrated by Poos's declaration that `the hour of Europe' had arrived (Cameron 
1999, p. 28). Five years on from his original analysis, Hill attempted a reassessment 
of the `capabilities-expectations gap' (Hill 1998). His conclusion was that the gap 
had narrowed but in an essentially negative sense. The perceived failings of CFSP 
had led to increasing pessimism as to the Union's abilities, particularly amongst 
internal actors and the US. Indeed, there had emerged a tendency to underestimate 
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the capacity of CFSP (Hill 1998, p. 22). Nevertheless, there remain areas and issues, 
`short of serious disorder, ' where the EU continues to play an important role, for 
example, development aid to ACP countries, Latin America, South East Asia; 
applicants for membership and the numerous countries interested in political 
dialogue with the Union (Hill 1998, p. 31-33). The Stability Pact and the South 
African example provide evidence that expectations and capabilities can coincide 
(Holland 1997, p. 180). Indeed, as perceptions of security and the means of providing 
it are modified to include the economic and social, so the EU's relative success with 
soft security issues could be considered more practical and advantageous. 
Meanwhile, in terms of CFSP and integration there remain those within the Union 
who cling to `the hope that external policy might be the motor for the whole 
integration process, ' in the belief that only a federal solution can cope with an ever 
enlarging Union on the international arena (Hill 1998, p. 30). The gap, therefore, has 
narrowed but it has not gone away, running the risk of creating a `credibility-gap' in 
the perception of the EU's international role (Hill 1998, p. 33, p. 36). 
The Institutional Setting 
A key feature of any state or system of governance is some form of institutional 
structure through which interests and capabilities can be channelled and translated 
into policy outcomes. In his analysis of CFSP, Fraser Cameron (1998) asks: `Do 
institutions matter? ' His conclusion is that they do as `institutional confusion 
continues to handicap the EU as a global actor' (p. 59). The institutional framework 
through which CFSP operates influences the nature of CFSP both as foreign policy 
and process of integration. All foreign policy is affected by constitutional and 
bureaucratic structures. CFSP is no exception; indeed it may be particularly 
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vulnerable to such forces. Meanwhile, the extent to which Community or pillar one 
institutions and decision-making practices operate within the second pillar, provides 
a test of supranational integration. 
The European Council stands at the apex of CFSP, as it had under EPC since its 
creation in 1975. Its role is to set the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP 
agenda. The essentially `ad hoc summit style of decision-making' (Moens 1996, 
p112) and crowded policy agenda of the European Council deny it sufficient time 
and appropriate mechanisms to engage in serious debate on foreign policy (Cameron 
1999, p. 33). However, it is not intended to decide specific policy issues, but to 
establish `a common European perspective at the elite level, ' a task for which it is 
well suited (Holland 1995, p. 10-11). The Presidency of the European Council 
represents the Union in CFSP, while the Commission represents the EU in external 
relations, a source of confusion for many both within and outside the Union. It 
continues to rotate on a six-monthly basis, providing individual member states with 
an opportunity to `colour foreign policy priorities' (Cameron 1999, p. 34), although 
this will always be constrained, to an extent, by the requirement for consensus. Such 
an opportunity is particularly welcomed by the smaller states, who fear a re- 
nationalisation of the system could lead to development of a directoire of big states 
(Allen 1996, p. 294)40. Nevertheless, the continual change in what is effectively the 
leadership of the Union in international affairs continues to diminish its ability to 
maintain a coherent and consistent foreign policy. Even the most communautaire of 
Presidencies has little interest in looking beyond six months, with concern for their 
ao Further apprehension about foreign and security policy becoming the preserve of a few more 
powerful states was further was caused by the establishment of the Contact Group on the Former 
Yugoslavia (Cameron 1998, p. 66). 
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own public opinion a higher priority than the future development of the Union 
(interview, DG E, March 1999). 
The Council of Foreign Ministers, also referred to as the General Affairs Council, is 
the main decision-making centre of foreign policy. It is assisted in this task by the 
newly created CFSP unit which replaced the EPC Secretariat and is integrated into 
the Council's External Relations Directorate General (DG E). Its primary function is 
to provide administrative support to the Council although it remains small in 
comparison to the Commission's DG for external affairs. The task of preparing 
Council meetings is shared between the Political Committee (PoCo), as under EPC, 
and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), as under pillar one. 
PoCo is charged with preparing reports and agenda items to be channelled through 
COREPER for the foreign ministers. Through this division of labour it was hoped 
that COREPER could use its position, straggling pillars one and two to ensure 
consistency between CFSP and the Community's external relations. The exact terms 
of this division were not specified, resulting in intense competition between the two 
bodies. Finally, a `gentleman's agreement' was reached whereby COREPER would 
not change PoCo recommendations dealing exclusively with pillar two issues, 
although in practice COREPER has gained the final word on cross-pillar issues 
(Allen 1998, p. 53; Regelsberger 1997, p. 76). 
Despite the limited introduction of QMV at Maastricht, consensus has remained the 
preferred method for reaching agreement in the Council, for fear of integrationalist 
encroachment, thus re-emphasising the intergovernmental nature of CFSP (Ginsberg 
1997, p. 27). Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary during the Maastricht 
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negotiations, makes the case for unanimity: `A policy which all can support, because 
all agree with it, carries far more weight than one where underlying dissent might too 
easily be exposed' (Hurd 1994, p. 422). While this certainly represents an ideal, the 
practicability of achieving consensus among fifteen-plus states presents a real 
obstacle to reaching speedy decisions in a rapidly changing world. Possible solutions 
to this dilemma were a key issue in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
The TEU marked an increased role for the European Commission in CFSP, as 
compared to EPC. The introduction of a shared right of initiative, although more 
limited than under pillar one, nevertheless suggested `a possible breach in the 
otherwise intergovernmental context of CFSP' (Holland 1997, p. 7). While the 
Commission's unique position in both pillars, afforded it an excellent opportunity to 
exploit its role, along with the Council, as guarantor of `consistency' (Holland 1995, 
p. 27). However, following its initial success in the South African joint action, some 
member states became concerned about the potential expansion of the Commission's 
role and the subsequent communautairisation of foreign policy it would entail 
(Holland 1997, p. 6). This, coupled with growing public concern for its perceived 
expansion, led the Commission to draw in its horns. However, reluctance to use its 
new powers did not prevented it from continuing to seek `to extend its legal 
competence for the sake of further integration', with the commensurate risk of 
further `demonstrating its actual incompetence to carry out such duties' (Allen 1996, 
p. 294-5). Moreover, the Commission continues to represent a considerable 
international bureaucracy with delegates stationed throughout the world, bringing 
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considerable weight and expertise to possibly the fifth largest diplomatic service in 
Europe (Cameron 1999, p. 40). 
The European Parliament probably had less to gain than the other Community 
institutions, given the traditionally limited influence of parliaments over foreign and 
security policy. The Single European Act had given it the right to ratify new treaties 
and association agreements with third parties, giving it the potential to exercise 
influence over a significant aspect of external relations. Progress at Maastricht was 
arguably less significant. Its right to scrutinise CFSP has been rigorously, if not 
always judiciously, applied in plenary sessions and in committee (interviews, UK 
MEPs, July/August 1997). While the Commission has proved more conscientious in 
its obligation than the Council to keep Parliament informed of developments (Ibid. ). 
The greatest potential for parliamentary influence is over finance. The TEU (Article 
J. 11) distinguishes between `administrative' and `operational' costs, with 
administrative costs being automatically charged to the Community budget. 
However, it is up to the Council to decide, unanimously, whether to charge 
operational costs to the Community or the member states. This led to considerable 
delays, as the joint action on humanitarian aid to Bosnia demonstrated, contributing 
to the impression that CFSP was `a convenient excuse for avoiding action and 
ridged, unalterable policy positions once they were agreed' (Peterson 1998, p. 6). 
Prima-face the issue appears a technical one, yet it goes to the heart of the 
intergovernmental-integration debate. Article J. 11 was in itself a compromise 
necessitated by the British Government's resistance to funding CFSP from the 
Community budget, with the concomitant extension of the EP's influence (Forster & 
Wallace 1996, p. 428). This leads to a further dilemma, between the reluctance to 
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increase the scope of the Parliament's budgetary powers while not wishing to 
increase national spending (Allen 1996, p. 296; Regelsberger 1997, p. 81). The 
implications of such reluctance to spend money on CFSP are obvious. The issue was 
not to be satisfactorily resolved until Amsterdam, nevertheless, simply by allowing 
some expenditure to come under the budgetary authority of the EP the TEU could be 
regarded as, partially at least, `automatically negating the exclusively 
intergovernmental nature of CFSP' (Spence 1998, p. 47). 
The TEU declared that `the Union shall be served by a single institutional framework 
which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the actions carried out... ' 
(Article Q. This was partly in recognition of the fact, as emphasised in the re- 
conceptualisation of security (see Chapter One) that `a European foreign policy could 
not be built upon the CFSP alone, ' but would need to draw upon all aspects of the 
Union's external policy, such as development aid and sanctions, which came under 
the jurisdiction of pillar one (Allen 1998, p. 51). Indeed, as Hill observes: `A truly 
European presence in the world would involve collective policies in all major issue 
areas, thus bringing economics and politics together, as well as rationalising the 
decision-making process' (1994, p. 122). However, a `single institutional framework, ' 
let alone consistency across the Union, would appear difficult to achieve given `the 
variety of competences and activities engaged in by the Union and the Community in 
external relations and foreign affairs' (Holland 1995, p. 226). 
Consistency operates on two levels: horizontally between the Community's external 
relations and CFSP and vertically between the Union and its member states. 
(Krenzler & Schneider 1997). Horizontally, the pillar structure with its different 
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policy-making procedures and shared competences actually serves to `further 
consolidate the [artificial] separation between external economic relations and 
foreign policy, ' (Bretherton & Vogler 1999, p. 194). As the above case studies 
demonstrate the result in terms of policy out-put is to `aggravate the problems of 
coherence and consistency in external relations' (Cameron 1999, p. 101). 
Vertically, the TEU gave legal force to member states' compliance to common 
positions and joint actions. Nevertheless, national foreign policies are far from 
becoming marginalized. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of CFSP as `serving 
rather than replacing national independence by allowing increased solidarity and 
national policies to develop in parallel' (Hill 1997). However, this strictly realist 
interpretation fails to take account of the `co-operation reflex' that is generally 
recognised as having developed between member states. National officials have 
become accustomed to working together through EPC and CFSP, leading to a degree 
of `social integration, ' which cannot be explained by a purely intergovernmental 
analysis (Glarbo 1999). Through his constructivist approach Glarbo highlights the 
sociological impact of habitualised co-operation in breaking down national 
prejudices among officials, a process not dissimilar to that identified by neo- 
functionalists. Consequently, `the co-ordination reflex dictates policy proposals 
originating in single or subgroups of states to be aired with political co-operation 
partners before an ensuing unilateralibilateral action is implemented' (Glarbo 1999, 
p. 644). As one Council official observed; `even if some view points are not 
necessarily the same, if you create a habit of talking to each other, after a certain time 
positions do become much closer' (interview, DG E, March 1999). 
Unilateral/bilateral actions can and do occur with out consultation, such as French 
President Mitterrand's efforts to negotiate a settlement in Bosnia in 1992; once the 
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ability to do so is lost member states will effectively have lost sovereign authority 
over foreign policy. Moreover, the co-operation reflex will tend to be limited to 
those most involved in decision-making at the European level, whose tendency to 'go 
native' may be resisted amongst those who have not benefited from the socialisation 
process. 
Conclusion 
The provisions of the TEU demonstrated a commitment to the idea of a CFSP and 
went some way to provide the mechanisms for its achievement. However, it could 
do little to develop actual policy goals. Indeed CFSP does not constitute a `common' 
policy, comparable to the Common Commercial Policy, and retains many of the 
characteristics of intergovernmental policy co-operation that operated under EPC 
(Martin 1997, p. 5; Peterson 1998, p. 5). Integrationalist ambitions for CFSP have 
therefore been disappointed. The realist interpretation of CFSP therefore appears to 
provide the most accurate/useful paradigm when conceptualising European foreign 
policy, whether in terms of foreign policy (failures) or (unlikely) process of 
integration. In contrast, neo-functionalist assumptions regarding the spillover from 
economic to political integration would appear, if not unfounded, at least over 
optimistic or premature. Nevertheless, there is evidence that a process of engrenage 
is taking place, leading to a narrowing of perceived national differences to an extent 
that cannot be explained merely in terms of national interest. 41 Practice has also 
revealed a number of tensions in the present division of high and low politics that 
suggests a rationalisation of Community and intergovernmental decision-making 
procedures would make for more efficient, effective and coherent foreign policy. 
41 See Chapter One for a constructivist approach to security whereby interests are acquired by a 
process of socialisation ( e. g. Lipschutz 1995; McSweeney 1999; Wendt 1992) 
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Both camps, however, fear the intrusion of the other onto their patch; the watering 
down of the Community method as likely an outcome as the withering of 
intergovernmental procedures. Whichever direction CFSP moves, therefore, could 
be a decisive factor in determining whether the EU is developing towards a federal 
solution or is merely a hybrid international institution. To determine this, as 
Ginsberg (1997, p. 12) observes, will require `a combination of political will, 
institutional reform and agreement over what kind of actor the member states want 
the EU to be. ' Arguably it is the latter of these which will prove most difficult to 
achieve. 
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Chapter Five 
The Treaty of Amsterdam 
The inability of governments negotiating at Maastricht to produce satisfactory 
solutions to the implementation and institutional mechanisms of the newly created 
CFSP provided one of the principal motives behind the intention to convene another 
inter-governmental conference in 1996 (Duff 1997, p. 124). Labelled Maastricht II, 
this was the first IGC to be mandated by Treaty rather than as a governmental 
response to internal and external pressure (Edwards & Pijpers 1997, p. 4). However, 
the end result of the IGC, the Treaty of Amsterdam, `is not likely to be remembered 
in the history of the European Union as the kind of watershed represented by its 
predecessors' (Moravcsik & Nicolaidis 1999, p. 60). The intervening time between 
treaties had witnessed almost `the complete unravelling of the compromise reached 
with such difficulty at the Maastricht European Council' (Edwards & Pijpers 1997, 
p. 2). In the face of the hostile public reception of the TEU and the difficult 
ratification processes in Denmark, Britain and even in France and Germany, the 1996 
IGC witnessed the attempt on behalf of the `large member states to reinforce their 
control over the EU project' at the expense of the Community method of integration 
(Devuyst 1999, p. 109). Such retrenchment was further encouraged by the continuing 
inability of CFSP to deal effectively with the war in the former Yugoslavia or other 
international crises as they arose. Consequently little substantive change was 
possible, although a number of minor institutional and mechanical reforms did, 
potentially, promise a more efficient system. However, the overall impact of the 
Conference was to prove that member state governments continue to dominate the 
institutional development of foreign and security policy as much as they do the 
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policy itself. Government representatives dominated treaty negotiations, with 
supranational Community institutions playing a subsidiary role. The IGC experience 
would appear, therefore, to confirm that states retain their primacy in the security 
field, regulating the degree to which authority is transferred to the regional level. 
The Road to Amsterdam 
In contrast to the deliberations leading to Maastricht that went on largely behind 
closed doors, the 1996 IGC drew on numerous submissions from member states, the 
Commission, EP and non-governmental organisations (Cameron 1999, p. 61). 
However, drawing upon the lessons of the Maastricht ratification debate, the overall 
approach of most submissions was one of caution and pragmatism (Laursen 1997, 
p. 60). This was reflected in the approach of the newly appointed Commission 
President Jacques Santer, who explained to an audience in London, `we should take 
as our motto "less action but better action" and only action that can be best achieved 
at European level' (Santer, speech 4/5/1995). 
In March 1994 the loannian informal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council agreed 
to set up a Reflection Group, made up of two representatives each from the member 
states, Commission and Parliament. The group, under the chairmanship of the 
former Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp, was to present a report on their 
deliberations to the Madrid European Council in December 1995. In keeping with 
the more cautious approach the final report recommended that the 'Conference 
should focus on necessary changes without embarking on a complete revision of the 
Treaty. ' The overriding aims, therefore, were: 
'- making Europe more visible to its citizens; 
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- enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement; 
- giving the Union greater capacity for external action. ' (Westendorp Report 1995, 
section III) 
The later would enable the EU to 'play its part on the international stage as a factor 
for peace and stability, ' and would therefore require a Union `capable of identifying 
its interests, deciding on its action and implementing it effectively, ' i. e. a capacity to 
make foreign policy (Westendorp Report 1995, section I1I)42. However, as the report 
itself observed, there was no common view as to the reasons for CFSP's 
shortcomings (ibid, para. 148), let alone any consensus as to possible solutions. 
Problems identified included a lack of running in time for CFSP, the creation of 
unrealistically high expectations together with rather vague objectives and 
inadequate instruments for achieving them, a lack of political will, or the inadequate 
working of the `pillared' structure (ibid). 
In practice the Reflection Group's deliberations served largely to reproduce the 
differences between its members and to `confirm a dearth of original ideas and the 
unlikelihood of consensus on major reforms' (Dinan 1999, p. 37). Indeed the final 
report was replete with qualifying phrases, reflecting the divergence of views, such 
as `broad majority, ' or `some members. ' This was reflected in the European 
Parliament's evaluation of the Reflection Group which recognised that `the report 
contains a number of possible options but also some shortcomings and negative 
options and no unanimous agreement on the major issues for the IGC' (Dury/Maij- 
Weggen Report, EP 12/3/1996, para. K). Member governments were more inclined 
to use it as a forum for putting their own ideas on the table, to identify areas of 
42 For Westendorp Report and other submissions to IGC see http: //europa. eu. int/en/agenda/igc. html. 
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possible consensus, rather than as a mechanism for changing underlying preferences 
(Moravcsik & Nicolaidis 1999, p. 60). As Santer was to lament to the European 
Parliament during his State of the Union Address in 1996; `A lack of dynamism, 
ambitions pitched too low - those are the impressions given by the discussions at the 
moment. Rather than concentrating on what is essential and facing up to the real 
challenges of the year 2000,1 sometimes think that the national governments are 
using the conference to revive their old proposals. ' (Santer, European Parliament, 
18/9/1996). 
Nevertheless, it was generally recognised that CFSP had to be reformed to make it 
more effective. The key issues for CFSP included the provision of a policy and 
planning unit, a 'Mr/Ms CFSP' to represent the Union's foreign policy abroad, 
revision of decision-making procedures and furthering the Union's capabilities in the 
security and defence field. Government positions on these issues failed to reflect 
uniformly federalist or nationalist policies, with governments apparently taking an 
`issue-specific' approach in support of stable national interests, reflecting a 
preoccupation with both European and domestic level political games (Moravcsik & 
Nicolaidis 1999; Edwards & Pijpers 1997). 43 The greatest consensus existed over the 
need for a policy analysis and planning unit, although there was some dispute as to 
whether the unit should be empowered merely to plan or initiate policy, the role of 
member states and Union institutions in the unit and its links with the Atlantic 
Alliance (M. E. Smith 1998, p. 160). The Reflection Group concluded that the unit 
should be located within the General Secretariat of the Council to reflect the primacy 
43 The positions of all fifteen member states was collated for the EP (8/12/1995). For the purposes of 
this discussion specific references will focus on the positions of the UK, France and Germany as the 
key players in CFSP, except where a particularly noteworthy contribution was made by another 
member state. 
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of member states in CFSP, while the involvement of the Commission in forecasting, 
analysis and the sharing of information would help foster links between the two and 
facilitate consistency between the external political and economic dimensions of the 
Union (Westerdorp Report 1995, para. 153). Certain member states, including the 
French, German (Fribourg Letter, 27/2/1996) and British (FCO 1995) governments 
also favoured some linkage with the WEU. Finally, it was 'widely considered' that 
the unit should be a preparatory body with no formal right of initiative (Westerdorp 
Report 1995, para. 153). 
The debate on a planning and analysis unit was closely linked to that over the 
appointment of a representative for CFSP, under whose authority the unit could 
ultimately lie. There was general agreement on the need for greater visibility and 
transparency to give CFSP a higher profile (Westerdorp Report 1995, section III). 
The French were the strongest supporters of an autonomous political personality, a 
Secretary General of CFSP or `President of the EU, ' appointed by and under the 
direct authority of the European Council, in contact with the other institutions 
(French Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 8/12/1995). There were 
few supporters for this option, however, perceived by many as leading to the 
development of a Fouchet Plan-style foreign ministry44, or simply as too 
intergovernmental. Other member governments' preferences fell approximately into 
three groups (Gourlay & Remacle, 1998). The first group, the `orthodox 
Europeanists' made up of the Benelux countries and supported by Greece, wished to 
see the creation of a unit jointly by the Commission and the Council and for external 
representation to be shared by one official each from the Presidency and Commission 
as See Chapter Three for Fouchet Plan. 
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(M. E. Smith 1998, p. 163). The second or `pragmatic' group, which included 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Ireland, supported an enhanced role for the 
Secretary General of the Council, to be elected by the Council and confirmed by the 
EP, to provide the EU with 'a recognisable identity and confer greater continuity, 
credibility, responsibility, legitimacy and transparency on the measures it takes, 
thereby overcoming the constraints imposed by the rotating Presidency' (Italian 
Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 8/12/1995). The third group of 
`pure intergovernmentalists, ' Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, preferred the 
appointment of a lower ranking official for the post of Mr/Ms CFSP. He or she 
would be fully answerable to the Council in representing the views of member states, 
not deciding them (British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental 
Conference, 12/3/1996 para. 41). 
These three groups, though differently constituted, also existed over the issue of 
decision-making (Gourlay & Remacle, 1998). A majority of states, made up of the 
Benelux countries, Germany, Italy, Spain, Finland and Austria, favoured the 
introduction of QMV as the general rule in the Council. As German Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel explained, it was necessary to 'break the taboo of majority 
decisions in CFSP, ' thus making it 'more difficult to block decisions and to increase 
pressure to reach consensus' (Kinkel speech, 17/1/1995). The only exceptions would 
be matters dealing with military issues; no member state would be forced to take part 
in a military mission, although all should be obliged to supply logistical and financial 
support (German Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 8/12/199545) 
as In addition to statements by government officials, the German contribution to the EP included 
papers submitted by the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag. These papers presented overtly federalist 
views towards European integration in general and the CFSP and European defence specifically. 
While going further than government proposals the close association between Chancellor Kohl and 
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This would allow for more flexibility, enabling a majority of member states to act 
together on behalf of the Union, providing vital national interests were not at stake 
(Italian Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 8/12/1995). The French, 
characteristically in a category of their own, supported mechanisms that would 
permit those member states willing and able to move faster and further on CFSP (and 
integration generally) to do so, while also retaining the principle of unanimity and 
the intergovernmental character of CFSP. They therefore supported the limited 
extension of QMV and tabled proposals for flexible unanimity, such as constructive 
abstention, which would allow a majority of states to proceed while maintaining the 
ultimate right of veto (French Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 
8/12/1995). The final group, composed of Britain, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and 
Sweden, wished to avoid any erosion of national vetoes. As explained in the British 
approach to the IGC, entitled 'A Partnership of Nations, ' the weaknesses of CFSP lay 
its short running in time and its formation and execution, rather than its decision- 
making processes. Moreover, and contrary to the majority view (sic), it would be 
'unwise to try to force action through artificial voting procedures, ' without the 
political will to act collectively, as 'CFSP will only carry weight internationally if it 
represents a genuinely common policy, not a majority one' (FCO 1996). 
On defence the lines between federalists and intergovernmentalists, Europeanists and 
Atlanticists remained drawn much as they had at Maastricht. However, the impact of 
EMU had worked to draw countries like Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands closer to 
the Europeanist core (Gourlay & Remacle 1998, p. 73) but this was to some degree 
counter-balanced by the added complication of three more neutral member states. 
the CDU, in paticular Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers authors of the two papers (Manifesto of 
the CDU/CSU Group, 1/9/1994; Discussion paper on strengthening the European Union's ability to 
act in the field of CFSP, 13/6/1995) is suggestive of executive support. 
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The debate on defence centred on the future institutional role of the WEU. In its own 
contribution to the Reflection Group the WEU presented three options (WEU 
" Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996, Madrid 
14/11/1995): 
A) Reinforced partnership between an autonomous WEU and the European 
Union (para. 50-58) 
B) Intermediate options towards an EU-WEU institutional convergence 
(para. 59-75) 
C) Integration of WEU into the EU (para. 76-92). 
A majority of governments supported a variant of option B or C, such as the Franco- 
German proposal, set out in a letter from Chirac and Kohl to the Spanish Presidency 
in December 1995, to `define the relationship between the WEU and the EU with a 
view to 1998' when members of the WEU could choose to opt out of the Brussels 
Treaty (French Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 8/12/1995). The 
long term goal would be a defence policy, `integrated into the Union's 
responsibilities on an intergovernmental basis, ' with the WEU becoming `the 
Union's instrument for implementing decisions adopted. . . in the field of the CFSP 
and defence' (German Position on the IGC, Report to European Parliament 
8/12/1995). Such an outcome would, according to the Reflection Group Report, 
respond to `the logic of Maastricht' and be `the best way to achieve coherence 
between the CFSP and the defence policy, thereby allowing for better coordination 
between the various instruments of crisis management' (Westendorp Report 1995, 
para. 177). 46 
46 For an analysis of the various options for WEU/EU merger and difficulties thereby presented, see 
chapter on ESDI. 
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The British position on defence, however, remained unaltered since Maastricht, 
emphasising the importance of NATO and the UN as `the foundations of European 
security and defence policy, ' with a NATO capable of tackling future crises and 
retaining its prerogative in providing territorial defence (UK Government 
Memorandum on Defence, 2/3/1995) 47. Support was given for the development of 
WEU capabilities, providing these were `compatible with not contradictory to 
NATO' (ibid). The real focus should be on `building the European identity within 
NATO, and developing the ability of European nations to contribute more to the 
Alliance' (Portillo, speech 23/10.1996). The EU, with its supranational procedures 
and lack of politico-military experience would be unsuited to the kind of life and 
death decisions required of military operations (Davis, speech 25/6/1996). 
Therefore, as Foreign Secretary Rifkind elucidated, while `it would be useful to 
improve defence co-operation in Europe by closer co-operation between the 
European Union and Western European Union. We do not, however, believe in the 
integration of these two bodies or the subordination of the WEU to the European 
Union' (Rifkind, Speech to House of Commons, 12/3/1996). This position was to 
remain essentially unaltered after the election of Tony Blair's government in May 
1997. As the newly appointed Minister for Europe explained; `We favour improved 
practical arrangements so that the WEU and EU can work effectively alongside each 
other, as separate institutions. We regard NATO as the primary framework for 
common defence for all members of the Alliance' (Henderson, speech 5/5/1997). 
47 Notwithstanding this consistency of approach British and French positions on defence had been 
undergoing a rapprochement, largely as a result of `France's willingness to participate in NATO on 
the same basis as other allies' (Rifkind, WEU Assembly 5/6/96). However, for essentially domestic 
political reasons it was not possible exploit this coming-together, with the Franco-German tandem 
remaining the focal bilateral relationship, despite the lingering differences between the two 
governments, not least on defence. 
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For the neutral states, merger of the WEU and EU was also unwelcome, as was any 
extension of obligations towards guarantees of territorial integrity. 48 However, this 
did not prevent them for making a positive contribution to the debate on security. A 
memorandum from Sweden and Finland in April 1996, called for a reinforced link 
between the EU and WEU and appropriate consultation with NATO. This would 
then help the Union define and assert an enhanced crisis management role, through 
the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue operation, 
peacekeeping and crisis management) `into the scope of the CFSP as membership 
tasks. ' Such a solution would not affect the status of member states' defence 
commitments to NATO or their own neutrality (The IGC and the Security and 
Defence Dimension: Towards an Enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management, 
25/4/1996). Subsequently, the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the treaty 
became one of the least contested issues on defence, although differences remained 
as to whether the EU should `request' or `instruct' the WEU to act in such 
incidences. 
The Commission and Parliament failed to produce any striking proposals for the 
IGC, reflecting the more cautious approach in the wake of public disenchantment 
with European integration, that `focused on the need to improve efficiency rather 
than on a political federalist project for the future Union' (Gourlay & Remacle 1998, 
p. 66). The Commission would, therefore, be actively involved in trying to improve 
the workings of CFSP `not to try and take over from the Member States, but to help 
bring our policies together and give them the missing strategic dimension' (Santer, 
48 For example, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Lena Hjolm-Wallen, told the Swedish Parliament that 
Sweden would remain neutral in a war in neighbouring regions, while the Finish government declared 
itself willing to carry out peacekeeping but not peace enforcement missions. In contrast both Austria 
and Ireland have moved closer to NATO (respective government positions on the IGC, Report to the 
EP 8/12/1995). 
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speech EP 17/1/1995). Nevertheless, both institutions were to make proposals that 
went beyond the more cautious consensus reached by the member states, particularly 
on defence, but on the whole they tended to set their sights `on the upper range of 
what [they] considered realistic' (Jean Monnet Papers, 1998). 
Both the Commission and the EP recognised the need for the Union to be able `to act 
rather than react, the better to defend the interests of its people' (Commission's 
Opinion on the 1996 IGC, para. 23). To this end it was proposed that QMV should 
become the norm in CFSP, except in military matters, where there should be an 
option to allow some member states to take action on behalf of the Union when not 
all wished to be involved, `as long as they are not against the general interests of the 
Union' (Commission's Opinion on the 1996 IGC, para. 31; Dury/Maij-Weggen 
Report, EP 12/3/1996, para. 18.8). Both agreed that a policy planning and analysis 
unit should be established composed of experts from the Commission and member 
states, under the auspices of the Commission (Commission's Opinion on the 1996 
IGC, para. 29; Dury/Maij-Weggen Report, EP 12/3/1996, para. 18.7). The 
Commission would continue to share responsibility with the Presidency for ensuring 
co-operation between the institutions and presenting a united front to the outside 
world (Commission's Opinion on the 1996 IGC, para. 23). However, both 
institutions opposed the idea of a special representative for CFSP, as Santer 
explained, `the idea of an independent personality operating in parallel to the Council 
and Commission will not work - it is bound to create confusion and tension' 
(Santer, speech 7/12/1995; see also Dury/Maij-Weggen Report, EP 12/3/1996, 
para. 18.9). The EP called for greater parliamentary monitoring of CFSP and both 
proposed that implementation expenditure be charged to the Community budget 
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(with the subsequent additional role for the EP and Commission), unless expressly 
decided otherwise (Commission's Opinion on the 1996 IGC, para. 33; Dury/Maij- 
Weggen Report, EP 12/3/1996, para. 18.11-12). Finally, the separate pillars should 
be scraped to allow the various strands of European Foreign policy to form `a single 
effective whole, with structures and procedures designed to enhance consistency and 
continuity' (Commission's Opinion on the 1996 IGC, para. 23). The result would be 
`a more effective EU foreign policy within the framework of the Community pillar, 
integrating the common commercial policy, development co-operation policy, 
humanitarian aid and CFSP matters... ' (EP Resolution on TEU, 17/5/1995, para. A3). 
On defence both recognised that `a proper common foreign and security policy has to 
extend to common defence arrangements' (Commission's Opinion on the 1996 IGC, 
para. 34). Therefore, they supported the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks and the 
WEU, minus Article V, into the Treaty to form the European pillar of NATO, which 
`remains at the centre of Europe's defence arrangements' (Commission's Opinion on 
the 1996 IGC, para. 34; Dury/Maij-Weggen Report, EP 12/3/1996, para. 19.1). 
Nevertheless, it was recognised that this would not be immediately possible as 
`defence matters are still too close to what Member States see as belonging to their 
national sovereignty' (Santer, speech 7/12/1995). The Commission proposed, 
therefore, that the IGC should start by writing the Petersberg tasks into the treaty, 
creating a role for defence ministers in the Council and reviewing the role of the 
WEU `with a view to incorporating it into the Union according to a settled timetable' 
(Commission's Opinion on the 1996 IGC, para. 35). 
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In his analysis of the final Treaty, the Commission President concluded that, while 
the negotiations had been difficult, the result was a fair approximation of what the 
Commission had presented in its Opinion in February 1996. However, while the 
progress made on CFSP appeared, political will providing, largely satisfactory there 
had failed to be a breakthrough on defence (Santer, speech EP 26/6/1997). Indeed, 
overall the conditions surrounding the 1996 IGC failed to offer the sort of 
opportunity afforded by the SEA `for supranational actors to mobilise previously 
disorganised, but potentially powerful transnational interests, ' as these did not exist 
as they had for the economic, regulatory policy involved in establishing the Single 
Market (Moravcsik & Nicolaidis 1999, p. 72). 
Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union49 
A consensus on CFSP was finally produced in time for the Amsterdam Council, 
`partly as a result of exhaustion and partly from a recognition that some countries 
had drawn `clear lines in the sand"(Cameron 1999, p. 64). Moreover, the failure of 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain to support an EU position criticising China's 
human rights record, and Britain and Germany's refusal to join the Italian and French 
led stabilisation force in Albania, appeared to confirm a growing trend among the big 
European states to go their own way on foreign policy (Financial Times 6/5/1997). 
Article J. 11 added a new objective of CFSP, to safeguard the `independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. ' Exactly what this entailed, however, was not expanded upon, but it was 
49 See Appendix C for Title V of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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probably the closest the Greeks could get to guarantee of territorial integrity without 
taking up the WEU's Article V commitment. 
Article J. 12 added a new instrument, the common strategy. According to Article 
J. 13, common strategies will be decided upon by the European Council, on the 
recommendation of the Council, in `areas where member states have important 
interests in common, ' such as the common strategy for bilateral relations between the 
EU and Russia, agreed at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The Council 
will then `implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common 
positions. ' Joint actions are clarified as addressing `specific situations where 
operational action by the Union is deemed to be required' (Article J. 14). Common 
positions `shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a 
geographic or thematic nature' (Article J. 15). It is not clear, however, how common 
strategies and common positions differ, other than the former providing a general 
basis upon which to elaborate the former. 
Article J. 18 provides for two new innovations -a `High Representative' for CFSP 
and a revised troika system. The Presidency retains responsibility for implementing 
foreign policy decisions and for representing the Union in international organisations 
and conferences. It will be assisted in this task by the Secretary General of the 
Council `who shall exercise the function of High Representative' (Article J. 18.3). In 
a newly constituted troika the Presidency will be joined by the High Representative, 
the Commission and if necessary the next member state to hold the Presidency 
(Article J. 18.4). The final paragraph of Article 18 also formalises the practice of 
appointing special envoys to represent the Union on particular issues. The High 
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Representative will also assist the Council `in particular through contributing to the 
formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions' in the CFSP and, at 
the request of the Presidency, `conduct political dialogue with third parties' (Article 
J. 26). At its Vienna meeting in December 1998, the European Council agreed that 
the High Representative should be `a person with a strong political profile. ' This 
intention was apparently confirmed by the decision of the Cologne European Council 
to appoint the former Spanish Foreign Minister and NATO Secretary General, Javier 
Solana to the position. However, to date the High Representative has failed to cut a 
dominant role on the international stage, perhaps a reflection of the continued lack of 
collective political will. 
The High Representative will also head the new Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit (PPEWU), to be established in the Secretariat General of the Council with 
`appropriate cooperation' from the Commission. Its personnel will be drawn from 
the General Secretariat, member states, the Commission and WEU. Member states 
and the Commission may suggest work to be undertaken by the unit, whose tasks 
will include monitoring and assessing developments relevant to CFSP and presenting 
policy options to the Presidency for discussion by the Council. However, it will rely 
upon the Commission and member states to provide it with relevant information, 
including confidential material, a dependency that might serve to restrict its 
performance (Declaration to the Final Act on the Establishment of a Policy Planning 
and Early Warning Unit). 
Article J. 24 provides for the possibility of concluding international agreements with 
one or more states or international organisations, within the sphere of CFSP. Acting 
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unanimously the Council may authorise the Presidency to enter into negotiations 
assisted, when necessary, by the Commission. Conclusion of such agreements will 
be made, on the recommendation of the Presidency, unanimously in the Council. No 
state will be forced to comply with an agreement against its own constitutional 
procedures, meanwhile other states can agree to apply the agreement provisionally to 
themselves. By enhancing the Union's ability to participate in international affairs 
this new procedure `could be interpreted in the future as recognising an implicit legal 
personality for the EU' (Cameron 1999, p. 67). In the mean time, however, ultimate 
responsibility for concluding agreements continues to rest with member states in the 
Council. 
For decision-making unanimity remains the rule, and is obligatory for decisions with 
military or defence implications. Nevertheless, the introduction of `constructive 
abstention' and the extension of QMV, added a degree of flexibility in line with the 
overall trend of the Treaty (see Duff 1997; Philippart & Edwards 1999). In order to 
prevent the abstention of one or a small number of member states precluding the 
adoption of decisions, a state may `qualify its abstention by making a formal 
declaration. ' As a result it will not be required to apply the decision but must `accept 
that the decision commits the Union, ' and `refrain from any action likely to conflict 
with or impede Union action. ' If more than on third of the weighed votes abstain the 
action shall not be adopted (Article J. 23.2). QMV was extended to cases where the 
Council adopts joint actions, common positions or other decisions based on a 
common strategy and when implementing a joint action or common position. If, on 
the basis of `important and stated reasons of national policy, ' a state opposes the 
adoption of a decision by QMV, the Council may, acting by QMV, `request that the 
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matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity' (Article 
J. 23.3). Thus the `timid move towards QMV' in CFSP is counterbalanced by the 
inclusion into the Treaty, `(f)or the first time in EU history, the French interpretation 
of the Luxembourg Compromise' (Devuyst 1999, p. 114). 
In order to finance CFSP, administrative expenditure shall be charged to the 
Community budget, together with any operational expenditure incurred. In cases 
having military implications or when agreed unanimously by the Council 
expenditure will be charged to the member states on a GNP scale (Article 18). In an 
inter-institutional agreement attached to the Treaty the Council, Commission and 
Parliament agreed that expenditure would be considered non-obligatory, thus 
endowing the EP with the final word. 
On defence the ambition for an `eventual' common defence policy was replaced by 
the slightly more assertive `progressive framing of a common defence policy' 
(Article J. 17.1). As predicated the Petersberg Tasks were incorporated under 
paragraph 2 of the article on defence. The WEU would not be integrated into the 
Union in the short or medium term, although the possibility of future merger was 
explicitly recognised. Consequently, the Union would `foster closer relations with 
the WEU with a view to the possibility of integration of the WEU into the Union, 
should the Council so decide' (Article J. 17.1). In the mean time the WEU would 
remain `an integral part of the development of the Union providing it with access to 
an operational capacity' (ibid. ). The Council `will avail itself of the WEU to 
elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have defence implications. ' 
And make arrangements for all participating members of the Union to be involved in 
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decisions taken in the WEU (Article J. 17.3). The special requirements of the 
neutrals and the primacy of NATO is recognised, the article `shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security of certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in 
NATO' (Article J. 17.1). As regards co-operation in the field of armaments member 
states are merely requested to co-operate as they `consider appropriate' (ibid. ). Thus 
the basis of West European defence was left essentially unaltered: intergovernmental 
and Atlanticist. 
Amsterdam and Beyond 
The initial reception for the Amsterdam Treaty, from an integrationist perspective, 
was far from positive. As one commentator observed, the Treaty `reads more like a 
party manifesto than a hallowed constitutional document' (Financial Times, 
19/6/1997). It is therefore, perhaps instructive to look upon Amsterdam `as more 
like a 10,000 mile service than a new engine' (Cameron 1999, p. 68). The 
intergovernmental nature of CFSP remains essentially unchallenged with the 
maintenance of the pillar structure and only limited expansion of majority voting and 
supranational institutional involvement. Nevertheless, the creation of the PPEWU, a 
High Representative, reform of decision-making and financing procedures and 
enhanced links with the WEU should enable CFSP to function more effectively and 
coherently. It is possibly too soon to judge exactly what progress these reforms have 
made, although the Union's reaction to crises in Kosovo and the Caucuses did not 
show a significant advance in the EU's ability to act rather than react. On defence 
the Amsterdam provisions for the eventual integration of the WEU and EU were 
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superseded by the Anglo-French declaration at St. Malo before the Treaty officially 
came into force. 
Overall, however, any assessment of Amsterdam must conclude that it was 
essentially an exercise in `damage control' on the part of member states and 
Community institutions alike, who appeared `more concerned that the Conference 
should not upset an already wary public or jeopardise a delicate domestic political 
situation' (Jean Monnet Papers, 1998). The preference of governments to pursuit 
relatively stable national interests on a case-by-case cost benefit analysis, supports 
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis's application of a liberal-institutionalist account of the 
bargaining leading to the Treaty. The introduction of constructive abstention in 
CFSP and the so called `flexibility clauses' scattered through out the Treaty, 
challenge the very `ethos of the Community method... equated with uniform 
integration, ' to focus instead on `co-ordination through more limited or different 
modes of regulation' (Edwards & Pijpers 1999, p. 105). Ultimately, it could be 
construed that the Community method of integration has reached its limits and that in 
the absence of spillover from EMU to political union the EU will continue as a 
hybrid mix of supranational governance and intergovernmental co-operation 
(Moravcsik & Nicolaidis 1999: Gourlay & Remacle 1998). CFSP would remain, in 
this context, `limited to some non-vital sectors of co-operation or `low intensity' 
crisis management in near by regions, ' while `the Union will remain largely a 
civilian power under the security umbrella of the US' (Gourlay & Remacle 1998, 
p. 90). This assumes of course that the US remains willing to provide such 
assurances, a crucial factor that remains to be fully tested. Moreover, while member 
states may be prepared, or even required, to pool resources for the provision of 
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security and the promotion of collective interests, the outcome of the 1996 IGC 
suggests that they feel confident enough in their own capacity as security providers 
to limit the degree of transfer to the supranational level. 
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Chapter Six 
European Security and Defence Identity 
It is a widely held truism that in order for the EU to be taken seriously on the 
international arena it needs some sort of military capability (Bull, 1982). This belief 
reflects the preoccupation within Security Studies and realist/neo-realist discourses in 
International Relations with the state provision of national security, which persists 
despite the shift in the concept of security, focusing much less upon its military 
aspects (see Chapter One). Indeed, as Sjursen points out, `the ability of the EU to act 
in the security and defence realm is seen as a fundamental component of the EU's 
political identity. ' (Sjursen 1998, p. 99) With the establishment of a Common 
Foreign and Security policy at Maastricht, reinforced at Amsterdam, functional logic 
would appear to suggest that the time is ripe for the European Union to develop its 
own defensive capability thus, potentially, transforming the `political identity' or 
character of the EU. The Treaty on European Union makes explicit the commitment 
to the `eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence. ' (Treaty of Maastricht; Art. J4.1). The means by which this might 
be achieved are posited in the Western European Union, which will, `elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. ' 
(Treaty of Amsterdam; Art. J7.3). The problem arises, however, as Salmon points 
out, that `... security and defence strike at the very raison d'etre of states, namely the 
ability to defend and uphold the lives and property of their citizens. Without that 
rationale, what are states left to do? ' (Salmon 1993, p. 219). A realist perspective 
would therefore caution against the practicability or even desirability of exposing 
defence to integrative forces. The susceptibility of defence to integration will 
ultimately depend on whether it is possible to regard defence as just another function, 
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ripe for integration (Foster 1997, Krupnick 1996). This in turn will depend upon 
conceptions of the state and sovereignty; whether, as Waever suggests, states are 
willing to be `flexible' in defining the limits/scope of their own sovereignty or 
whether integration of defence remains a zero-sum game (Waever 1996, p. 116). The 
existence of such a limit, conceptual and/or real as far as state actors are concerned, 
will be decisive in determining whether the EU is able to over-step the accepted 
boundaries of statehood. 
The negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam suggested 
that, for a number of states, session of any authority over defence to a supranational 
organisation remains unacceptable. However, the British position, which had 
appeared to be most entrenched at Amsterdam, changed dramatically in December 
1998 with the Anglo-French declaration at St. Malo, calling for a more concerted 
effort in co-ordinating European defence and making some form of merger between 
the EU and WEU possible. Consequently, member states were able, at the Helsinki 
European Council Summit in December 1999, to agree terms for the inclusion of WEU 
functions, minus provisions for Article 5 territorial defence (which is the preserve of 
NATO anyway) into the second pillar. 
To fully comprehend these developments, and their bearing upon the process of 
European integration, it is necessary to examine the interaction of three broadly 
defined issue areas, namely: institutional, national interests and external actors. The 
institutional question evolves around the complex relationship that has developed 
between the EU, WEU and NATO since the transformation of European security in 
the wake of the end of the Cold War. Therefore it is necessary to examine both the 
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adaptation of NATO roles and missions to this new environment, in particular the 
commitment to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 
within the North Atlantic Alliance, and the rejuvenation of the WEU in the wake of 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. As a sphere of integration dominated by 
intergovernmental solutions, the national interests of key players in European 
security are paramount in assessing and explaining further integration. Of particular 
significance are the positions of the British and French. Both governments have 
undergone a re-assessment of their priorities for European defence in recent years. 
An understanding of these policy changes and their implications is therefore 
essential. Finally, it is necessary to consider the influence of those states outside the 
EU. Primary amongst these is the attitude of the United States, particularly within 
the context of NATO. Other actors to be considered include non-EU members of 
NATO such as Norway and Turkey. 
NATO: The Transforming Alliance 
The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union brought the Cold War to an end, transforming the security agenda. No longer 
was Western Europe threatened by the spectre of a massive conventional and nuclear 
attack from the East, the artificial division of Europe and Germany was over, leaving 
European states potentially free to join in a pan-European security community. 
Consequently, it appeared that NATO's very raison d'etre had disappeared. A 
product of the division of Europe, NATO should cease to exist along with that 
division. It would be supplanted from above by a rejuvenated Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and from below by the EU, bestowed 
with a common foreign and security policy. The OSCE had the double advantage of 
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a membership extending to all European states, plus the United States and Canada, 
and a history of marginalisation such as to rob it of any lingering Cold War 
suspicion. Meanwhile, the intergovernmental conference of the European 
Community was actively discussing the formulation of a common defence (see 
Chapter Four). 
However, talk of NATO's demise in the wake of the end of the Cold War proved to 
be premature. The heads of state and government of the NATO member states 
responded swiftly to the rapidly transforming security environment with their 
declaration, in London in July 1990, on `A Transformed Alliance. ' This was 
followed in November 1991 by the launch of NATO's New Strategic Concept 
(NSC). Emphasis was placed upon the need to reduce the over all size and readiness 
of the Alliance's military forces, given the diminished threat from the East. 
Remaining forces were to be restructured to meet the post-Cold War security `risks', 
which were identified as being `multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional. ' (NSC 
para. 9) However, the need to retain the capacity for collective defence, backed up by 
nuclear deterrence, would remain the primary function of the Alliance. The political 
aspects of security were to be reinforced through dialogue, transparency and co- 
operation with both the Alliance's former adversaries and other security institutions. 
Consequently, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was expanded to include the 
foreign ministers of former Warsaw Pact countries in the North Atlantic Co- 
operation Council (NACC). Meanwhile, the importance of the security role 
performed by the OSCE, EC and WEU was recognised, as part of a system of 
`interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions. ' In particular the development of 
a `security dimension' within the EC was welcomed: 
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`The development of a European security and defence role, reflected in the 
European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the 
European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the 
Alliance as a whole, ' (NSC para. 3) 
This rather tentative endorsement included the caveat (as acknowledged in the TEU) 
that NATO remained `the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the 
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of 
its members... ' (NSC para. 22). 
Thus by the beginning of 1992 the contours of the institutional debate over the 
location of a European defence identity had been sketched out. The EU, with the 
assistance of the WEU, had its sights set on the eventual framing of a common 
defence while accepting, for the time being, the predominance of NATO. 
Meanwhile NATO, in an attempt to appear relevant to the future, and to compensate 
for the withdrawal of American troops, accepted the need for the European members 
of the Alliance to take more responsibility for their own defence, providing it 
remained the primary institution. This situation raised two fundamental questions; 
firstly, how could the EU fulfil its commitment to a common defence without, even 
with the WEU at its disposal, the necessary military assets and capabilities with 
which to implement such a policy? Secondly, to what extent was the transformation 
of NATO any more than a cosmetic exercise to sustain an organisation that had 
outlived its purpose? 
In the optimistic climate of the early 1990s it was possible to foresee the EU 
developing a security and defence identity, through the WEU, which would 
eventually transcend NATO (Moens, 1992). In June 1992 the two organisations 
seemed to be developing in parallel (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999 p. 209). Following 
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the WEU's commitment to the `Petersberg tasks, ' of humanitarian and rescue 
missions, peacekeeping and peacemaking, the North Atlantic Council, meeting in 
Oslo, declared that NATO was `prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis... 
peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE or Security Council of 
the UN' (Oslo Communique) Subsequently, both institutions were eager to prove 
their competence within this new area of activity. Unfortunately, just as the onset of 
the Yugoslav crisis had, through out the Maastricht negotiations, served to highlight 
the practical difficulties of producing a common European foreign policy, so the 
continuing conflict underlined the inadequacies of the EU's attempt, through the 
WEU, to assume anything approaching a military role. 
In the wake of the Petersberg and Oslo declarations, both the WEU and NATO sent 
naval patrols to the Adriatic in July 1992, to enforce UN sanctions against Serbia. 
The rather bizarre situation of the two flotillas, each operating either side of a line, 
reporting to different commanders, but doing the same job using the same ships, 
persisted for almost a year, until the two operations were combined under the NATO 
led `Operation Sharp Guard. ' Further WEU involvement in the former Yugoslavia 
was limited to the deployment of civilian police officers, initially to support customs 
officers along the Danube and then, for the first time under the TEU at the request of 
the EU, to the divided city of Mostar, as part of the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. Whilst not unimportant, this constituted a rather limited input for 
the would-be defence arm of the European Union, `atypical' of what governments 
had had in mind under the Amsterdam Treaty (interview, WEU Secretariat, March 
1999). In contrast, NATO soon found itself involved in the monitoring of UN no-fly 
zones over Bosnia, culminating in the bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions 
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around Sarajevo under `Operation Deliberate Force'. NATO headquarters facilities 
were also made available to the UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), 
which was superseded, following the peace agreement, by the NATO led peace 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). 
Clearly, therefore, the transformation of NATO had been far from cosmetic. The 
wide range of tasks performed by IFOR and SFOR, from law enforcement to 
education, provide empirical evidence as to `the extent of adaptation accomplished 
by an organisation which, until 1990, embraced a strategic concept involving the 
early first use of nuclear weapons. ' (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999 p. 211) However, 
the question over the EU/WEU's capacity for military action remained unresolved, 
the Yugoslav experience seeing it `increasingly marginalized, while NATO's role 
expanded considerably. ' (Ibid. ) Military capabilities and the means and will to use 
them still mattered in post-communist Europe. 
CJTF: a wolf in sheep's clothing? 
Thus far the institutional aspect of the security debate in the early 1990s has been 
characterised in terms of a rivalry between the EU/WEU and NATO. This rivalry 
was underwritten by the suggestion that a distinct European security and defence 
identity (ESDI) was incompatible with the primacy of NATO. However, in January 
1994 the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Brussels, gave explicit backing to the 
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and its call for the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy: 
`We give our full support to the development of a European Security and 
Defence Identity... The emergence of a European Security and Defence 
Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing 
the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater 
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responsibility for their common security and defence. ' (NATO Press 
Communique M-1 (94) 3, para. 4) 
Moreover, beyond such rhetoric the Council declared itself willing to lend practical 
assistance to such efforts: 
`... to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of 
consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken 
by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. ' (NATO Press Communique M-1 (94) 3, para. 6) 
The mechanism for such asset sharing, as outlined in the Brussels Communique, was 
to be the development of the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). 
However, it took a further two years before the details of the commitment could be 
agreed upon at Berlin in June 1996, overcoming American concerns about the use of 
US assets in the possible absence of a US commander and French reservations about 
entrusting European military capabilities to NATO. (Barry, 1996 p. 84) 
The inspiration for the CJTF initiative came from the experience of deploying NATO 
assets in UNPROFOR and later IFOR (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999 p. 210). The 
concept itself draws much of its substance from US military doctrine and can be 
defined as; `a multinational, multiservice, task-force consisting of NATO and 
possibly non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited peace 
operations beyond Alliance borders, under the control of either NATO's integrated 
military structure or the Western European Union. ' (Barry, 1996 p. 84) 
Consequently, it becomes possible for the WEU to form and command a military 
operation, using NATO assets and capabilities, without the direct participation of the 
US. This is to be achieved through the use of `separable but not separate capabilities, 
assets and support assets, ' (NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (96) 63) para. 7) in 
the form of a nucleus CJTF headquarters and other command and control elements 
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(C2) taken from within one of the major NATO HQs. The staff for these 
headquarters would also be provided from the parent HQ, through the use of `double- 
hatted' personnel (Ibid. ). By utilising existing assets duplication is avoided, thus 
over coming the reluctance of EU member states to invest in the necessary military 
hard ware and technology which a totally independent ESDI would require. 
Moreover, through the utilisation of existing NATO allocated assets, the construction 
of a rival military organisation is also avoided, allaying American and other 
Atlantisist fears of a challenge to NATO's position. 
In order for NATO assets to be released for a WEU led operation agreement has to 
be reached in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Furthermore, once approval is 
given, NAC will `keep itself informed on their use through monitoring with the 
advice of the NATO Military Authorities... and keep their use under review. ' 
(NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (96) 63) para. 7). In other words before an 
operation can be launched agreement must be reached among all nineteen member 
states, including the US, and will remain subject to further scrutiny once it is 
underway. However, actual NATO owned assets are very few, comprising 
principally of some fixed command control and communication systems (C3) and a 
number of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). Consequently, what 
`Europeans would need to conduct anything but small scale and near by interventions 
are not NATO assets but national US ones. ' (Gordon, 1997/8 p. 111) Thus, unless 
WEU member states are willing to invest in enhancing their own military capabilities 
(part of the rational behind CJTF is that they are not), they will remain dependent 
upon the US for both military and political support. Such dependency risks the 
subordination of the whole of CFSP to the blessing of the United States (interview, 
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Council Secretariat, March 1999). In particular, a question mark remains over the 
willingness of the US to approve the use of its assets and associated personnel, under 
European command, for an operation which it is unwilling to become directly 
involved in itself. As Anne Deighton points out, `there is a lack of clarity about the 
definition of a task that is important enough for the committal of European troops, 
but not important enough to warrant direct US participation. ' (Deighton 1997, p. 172) 
It is possible that in the event of a small-scale operation, supported by Washington, 
with minimal risk of escalation, the US would authorise a WEU-led CJTF (Gordon 
1997, p. 264). However, as the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has illustrated, 
`even where general interests and political intentions remain similar, ' such as with 
peacekeeping, `significant political divergences, ' exist between the US and Europe 
(assuming the Europeans can agree among themselves) (Chilton 1995, p. 93). In the 
event of approval being granted for a WEU led mission, NAC's right to monitor and 
review the use of NATO and/or US assets could conceivably lead to their withdrawal 
from an on-going operation which became subject to unexpected `mission creep. ' As 
a result, the `possibility of a de facto US veto over... WEU uses of the CJTF 
therefore still exists. ' (Duke, 1996 p. 179) 
The CJTF concept provides a mechanism by which the WEU can act as the defence 
arm of the European Union, thus adding credibility to CFSP and increasing the 
potential for the EU to act more effectively on the international arena. However, as 
Paul Cornish observes, `CJTF is not simply a Euro-friendly afterthought in NATO's 
restructuring process. ' (Cornish, 1996, p. 763) It was, as the late NATO Secretary 
General Manfred Wörner described, the `next logical step' in NATO's own 
development (Wörner, 1994 pp3-6). As such the CJTF fulfils three functions 
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(Cornish, 1996). Firstly, and most importantly, it allows NATO to develop the 
necessary mechanisms to carry out future non-Article 5 missions such as IFOR and 
SFOR (Vincent, 1994). Secondly, it provides an opportunity for NATO's 
partnership nations to become actively involved in NATO operations. Finally, it 
allows for the development, as declared at Berlin, of ESDI within the Alliance. By 
thus embracing ESDI, in a addition to making NATO and US assets and capabilities 
available to the WEU, CJTF `will enable the development and growth of ESDI to be 
carefully controlled, ' with the result that `it is most unlikely that a serious rival to 
NATO could now develop, ' in the medium term. (Cornish, 1996, p. 764) 
The territorial defence of Europe remains the sole preserve of NATO. This has not, 
however, resulted in a division of labour between the two organisations, as originally 
anticipated, with NATO confined to Article 5 and WEU non-article 5 missions. 
(Cornish, 1996 p. 762) Rather, as its involvement in the Balkans has demonstrated, 
NATO intends to pursue an active crisis management role, potentially well beyond 
Alliance territory50. Consequently, the opportunities for independent action by the 
WEU would appear to be narrow, limited to small-scale `soft' humanitarian and 
rescue missions, while NATO takes on the more controversial and deadly `hard' 
missions requiring military enforcement. (Ibid. p. 763) In the real-politick of 
international affairs, NATO was proved to be the more `agile' European security 
institution, seizing the initiative from the EU (Sjursen, 1998 p. 111-2). What has 
been achieved, therefore, is not an independent military capability for the EU but 
`institutionalised co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance. ' (Menon, 1996, p. 279) 
50 See Roger Cohen, `Europeans Contest U. S. NATO vision: Broader Alliance Role Opposed; ' 
International Herald Tribune (1/12/1998) 
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While useful in the short to medium term, development of the CJTFs does not 
provide the EU or EU member states with an independent mechanism for the military 
enforcement of CFSP. The integrative potential of the CJTF depends upon whether 
it is seen as a means in itself or as a means to another end. The CJTF concept is not 
bereft of any integrative potential. As Sjursen points out, `in practice, the 
functioning of the CJTFs require close co-operation and co-ordination, binding states 
together in a close working relationship... ' (Sjursen, 1998, p. 105). According to 
functionalist logic collaboration at this level could lead to pressure for further 
political integration. Indeed, through its provision of an integrated military 
command structure over the last half century, NATO has provided an important 
mechanism for nurturing a multi-national military culture. Consequently, by 
effectively putting the cart before the horse in providing the means for common 
defence before the creation of a common or single defence policy, the CJTF raises 
the possibility that `military integration may precede political integration, ' as 
evidenced in Bosnia. (Chilton, 1995 p. 86; Sjursen 1998 p. 105; Jopp, 1998 p. 159) 
However, as Chilton observes, the CJTF provides for combined rather than common 
or collective defence. (Ibid. p. 102) The CJTF is intended to be a `coalition of the 
willing, ' with each contributing state deciding on a case-by-case basis when, and to 
what extent, to become involved in any CJTF mission. This inevitably raises the 
issue of burden sharing but also the fact that it remains the inalienable right of the 
nation-state to decide when and how to deploy military forces. As a result the 
sovereign integrity of the state is maintained, while the suggestion that defence is no 
more than just another function ripe for integration is refuted. (Foster, 1997; Gordon, 
1997/8) 
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A Role for the WEU? 
If, as Jean-Felix Paganon suggests, ESDI constitutes an `institutional triangle, ' then 
the WEU has a `pivotal role to play' in the future development of European security 
architecture (Paganon, 1997 p. 94). It forms both the `defence component' of the EU 
and the `European pillar' of NATO, therefore providing the crucial link between the 
two most important security institutions in Europe. At their historic Council meeting, 
held at Petersberg castle near Bonn in June 1992, WEU ministers declared that the 
WEU was `ready to play a full part in building up Europe's security architecture, ' 
together with the EU and NATO (Petersberg Declaration, 1992, Section I. para. 3). 
Subsequently, this once moribund institution became imbued with a new sense of 
purpose seeking to expand its membership, roles and missions, together with an 
evolving capacity for independent action. 
As a result of decisions taken at Maastricht and Petersberg membership of the WEU 
has been extended to include all members of the EU as either full members or as 
Observers. Greece became the tenth member of the WEU in 1992, while Denmark 
(although a NATO member) and Ireland became Observers, to be joined by Austria, 
Finland and Sweden on their accession to the EU. Meanwhile, non-EU European 
members of NATO were offered Associate membership, bringing Iceland, Norway 
and Turkey into the fold, followed by Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 
1999. In May 1994, at the WEU's Kirchberg summit, the status of Associate Partner 
was created and extended to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which had 
signed partnership agreements with the European Union. By 1999 total WEU 
membership stood at twenty-eight. However, not all members have equal rights 
within the organisation, with only the ten full members enjoying complete voting 
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rights within the WEU Council (Coffey, 1998 p. 118). Moreover, while the TEU 
opened membership of the WEU to all EU members the formal link between NATO 
and WEU, particularly through Article 5 of their respective treaties, it has become 
accepted that `NATO membership is a prerequisite for WEU membership, even 
though the reverse is not true. ' Consequently, the US possesses a potential indirect 
veto over membership of Europe's own defence organisation. (Gnesotto, 1996 p. 24). 
Arguably the most significant aspect of the Petersberg Declaration was the 
commitment by WEU member states to `support on a case-by-case basis. . . the 
effective implementation of conflict-prevention and conflict-management measures, 
including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security 
Council. ' (Petersberg Declaration, 1992, Section I. para. 2). As a result, in addition to 
providing collective defence, units assigned to the WEU could be deployed for 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacekeeping - the so called `Petersberg Tasks' (Ibid. 
Section II, para. 4). However, a commitment to deploy forces to such operations 
would remain `in accordance with our (member states') own procedures, ' the details 
of which were not elaborated upon. Nevertheless, the Petersberg Tasks came to 
`form the `core' function of the WEU. ' (Sjursen, 1998 p. 99). 
To give substance to the Petersberg Tasks, practical measures have been taken to 
provide the procedures and mechanisms needed to plan, prepare and conduct future 
operations. These include a Situation Centre to keep track of potential crises, and a 
Satellite Centre which uses both commercially available imagery and imagery from 
the Franco-Italian-Spanish Helios defence observation satellite. A Planning Cell has 
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also been established, to prepare contingency plans for the deployment of forces 
under WEU auspices and making recommendations for the necessary command, 
control and communication arrangements (C3). However, this does not amount to an 
operational planning tool. Its function is merely to provide military advice to the 
WEU Council, monitoring potential crisis areas and offering contingency plans, 
before handing the conduct of an operation over to NATO, under the direction of 
Deputy SACEUR, or individual `framework' nations. The role of the Planning Cell 
can therefore be summed up as saying to NATO or individual states, "this is our 
basic framework plan that the Council agreed to, would you please now expand on 
the detailed operational plan... " (interview, NATO HQ, March 1999). Furthermore, 
the WEU does not possess its own forces or permanent command structures. Instead 
the Planning Cell holds a database of military units and headquarters that `might' be 
allocated to the WEU for specific operations (Petersberg Declaration, 1992, Section 
II. para. 9). Duplication of forces for NATO and WEU is therefore avoided through 
the `double hatting' of available units. These `Forces answerable to the WEU' 
(FAWEU) consist of national and multi-national formations, including the 
EUROCORPS, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force and, under the CJTF 
initiative, NATO assets and capabilities. However, it remains up to the states 
themselves whether they are willing to make their assets available to the WEU and in 
the case of forces usually assigned to NATO only, `after consultation with NATO' 
(Petersberg Declaration, 1992, Section II. para. 6). The WEU, therefore, remained a 
long way from achieving its own operational capacity, independent of NATO 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 1999 p. 206), with ultimate control of military capabilities 
remaining with the member states. 
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Given its pivotal position between NATO and the EU, the relationship of the WEU 
with these two organisationally opposed institutions, provides a key indicator as to 
the integrative potential of defence. The TEU sought to set the guidelines for the 
EU/WEU relationship. Since then the Secretariat has moved from London to 
Brussels, thus lending practical assistance to the development of a closer relationship 
with both the EU and NATO. Meetings have been co-ordinated between relevant 
working groups. Arrangements have been made for the exchange of relevant 
information between the two secretariats and participation by secretariat members in 
each other's meetings. Despite the misgivings of some states, notably Britain and 
France, about the involvement of the European Commission in the sacrosanct area of 
defence, the Commission has been given the opportunity to obtain WEU information 
and join WEU meetings as part of the Presidency's delegation (Jopp, 1998 p. 157). 
The duration of the WEU Presidency has been reduced from twelve to six months in 
an attempt to harmonise the sequence of presidencies with the EU. The creation of 
the EU's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), drawing personnel 
from the EU General Secretariat, the European Commission, EU member states and 
the WEU should also enhance closer co-operation between the two organisations on 
a day-to-day basis. Limited use has also been made of the mechanisms whereby, 
under Article J. 4 of the TEU, the EU can request the WEU `to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union that have defence implications. ' (Art. 
J. 4 (2)). For example, the WEU contributed a police contingent to the administration 
of Mostar, on the basis of a formal request from the EU. 
However, problems remain. The sharing of information has, from the EU's 
perspective, been rather one sided, with the WEU reluctant to pass classified NATO 
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documents to the EU (interview, NATO HQ, March 1999). The synchronisation of 
EU and WEU presidencies only works when the holder of the EU presidency is also 
a full member of the WEU and therefore (with the exception of Denmark), also a 
member of NATO. Indeed, overall progress towards greater co-operation has been 
disappointing, particularly when compared to the closeness of the WEU/NATO 
relationship. This is probably `related as much to a difference in culture as it is to 
shortfalls in the existing mechanisms for co-operation. ' (Paganon, 1997 p. 98) These 
are two very different organisations; all decision-making within the WEU is 
intergovernmental and by consensus in contrast to the EU's complicated systems of 
majority voting and supranational institutions. The EU Presidency is much stronger 
than its WEU counterpart and the personnel also tend to have different backgrounds 
and experiences when it comes to security - political and economic in the EU, 
military in the WEU. The implications of this clash of cultures were illustrated by 
the EU's treatment of the WEU when requesting a de-mining operation in Croatia. 
According to one WEU official the financial mechanisms for the operation where 
`wholly inappropriate, ' treating the WEU `very much as the EU would treat an NGO 
doing a contract for humanitarian aid. ' (Interview, NATO, March 1999) 
Conversely, there is `greater affinity between the organisational cultures, and indeed 
personnel, ' of the WEU and NATO (Bretherton &Vogler, 1999 p. 206). 5' Indeed a 
`special relationship' has existed between NATO and the WEU since the Modified 
Brussels Treaty ruled out the duplication of NATO capabilities, effectively 
subordinating the WEU to NATO in the defence of Europe. (Jopp 1998, p. 157) 
However, just as the WEU's relationship with the EU has been evolving, so has its 
51 This difference in culture between the EU and NATO/WEU was recognised by many of the subjects 
interviewed at NATO, WEU and the EU, although EU officials tended to be more sanguine. 
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relationship with NATO - from subordinate to equal partner and possible rival. As 
already noted the CJTF concept opens up the possibility of WEU led operations 
using NATO assets and capabilities. Subsequently planning work has been 
conducted to identify the sort of mission the WEU might take on and what NATO 
assets it might need to call upon. A classified Framework Agreement, drawn up for 
NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999, sets out the modalities for the transfer, 
monitoring and return of such assets. In the context of NATO's own institutional 
adaptation, a new command structure with multinational European command 
arrangements has been developed to prepare, support, command and control WEU- 
led operations. Deputy SACEUR becomes the key figure who will prepare for 
transfers of NATO assets and capabilities and could provide the operational 
command. Other practical measurers for enhanced co-operation include; joint 
sessions of the WEU and NATO Councils; a Security Agreement to facilitate the 
exchange of classified information; regular consultations between Secretariats and 
military staffs; and participation by each Secretary General in the ministerial 
meetings of the other. None of this rules out possible differences of opinion, from 
tensions within WEU/NATO Council meetings to competition in the enforcement of 
sanctions against Serbia. The Adriatic incident undoubtedly marked the nadir of 
NATO/WEU relations, however experiences in the Former Yugoslavia as a whole 
led to a consensus among WEU member states that NATO possesses material 
advantages when military action was required. 
The WEU therefore remained poised between NATO and the EU, its position 
reflecting a compromise between the need for a military capability for the CFSP and 
reluctance to endow the EU with its own defence; between integrationists and 
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intergovernmentalists; Europeanists and Atlanticists. Moreover, the WEU acts as a 
`lubricant' between NATO and the EU, while their membership, role and ethos 
remain different. (Cornish, 1996 p. 768) Consequently, its `well-worked-out 
arrangements with NATO and the EU, ' allow it `to draw on the military support of 
the former, and the political guidance and non-military strengths of the latter. ' 
(Baffles, 1999a) But, such is the technical nature of these arrangements `that public 
opinion is not likely to notice the Community is being brought nearer to the threshold 
of radical change by seemingly innocuous administrative incrementalism. ' (Hill, 
1994 p. 116) Indeed, as Philip Gordon observes, in the absence of the WEU and the 
role it fulfils `Europeans would probably want to invent a security organisation of 
their own, and since all Europeans would not agree on a defence role for the 
European Union, they would probably end up with something very much like the 
WEU. ' (Gordon, 1997 p. 104) 
Meeting in the Middle? Shifts in French and British policy on ESDI 
If the evolution of the WEU provides morsels of hope for the neo-functionalist, that 
economic integration leads to political and security integration, and to the realist that 
co-operation on military affairs remains the preserve of intergovernmental 
arrangements, it also provides evidence to support a liberal-institutionalist approach. 
Neo-functionalist spillover pressures exist, but it takes a shift in the policy of key 
governments for integration to move forward. In the case of defence the key 
governmental player are France and Britain. Both states share similar historical 
legacies as global, imperial powers; both hold permanent seats on the UN Security 
Council; both maintain independent nuclear deterrents; both possess the capability to 
project power beyond the North Atlantic area. However, despite the apparent 
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similarities in their position the two states have traditionally taken diametrically 
opposed approaches to the institutional architecture of Europe. The French have 
sought, ideally, to replace NATO and US domination with a wholly European 
organisation; while the British have been staunch defenders of NATO, opposing any 
effort to undermine the Alliance. The only point on which the two have agreed is 
that defence should not become subject to any supranational control. However, in 
the wake of reform in NATO, the EU and WEU, both states have to some extent 
revised their traditional stances on defence, with significant implications for the 
European defence debate. It remains to be seen what the implications of these shifts 
will be for the EU, given the apparently special nature of defence and the existence 
of alternative defence institutions in Europe. 52 
The sea change in French policy has been its re-orientation towards NATO. Since 
the time of de Gaulle French foreign and defence policy had been based upon its 
independence, of which the `cornerstone' was an autonomous strategic and tactical 
nuclear capability, the force de frappe (Menon, 1995 p. 19). The maintenance of this 
independence was perceived to be incompatible with membership of NATO's 
integrated military command structure and the subsequent subordination of French 
defence forces to an American commander (Cogan, 1997 p. 121). This hostility to 
NATO did not fade in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The elimination of 
the Soviet threat apparently removing the military need for the US and NATO to 
remain pre-eminent in Europe, leaving the way open for a European defence entity to 
52 Although arguably the main beneficiary of ESDI, German policy is of lesser significance in 
security/defence debate. Moreover, it has not been necessary for Germany to undergo a fundamental 
review of its traditional stance of supporting both an increasing security role for the EU and support 
for the Atlantic Alliance. 
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assume increasing responsibility for collective security (Grant, 1996 p. 59). However, 
it soon became clear that France did, in fact, need NATO. 
The protection afforded Western Europe by the Americans during the Cold War had 
arguably provided the safe environment in which France could assert its 
independence and espouse European defence, sure in the knowledge that ultimately 
the US would lead the defence of Europe (Menon, 1995 p. 20). Experiences in the 
Gulf War and Bosnia quickly exposed the deficiencies of conventional French 
forces, demonstrating that France, and indeed the Europeans as a whole, `lacked the 
military ability to back up its pretensions to a world role' (Menon, 1995 p. 21). 
Moreover, in both instances French forces found themselves operating under US 
military command, with the French contingent of IFOR coming under direct NATO 
command for the first time since 1966 (Grant, 1996 p. 58; Le Gloannec, 1997 p. 86). 
Indeed, in the light of European failings in Bosnia, the French government started to 
fear US disengagement more than the prospect of US hegemony (Grant, 1996 p. 64) 
The very basis of French independence, the force de frappe, was also threatened by 
the emerging New World order. NATO's declaration in its New Strategic Concept 
that nuclear weapons were to be `truly weapons of last resort' highlighted the 
declining relevance of nuclear power. Consequently, the argument in favour of 
remaining apart from NATO as a means of maintaining nuclear independence `lost 
most of its intensity' (Cogan, 1997 p. 130). Increasingly, assertion of French power 
would depend upon the ability to project power, which for the short term at least, 
would require recourse to NATO/US assets and capabilities. This in itself also 
became more palatable to the French as it was deduced that a reduced US military 
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presence in Europe would entail a concomitant reduction in American influence. 
Moreover, US policy itself became, under President Clinton, more supportive of the 
development of ESDI, which had `a significant impact in Paris'. It became, 
therefore, increasingly possible for France `to move closer to the NATO structures 
without the fear of loss of sovereignty that existed during the Cold War' (Cogan, 
1997 p. 131). 
President Mitterrand, however, remained cautious (Menon 1995 p. 27; Grant, 1996 
p. 65). Although the French participated in negotiations leading to NATO's New 
Strategic Concept in 1991, France's allies, particularly the British and Americans, 
remained suspicious of French intentions, particularly with the creation of Eurocorps 
as a potential rival to NATO. This, together with France's partial membership of the 
organisation's decision-making bodies, `proved to be counter-productive in terms of 
promoting French goals within the Alliance' (Grant, 1996 p. 65). Consequently, by 
clinging to outdated policies France missed a perfect opportunity to induce reform, 
causing annoyance to its allies and excluding itself from important decisions 
(Menon, 1995 p. 24). 
Nevertheless tentative moves were made, such as the establishment, with Britain in 
July 1993, of the Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy, marking a departure for both 
states from their previous reluctance to discuss nuclear issues. While Mitterrand and 
Commission President Jacques Delors `toyed with the idea of devising a European 
role for France's nuclear weapons' (Le Gloannec, 1997 p. 85). Agreement was also 
reached, in January 1993, between France, Germany and NATO, that Eurocorps 
could be placed under NATO operational command in the event of a crisis, thus 
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allaying fears of Eurocorps challenging NATO while bringing France closer to the 
Alliance fold (Menon, 1995 p. 26). 
Ironically, it was the election of a Gaullist government in 1993, followed by the 
election of Jacques Chirac as President in 1995 that led to a further warming of 
relations between France and NATO. Part of the Gaullist government's programme 
was reform of France's defence forces to meet the security challenges of the new 
European order. This reassessment included the recognition that France could not 
afford to be a mere spectator in NATO's reform process (Menon 1995 p. 29). In 
April 1993 the head of the French mission to the Military Committee joined in, for 
the first time since 1966, all Committee meetings relating to peacekeeping missions 
that involved French forces (Grant, 1996 p. 61). French representatives were also 
involved in discussions leading to the unveiling of the CJTF initiative in Brussels in 
1994. The CJTF concept promised to promote a key French aim by giving substance 
to an ESDI. However, support for the principle that this identity should develop 
`within' the Atlantic Alliance, `signalled a shift in the instance of Paris on the 
creation of a truly autonomous European defence identity' (Menon, 1995 p. 31). The 
revolution in Franco-NATO relations was given further impetus during the NAC 
ministerial meeting on 5th December 1995, when Foreign Minister Herve de 
Charette declared French support for the transatlantic security link and its intention 
to participate more fully in the functioning of the Alliance. As a result the French 
Defence Minister would participate in meetings of the Council of defence ministers, 
France would resume its seat in the Military Committee and work to improve its 
relationship with SHAPE. It would not, however, join the Defence Planning 
Committee or the integrated military structure. De Charette also outlined France's 
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three objectives for NATO reform; the development of ESDI within the Alliance; 
strengthening the WEU; and continuing adaptation of the structures of the Alliance 
(De Charette, 1996). As Defence Minister Charles Millon explained, this 
rapprochement was intended to allow France to make `a better contribution' to the 
reform of the Alliance and `to enable her partners to share her convictions in favour 
of strengthening political control and the European identity within NATO' (Millon, 
1996). The December 1995 announcement marked `a significant symbolic step' in 
French attitudes to European defence, accepting that rather than creating `a totally 
separate defence identity around the WEU' they would accept the creation of `a 
distinctly European defence "pillar" within NATO' (Cogan, 1997 p. 133). 
Nevertheless, tensions continued to dominate France's relationship with NATO, as 
the debate over the appointment of NATO's Southern Commander demonstrated. 
France has not abandoned the principle of a European defence identity, independent 
of NATO (Cogan, 1995), nor indeed its own ambitions as a world power (Le 
Gloannec, 1997). As Alain Richard told fellow defence EU ministers at their historic 
meeting in Vienna, in October 1998; `No one contests the importance of the 
transatlantic link for our security, but neither does anyone doubt that a Europe with a 
single currency cannot go long without a real defence and security dimension' 
(Atlantic News no. 3055). However, by accepting, through Gaullist realist logic, 
Europe's current dependency on the US and NATO, the reformed French policy at 
least ensures its own input into the process of developing ESDI within the Alliance 
until such a time as that dependency is broken. 
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If the modification of French policy towards ESDI marked more of a tactical than a 
strategic change, the shift in British policy constitutes an apparently complete U-turn, 
with profound implications for the future of European defence. The New Labour 
government of Tony Blair undoubtedly brought a change of style to Britain's 
relations with its European partners, `offering the likelihood of more positive, 
constructive and reasonable behaviour' (Hughes & Smith, 1998 p. 94). However, in 
substance the change appeared less noticeable, particularly on the issue of ESDI. 
The Labour Party's manifesto for the May 1997 election stated that, in common with 
the Conservative government of John Major; `We favour practical arrangements so 
that the WEU and EU can work effectively alongside each other, as separate 
institutions. ' This commitment was restated during the Amsterdam IGC, Defence 
Secretary George Robertson restating that; `we will be working for better co- 
operation between the European Union and the Western European Union, but not for 
merger between them. ' (Speech at WEU Ministerial Council, 13/5/1997) Having 
successfully pursued this line at Amsterdam, Blair told the House of Commons in his 
Statement on the Treaty; `... getting Europe's voice heard more clearly in the world 
will not be achieved through merging the EU and WEU or developing an unrealistic 
common defence policy... ' (Speech, House of Commons, 18/6/1997). 
The British review of European defence stemmed from a duel assessment within the 
Foreign Office of Britain's role in Europe and Europe's role in the world (de Puig 
1999, interview UK Delegation to NATO, March 1999). Investigation of the latter 
issue concluded, particularly in the light of events in the Balkans, that a successful 
CFSP would require access to defence capabilities. Meanwhile, the former study 
suggested that British military assets could be used to provide this capacity while 
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also winning approval from its European partners for taking a lead on European 
defence (Grant in de Puig, 1999). Consequently, at an informal meeting of the 
European Council in October 1998 at Pörtschach in Austria, Tony Blair opened the 
debate on security and defence. The British Prime Minister called on Europeans to 
increase their defence capacity in order to fulfil their responsibilities in situations 
such as the Kosovo crisis, without US involvement. Ruling out a `euro-army', Blair 
stressed that it would remain up to individual nations to decide on the deployment of 
troops that would remain under NATO authority, restating the British stance that; 
`Nothing must happen that in anyway impinges on the effectiveness of NATO' (The 
Times, 21/10/1998). 
Despite some scepticism among its European partners, the British government 
continued to develop their ideas. Speaking at the first informal meeting of the EU's 
defence ministers in Vienna, on October 4 t", George Robertson stressed the need for 
`armed forces that are deployable and sustainable, that are modern, powerful and 
flexible, that are mobile, survivable and highly capable. ' In addition, he explained, it 
would be necessary to ensure that the institutional mechanisms, to translate political 
will into military capability, worked effectively. These mechanisms already existed, 
but `procedures are complicated' and therefore needed to be `streamlined. ' He 
suggested four options; merger of the WEU into the EU; `merging some elements of 
the WEU into the EU and associating other elements more closely with NATO; ' 
reinforcing the European pillar of NATO; or `reinforcing and reinvigorating the 
WEU. ' Of all the options advanced, the admission that `we do not rule it (WEU/EU 
merger) out, ' marked the most significant, if still hesitant, departure for British 
policy (Atlantic News no. 3055,5/11/1998). 
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The debate was given further impetus in December 1998, when Prime Minister Blair 
and President Chirac, at their summit in St. Malo, issued a joint declaration. 53 
Although the Anglo-French summit has become an annual event, this was the first 
time that Britain and France, as opposed to Germany and France, had been at the 
forefront of pushing for an important new European policy. But, as President Chirac 
noted, Britain and France are `the only two European powers with a strong 
diplomatic and military capability, ' (Financial Times, 5-6/11/1998) and hence able to 
lead the development of a European `superpower' (The Times, 4/12/1998). The text 
of the declaration asserted that the EU needed `to be in a position to play its full role 
on the international stage. ' Consequently the Union would need, as French 
governments had so often asserted against their British counter-parts, to `have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crisis. ' (St. Malo Declaration, paragraph 2). It was further agreed that, in line with 
both traditional British and French policy, decision-making on defence issues should 
take place in the European Council, within the framework of CFSP, on a purely 
intergovernmental basis (ibid. paragraph 1). Member states would maintain their 
commitments to NATO `which is the foundation of the collective defence of its 
members, ' (ibid. paragraph 2) thus gaining for the British an explicit commitment 
from the French government towards the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the two leaders 
lent their support for the development of an EU capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by suitable structures and credible forces `without unnecessary 
53 See Appendix D 
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duplication' of NATO, while continuing to have recourse to NATO and other 
military means when necessary (ibid. paragraph 3). 
Undoubtedly, British policy on European defence underwent a significant change 
between Amsterdam and St. Malo. This was due to a combination of factors. As 
with previous initiatives, events in the Balkans provided an illustration of what 
Europeans should, but could not, do to manage a crisis in their own back yard. As 
the Prime Minister explained in a newspaper interview, the crisis in Kosovo had 
underlined the need for Europeans to `think more boldly and imaginatively' about 
defence and be able to `speak and act more effectively' (The Times, 21/10/1999). As 
one commentator observed, Blair had gone to St. Malo `frustrated that the Americans 
were running the show on Kosovo and the Europeans were not' (International 
Herald Tribune, 1/3/1999). 
Within the EU initial reaction to the British initiative was cautious, suspecting that 
Britain was using defence as its last remaining trump card to influence European 
decision-making. As one Dutch official observed, `Britain feels it has to make a 
gesture to balance its self-imposed exclusion from the euro, but it is not clear how far 
this goes' (The Times, 22/10/1999). The British government was also chastised for 
its unilateral support for the US bombing of Iraq in December 1998, and for allowing 
the merger of two British defence contractors at the expense of an Anglo-German or 
Anglo-French union. However, as the British have continued to show their support 
for the development of ESDI, so their sincerity has come to be accepted (interviews, 
NATO, Council Secretariat, DG1A). As a result it is possible that the "one day" 
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when the EU becomes a defence organisation is `perhaps brought closer by the latest 
British-led debate on European defence' (Baffles, DUPI 24/3/1999). 
Nevertheless, the newly found enthusiasm for European defence has continued to be 
qualified by traditional British concerns. There is no role in the Franco-British 
proposals for the European Parliament, Court of Justice and the Commission in 
decision-making concerning military matters. Moreover, the preservation of the 
transatlantic link remains Britain's primary objective. Indeed, the strengthening of 
the transatlantic link remains one of the British government's key objectives; as Blair 
told a conference celebrating NATO's fiftieth anniversary; 
`To retain US engagement in Europe, it is important that Europe does more 
for itself. A Europe with a greater capacity to act will strengthen both the 
European Union and the Alliance as a whole. ' (Speech at RUSI, 8/3/1999) 
This is, however, a difficult balance to achieve - to give Europeans the capacity to do 
more, while not appearing to challenge NATO and the American commitment to the 
continent. While Europeans lack sufficient resources of their own, US support for 
ESDI remains essential if it is to develop further; as negotiations for the loan of US 
assets and capabilities to WEU-led CJTFs demonstrated. American support for an 
enhanced European pillar of NATO has traditionally been ambiguous. Writing after 
the St. Malo agreement US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, outlined the US 
position. Welcoming the Anglo-French initiative and European efforts to take greater 
responsibility for security in their own backyard, she stated that; `European efforts to 
do more for Europe's own defence make it easier, not harder, for us to remain 
engaged. ' (Financial Times, 7/12/1998) However, reservations remained, summed 
up by the `three Ds, ' namely; decoupling of the transatlantic link, as maintained 
through NATO; duplication of defence resources in NATO and the EU; and 
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discrimination against NATO members who are not also members of the EU. (Ibid. ) 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot added to US requirements that the 
development of ESDI `carries an obligation for the highest possible degree of 
transparency and consultation. ' Thus avoiding the `three Ms; ' 
`If ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood or mishandled, it could create the 
impression - which could lead to the reality - that a new European-only 
alliance is being born out of the old, trans-Atlantic one. If that were to 
happen it would weaken, perhaps even break, those ties... that bind our 
security to yours. ' (Speech at RUSI, 8/3/1999) 
US support for ESDI therefore remains, as the American Ambassador to the UK, 
Philip Lader, explains, `sincere but qualified' (interview, BBC TV 6/3/1999). While 
US support is crucial both in terms of providing operational capabilities and long- 
term security for Europe, American sensitivities will have to be taken seriously with 
regard to the future development of ESDI. Britain is particularly well placed to 
provide such assurances, as the assumption remains, both in the US and in Europe, 
that the British will keep the US informed of developments, while resisting any move 
that would threaten the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance (interview DG 1 A, March 
1999). The transformation of British and French policy on European defence is 
therefore of particular significance in leading to potentially greater European 
capacity to provide security with a military element. However, the basis for such a 
capability remains with the member states rather than the EU i. e. at the national not 
the supranational level. 
The Future of the WEU 
The transformation of British policy towards European defence removed one of the 
major political obstacles that had existed during the Amsterdam IGC, to bringing the 
EU and WEU closer together, and ultimately some sort of merger between the two 
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institutions (Baffles, DUPI 24/3/1999), thus endowing the EU with the means to 
pursue a military security role. Indeed, as one WEU official commented, `now the 
aim of the WEU is to disappear' (interview, WEU March 1999). However, there was 
no one programme for the future evolution or dissolution of the WEU. Six broadly 
defined alternatives were identified, ranging from consolidation of existing 
arrangements to the wholesale merger of the WEU into the EU. The later option was 
by far the most radical and consequently could be immediately ruled out. Both 
Britain and France maintained their traditional animosity towards suggestions that 
supranational European institutions should have a role in defence. Given that it was 
necessary to devise a separate `pillar' for foreign and security policy, defence was 
even less likely to become fully communitorised. The second alternative was, 
therefore, to add defence to the second pillar, as a logical extension of CFSP, 
possibly with special provisions for decisions or actions with defence implications. 
This option would have the advantage of bringing defence within the Union without 
the need to replicate decision-making procedures. As one WEU official observed, 
`one of the problems of WEU at the moment is the fact that it is one step removed 
from the political... policies that are developed within CFSP' (Ibid. ). Alternatively 
defence could form a fourth pillar, with its own institutional mechanisms, along the 
lines of the provisions for EMU (Howe, 1996; Jopp, 1998; Baffles, 1999b). This 
would have provided flexibility to accommodate the different stances on defence of 
EU member states, from the neutral countries to full members of NATO, although it 
would not have addressed the duplication of decision-making procedures in the 
WEU/EU relationship. A further alternative would have been to divide the functions 
of the WEU, placing its political role within the EU and its military functions in 
NATO. Thus decision-making would have been streamlined and duplication of 
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NATO structures avoided, but at the possible cost of reinforcing Europe's reliance 
upon the USA. The final two options would have been to retain the WEU as a 
separate but rejuvenated institution at the disposal of the EU for military operations 
and/or to further strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Either of these solutions 
would have served to consolidate rather than transform the status quo as established 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Ironically the change in British policy effectively 
moved the European defence debate into its post-Amsterdam phase before the Treaty 
itself was ratified (in May 1999)! 
The potential problems raised as a result of EU/WEU merger have already been 
discussed: principally differing membership, deficient European defence capabilities 
and resources, inappropriate financial arrangements and a perceived challenge to 
NATO and the US commitment to Europe. Nevertheless, at the European Council 
meeting in Cologne in June 1999, EU heads of state and government called upon the 
General Affairs Council to define `the modalities for the inclusion of those functions 
of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in 
the area of the Petersberg tasks. '54 The expectation was expressed that by the end of 
2000 `the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose' (Cologne 
European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on 
Security and Defence, 3-4 June 1999, para. 5). The German Presidency's report on 
strengthening CFSP was also approved and adopted as reflecting a consensus among 
the Member states (Ibid. para. 4). Amongst the proposals put forward by this paper 
were that decision-making should take place `within the framework of the CFSP, ' 
but subject to `appropriate procedures in order to reflect the specific nature of 
sa In other words develop a capacity for peacekeeping type missions but not Article 5 collective 
defence. 
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decisions in this field' (German Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common 
European policy on security and defence, 16/3/199, para. 2). In particular 
mechanisms should be in place to ensure political control and strategic direction for 
the EU to decide and conduct Petersberg missions effectively. These could include 
regular or ad hoc meetings of EU Defence Ministers; the creation of a Political and 
Security Committee, consisting of representatives with political and military 
expertise; an EU Military Committee; a military staff, including a situation centre, a 
Satellite Centre and Institute for Strategic Studies (which already exist in the WEU). 
Above all, however, Member states `will retain in all circumstances the right to 
decide if and when their forces are deployed' (Ibid. para. 3). 
In terms of actual military forces the emphasis remains on the use of NATO assets 
and capabilities, and failing that other national and multi-national units made 
available by Member States. To ensure the viability of the former it is necessary to 
ensure EU access to NATO planning capabilities and the availability of pre- 
identified NATO assets and capabilities to European-led operations (Ibid. para. 4). 
With regard to membership, all EU members should be able to participate fully, and 
on an equal footing, in EU operations. Problems could conceivably arise when 
involving the neutral, non-NATO states and Denmark, who despite accepting the 
inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam, continue to hold 
reservations about becoming involved in operations that risk escalation. There is a 
dual-risk of either forcing neutrals into `arrangements incompatible with their current 
positions, ' or by excluding them, potentially `enabling them to enjoy the benefits of 
membership without incurring any obligations in the field of defence' (Coffey, 1998 
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p. 126). At the very least special account will have to be taken of those states actually 
contributing forces to an operation. Moreover, membership within the EU of neutral 
states provides further logic for the maintenance of the exclusive role of NATO in 
providing territorial defence. However, how long this position can be maintained in 
the context of the `longer-term ambition for a truly comprehensive European defence 
in the EU framework, ' remains to be seen (Baffles DUPI, 1999 p. 11). Provisions will 
also be required for non-EU European members of NATO to enjoy the fullest 
possible involvement in EU operations (German Presidency Report, para 5). This 
will be particularly important when such states are contributing forces and have the 
capacity, within NATO, to bloc the use of Alliance assets and capabilities to 
European-led operations. 55 
For their part NATO heads of state and government, at NATO's fiftieth anniversary 
summit in Washington, in April 1999, welcomed `the new impetus given to the 
strengthening of a common European policy in Security and defence' and 
acknowledged `the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for 
autonomous action' (NATO Press Communique NSC-S (99) 64 - 24 April 1999, 
para. 6). In stark contrast to the Berlin Communique that referred only once to the 
EU, as opposed to twenty-eight times to the WEU (Van Orden 1997, p. 124), the 
Washington Communique specifically refers to ensuring `ready assess by the 
European Union to the collective assets of the Alliance, ' for 'EU-led operations. ' 
(emphasis added: NATO Press Communique NSC-S (99) 64 - 24 April 1999 para. 
10). Although the Alliance's new Strategic Concept is more cautious, preferring the 
wording `WEU or as otherwise agreed' (NATO Press Communique NSC-S (99) 65 - 
ss This would serve, de facto, to associate these states (Norway, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary & 
Poland) more closely with CFSP, something Turkey in particular welcomes (interview, Turkish 
Delegation to WEU, March 1999). 
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24 April 1999). Nevertheless, it was agreed to work on mechanisms to assure EU 
access to NATO planning capabilities; the availability of pre-identified NATO assets 
and capabilities to EU-led operations; and the further development of NATO 
command structures, in particular to enable Deputy SACEUR to `assume fully and 
effectively his European responsibilities' (NATO Press Communique NSC-S (99) 64 
- 24 April 1999). 
Finally, it was decided at the Helsinki European Counci156 that the EU will 
effectively absorb the `Petersberg parts' of the WEU into the second pillar, through 
self-created mechanisms, rather than a mechanical merger. Consequently, Defence 
Ministers will meet in the General Affairs Council, when discussing the Common 
European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), to provide guidance on defence 
matters (Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 8 December 1999, 
para. 14). Furthermore, a standing Political and Security Committee, a Military 
Committee and a Military Staff, will be established to `enable the Union to take 
decisions on EU-led Petersberg operations and to ensure, under the authority of the 
Council, the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations 
(ibid. para. 3). All fifteen members of the Union will participate equally in the new 
structures, focusing the political pressure on to the non-EU Europeans. It was also 
agreed to accept Anglo-French proposals for a rapid reaction force by 2003, made up 
of 50,000 to 60,000 personnel and deployable within sixty days for up to a year, to 
carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks (ibid. para. 28). However, it was also 
stressed that contributions to such a force would be on a voluntary basis, would not 
duplicate NATO and `does not imply the creation of a European army' (ibid. para 
56 See Appendix E. 
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27). Once again the emphasis remains on individual member states choosing to act 
collectively, rather than the creation of a supranational security organisation. 
Conclusion 
The political groundwork for the merger of the WEU into the Second Pillar of the 
EU, leaving aside any Article 5 commitment, would therefore appear to be in place. 
However, a number of practical difficulties remain which need to be addressed if 
ESDI is to serve to strengthen rather than weaken CFSP. Firstly, while there may be 
the political will to institutionalise ESDI, consensus within CFSP itself has not been 
widely apparent. Member states have continued to by-pass CFSP, seeking unilateral 
or bilateral solutions to international crises e. g. Britain's support for US bombings on 
Iraq, the Contact Group on Kosovo. However, it is the very inability of member 
states to co-ordinate a response to such events that has precipitated the latest move 
towards developing ESDI. This suggests that extrogeneous forces exert greater 
integrationist pressure than internal spillover. During the Cold War the primary 
external threat to Western Europe, as posed by the Soviet Union, was met through 
alliance with the US. The EC was thus able to fulfil its economic goals without 
worrying about security. Since the end of the Cold War however, security, even 
military security, has returned to the EU's agenda. No longer faced by one external 
threat and with US commitment to Europe less assured, Europe is faced with diverse 
and multi-directional risks that threaten to unravel the EU's claim to provide security 
in Europe. If the EU fails to address these issues, it is in danger of appearing either 
irrelevant or at best confined to exercising a hybrid type of civilian power. 
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At an apparently more mundane level, it will be necessary for the EU `whose staffs, 
procedures and budgets were designed for quite different purposes, ' to be `adapted to 
the distinctive and often life-and-death demands of efficiency in defence' (Baffles, 
1999a p. 5). The decision-making procedures of pillar two will obviously have to be 
adapted to take account of national sensitivities on defence and to assimilate military 
personnel. There is some scepticism amongst WEU and NATO officials as to the 
ability of the EU to undertake such an institutional and cultural transformation 
(interviews, NATO HQ & WEU Secretariat, March 1999). One official compared 
the EU's attitude towards merger to someone buying a flash new car without 
understanding how everything works. Although refuted by EU officials (interviews, 
Council Secretariat & DG 1A, March 1999), the very fact that such an impression 
exists leads one to question whether the EU knows what it is taking on with defence. 
The potential impact of the EU assuming a defence capability could serve to 
transform the very nature of the Union. If the military role of the EU was to remain 
confined to areas of `soft' security, ESDI could be viewed as `merely adding a 
military element to external policy options' available to CFSP (interview, WEU 
Secretariat, March 1999). However, should a limited military capability lead to 
further integrationist pressures, military and political, it could come `close to the 
establishment of the EU as a supranational organisation. ' (Coffey, 1998 p. 126) This, 
after all, was the conclusion of those who framed the aborted treaty establishing a 
European Political and Defence Community in the early 1950s. Such theoretical 
conjecture is, perhaps premature. There is a danger of reading more into current 
events, such as the Anglo-French initiatives, than history may warrant. Moreover, 
while some of the political obstacles to ESDI have been removed, many practical 
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issues remain, in particular; a general lack of political consensus in CFSP, the 
absence of independent European defence capabilities and a reliance on the wavering 
support of the United States. Consequently, there remains a significant `gap' 
between aspirations for ESDI and what EU member states are actually capable of 
achieving in defence. 
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Conclusion: 
Beyond State Building: CESDP, Globalisation and the Security State 
Summery 
Having established a requirement to determine the 'nature of the beast' when 
considering the EU as an international actor, using an International Relations 
approach57, it was necessary to establish those qualities commonly associated with 
the modern state as a unique actor on the international arena. In particular, the 
apparent significance of the provision of security and military power in a state's 
make-up was defined. Political theorists since Thomas Hobbes have defined the state in 
terms of its relationship vis-a-vis society, in which the need to provide external security 
is more or less assumed as a precondition for state-society relations. Max Weber 
provides a useful structural definition of the state, formed around four independent 
elements - monopoly, territory, legitimacy and force. No one element can exist without 
the other, but it is the exclusive right to use force, which alone distinguishes the state. 
The danger here was to be drawn into a circular argument whereby it is established that 
a state possesses certain attributes, the EU does not have these therefore to become a 
state the EU must acquire them. This would have lead to a restrictive approach, 
overlooking the significance of the EU as part of the transformation of the nature of 
governance in the international system. Indeed the EU could be constructed as either a 
dependent or independent variable in this process, whereby it is both a cause and/or a 
consequence of change. 
57 An IR approach is adopted in preference to using the tools of Comparative Politics on the basis that 
foreign and security policy remain, within the context of European integration, dominated by 
intergovernmental decision-making and are still in the process of becoming integrated (see 
introduction). 
231 
An investigation of International Relations theory (Waltz, Hoffmann, Koehane, 
Morganthau, Buzan, and Nye) failed to produce a comprehensive definition of the state. 
The main schools of rationalist thought, from Realism to Liberalism, fail to fully 
conceptualise the state, which is subsequently either assumed or dismissed as a unit of 
analysis. However, it is possible to glean an image of the state as a legally based 
organisation of people on a territorial basis, which constitutes a unique actor on the 
international stage. It is unique because it alone possesses the capability to decide the 
life and death of its and its neighbours' population. 
However, the status of the state as the most important and powerful international actor 
is increasingly challenged by the effects of globalisation, which make national 
regulation increasingly problematic, and by the rise of international and supranational 
institutions, of which the EU is the most sophisticated. Within this context the role and 
structure of the state is being transformed, as is evidenced through an analysis of 
contemporary discourses on security. Conventionally defined as 'a condition of the 
state, to be achieved by the state through the instrumentality of state military power, ' 
(McSweeney 1999, p. 36) security has traditionally been conceived as a highly state- 
centric concept. However, particularly since the end of the Cold War the nature of 
security is perceived to have changed both in terms of the security agenda and, 
perhaps most significantly, the assumption that the state is the primary referent object 
of security. These two processes are related; as economic, social, environmental and 
demographic issues come to be viewed increasingly in terms of posing a threat that 
needs to be addressed, so the unit for addressing these issues is also redefined, 
downwards towards the individual and society, and upwards to the regional and 
global level. This posses a fundamental challenge to the conceptualisation of 
232 
security as primarily guarding 'the state against those objective threats that could 
undermine its stability and threaten its survival' through the utilisation of its 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force. (Lipshutz 1995 p. 5) Moreover, it is 
necessary to recognise that the changing perception of security reflects not only the 
transformation of the international system, precipitated by the end of the Cold War 
and the spread of globalisation but also, potentially, a fundamental shift in the nature 
and role of the state (Clark 1998) and therefore, by extension, perceptions of the 
evolution of the EU. The EU may thus be alternatively viewed as an emerging new 
state that needs to be made secure in the traditional national security sense, as simply 
a variant of classic liberal collective security or as the product of changing concepts 
of security. 
Similar issues were confronted when considering foreign policy, another overtly 
statist concept, which is challenged by globalisation's blurring of the distinction 
between the domestic and the foreign and the increasing salience of economic, 
cultural, social and environmental issues on the global agenda. Moreover, as with 
security, foreign policy has traditionally been regarded exclusively as a state activity, 
to thus attribute the EU with a foreign policy capability, distinct from its constituent 
states, challenges traditional notions of international actors, defined as states, towards 
a' 66mixed actor" version of the international arena, ' with its alternative emphasis, 
away from sovereignty, recognition and territorality, towards attributes of 
`autonomy, representation and influence. ' (Hill 1994a, p. 456) 
Before reaching a conclusion as to the possible outcome of the EU developing its 
own foreign and security policy, the utility of the main theories of integration, as 
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tools for understanding the development of state-like structures, within the context of 
changing perceptions of the state and security, was considered. The federal, 
functional, neo-functional and liberal institutionalist approaches to integration all 
reveal insights into both the expansion of European integration into political sphere 
and the reasons for its, so far limited, success. However, no one approach is capable 
of explaining the stop-go nature of integration. The best that can be achieved is a 
synthesis. Neo-functionalism helps identify the underlying integrationalist pressures, 
resulting from the spillover of economic to political integration, the entrepreneurial 
role of supranational institutions and the importance of socialisation in developing a 
co-operation reflex. While these processes have been at work in foreign and security 
policy they have not manifested themselves in irresistible integrationalist logic. In 
order to account for the slowing down or pauses in integration it is therefore more 
necessary to apply a more intergovernmentalists approach, such as Moravcsik's 
(1999a) liberal institutionalism, which focuses upon the bargaining among member 
states. 
From the start, member states of the European Union have sought to increase their 
international weight through increased co-operation and a co-ordination of foreign 
policy. Consequently, foreign, security and even defence policy have been on the 
European agenda since the late 1940s, culminating in the defeat of the European 
Defence Community in 1954. With this failure the `two dominant parameters of 
European security, ' during the Cold War were set, namely `the pre-eminence of 
NATO and the clear separation of defence issues from the institutions of European 
integration' (Menon 1996, p. 265). However, by the late 1960s Foreign policy had 
returned to the European agenda, as cracks appeared in the Atlantic Alliance and 
234 
third parties, affected by the Community's growing economic weight, sought a 
European `political' interlocutor' (Ifestos 1987, p. 137). Consequently, 1970 
witnessed the introduction of European Political Cooperation (EPC), intended to 
enable a `united Europe' to assume `its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and 
to make a contribution commensurate with its traditions and mission' (Hague 
Summit Declaration in Lodge 1989, p. 228). However, EPC was to remain an 
intergovernmental framework for policy coordination, lying outside the Community 
treaties until the Single European Act in 1986. Indeed, EPC provided an alternative 
to functional/neo-functional or federal integration, contributing to the political unity 
of the European Community while preserving the national independence of the 
member states in foreign and security policy (Ifestos 1987). 
With the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, the whole nature of security in Europe changed, apparently propelling the 
Community towards a new and expanded role (Allen & Smith 1990). The Treaty of 
Maastricht's proclamation that, `[a] common foreign and security policy is hereby 
established, '(Article. J) was, therefore intended as a qualitative leap forward, enabling 
the Union and its member states to rise to new challenges and opportunities. But, CFSP 
remained outside the Community Treaties, constructed instead as a second `pillar' of 
European Union. Moreover, in the wake of its perceived failure in the Former 
Yugoslavia, of institutional wrangling, and the `go it alone' preferences of the big 
member states, any initial assessment of CFSP could hardly fail to conclude that 
European co-operation in foreign and security policy seems destined to remain, 
essentially, intergovernmental. 
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The difficulties encountered at Maastricht in reaching an agreement were reflected in 
the intention, written into the TEU, to hold a further Intergovernmental Conference, a 
Maastricht II, in 1996. CFSP, and in particular the future of the WEU as the 
`defence arm' of the Union, were expected to dominate the agenda. However, in the 
wake of the difficulties encountered with the ratification of Maastricht only limited 
reforms were possible under the ensuing Treaty of Amsterdam, which is perhaps 
most accurately characterised as an exercise in national `damage control. ' Indeed, 
the introduction of constructive abstention in CFSP and the so called `flexibility 
clauses' scattered through out the Treaty, challenged the very `ethos of the 
Community method... equated with uniform integration, ' to focus instead on `co- 
ordination through more limited or different modes of regulation' (Edwards & 
Pijpers 1999, p. 105). Ultimately, it is possible that the Community method of 
integration has reached its limits and that in the absence of spillover from EMU to 
political union the EU will continue as a hybrid mix of supranational governance and 
intergovernmental co-operation (Moravcsik & Nicolaidis 1999: Gourlay & Remade 
1998). CFSP would remain, in this context, `limited to some non-vital sectors of co- 
operation or `low intensity' crisis management in near by regions, ' while `the Union 
will remain largely a civilian power under the security umbrella of the US' (Gourlay 
& Remade 1998, p. 90). 
However, the military aspects of security returned to the European agenda at Maastricht 
with the commitment, if rather tentative, to the `eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence' (Article J4.1). The WEU was 
tasked to `elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications. '(ArticleJ. 4.2). In order to understand how this might work it was 
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necessary to examine the transformation of NATO since the end of the Cold War and, 
in particular, the development of a European Security and Defence identity within the 
Alliance. The Combined Joint Task Force concept provides the mechanism whereby 
the WEU can use NATO assets and capabilities to act as the defence arm of the EU, 
thus adding credibility to the CFSP and enhancing the potential for the EU to act more 
effectively on the international arena. However, the CJTF `is not simply a Euro- 
friendly afterthought in NATO's restructuring process' (Cornish 1996, p. 763). It is part 
of NATO's wider restructuring which will allow it to take on new roles and missions; 
moreover, the containment of an ESDI within the Alliance will `enable the development 
and growth of ESDI to be carefully controlled' (ibid, p. 764). As for the WEU, the 
1996 IGC failed to move entrenched national positions, most notably the British, 
beyond the Maastricht compromise. However, the dramatic shift in British policy, 
marked in December 1998 by the Anglo-French declaration at St. Malo, made some 
form of merger between the EU and WEU possible. Consequently, member states were 
able, at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999, to agree terms for 
the inclusion of WEU functions, minus provisions for Article 5 territorial defence 
(which is the preserve of NATO anyway) into the second pillar. 
The evolution of the WEU provides morsels of hope for the neo-functionalist, that 
economic integration may spillover into political and security integration, however, 
this has not led to a reorientation of loyalties at the elite level, let alone among 
European citizens, for whom the nation state remains the legitimate source of 
security. Even, as Forster observes, `the most integrationist governments are hesitant 
advocates of the `Community method' for defence (and foreign) policy issues' 
(Forster 1997, p. 310). This would appear to support realist/neo-realist expectations 
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that co-operation on military affairs remains the preserve of intergovernmental 
arrangements. It also provides evidence to support a liberal-institutionalist approach; 
neo-functionalist spillover pressures exist, but it takes a shift in the policy of key 
governments for integration to move forward. Meanwhile, at the operational or 
functional level, increased European co-ordination has developed as of necessity to deal 
with peace keeping and humanitarian tasks. Working under multi-national command 
has become the accepted norm. The difficulties encountered by such operations suggest 
that the main barriers to further co-operation/integration lie in a lack of political will to 
take decisive military action (Jackson 2000). 
Conclusions 
To return to the initial starting point of the thesis, it was proposed that `security and 
defence strike at the very raison d'etre of states, namely the ability to defend and 
uphold the lives and property of their citizens. ' (Salmon 1993, p219). Indeed, this 
position provides the basis for traditional realist/neo-realist IR and Strategic Studies, 
as well as informing the majority of popular debate concerning the EU's foreign and 
security policy. From this follows the proposition that as the EU acquires the ability 
to protect and promote the interests of its citizens so it will be taking on core 
functions of the state and hence assuming many of the characteristics of the state as 
an international actor. 
However, as contemporary discourses on the state and security suggest the centrality 
of the state on the global arena and as the referent object of security is challenged by 
the transnational forces associated with globalisation. Within this context security 
has been re-conceptualised to the extent that almost any issue perceived to pose a 
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threat could be described in terms of security. Consequently, the nature and means 
by which such a threat might be met have also been redefined towards the economic, 
social, cultural and environmental. Subsequently the state's role in providing 
security can be seen as marginalized in at least two respects. Firstly, these `new' 
security issues are not practically reducible to the national level, but rather up to the 
transnational or even supranational level, or down to the levels of societies and 
individuals. Secondly, as security becomes de-militarised so the state's monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force becomes less significant in defining the state as a 
unique international actor. Consequently, is could be argued that within such a 
context, the EU's acquisition of a security and defence identity is of lesser 
significance than it might have been in the international environment of fifty years 
ago. Moreover, as non-military issues come to dominate the global agenda, so the 
Union's existing, essentially economic and civilian external relations arguably 
acquire a greater significance. 
The challenge then becomes how to conceptualise the EU's acquisition of a foreign 
policy and security identity. Theories of integration were employed in this thesis in 
an attempt to explain the internal mechanisms leading to the development of new 
policy areas and structures. The neo-functionalist concepts of spillover, 
politicisation and externalisation (Haas 1968, Haas & Schmitter 1964, Schmitter 
1969) proved useful in identifying underlying trends, and it may be that defence 
could become susceptible to these pressures. This will ultimately depend on whether 
it is possible to regard security or defence as just another function, ripe for 
integration (Foster 1997, Krupnick 1996), or to follow a most constructivist 
approach, whether identities can be re-defined at the European level (Adler 1992, 
239 
Waever 1995). The federal approach also proved useful in highlighting the 
significance of defence and security in the development of multi-national state 
structures (Wheare 1946), and by providing a gauge for integration along the 
confederal/federal continuum (Forsyth 1981). Meanwhile, intergovernmental 
approaches highlighted the evident importance of intergovernmental bargaining in 
determining the outcome of common policies, themselves conditioned by previous 
bargains (Moravcsik 1999a). However, these approaches need to be adapted to 
account for the epistemological changes occurring in the conceptualisation of the 
state and security, something beyond the immediate remit of this thesis. 
Indeed there would appear to be a general discrepancy between contemporary 
theoretical literature on the state and security, and the conventional language used to 
describe CFSP and ESDI by those involved in the process itself, as evidenced in the 
empirical chapters. Therefore, while it might be theoretically unsound to conceive of 
the EU developing state-like structures (Ruggie 1993) to many of the politicians 
involved (and by extension the media and general public) the acquisition by the EU 
of a foreign policy and security/defence identity remains bound up with the 
achievement of statehood. However, such a perspective over-looks the degree to 
which states are no longer, assuming they ever were, able to produce their own 
security. Attempts to co-ordinate foreign and security policies through the EU can 
therefore be viewed equally as an attempt by its member states to achieve 
collectively what they are unable to do individually as it can be viewed as a 
challenge to individual state sovereignty. Indeed it was the former of these 
considerations that first lead EC member states to embark upon European Political 
Co-operation. 
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Given the persistence of intergovernmental decision-making in determining the 
evolution and content of the EU's foreign and security policy, it is perhaps easier to 
portray its development as the response of member states to global forces, rather than 
the imposition of supranational governance upon sovereign states made impotent in 
the wake of globalisation. As such, rather than leading to the development of an EU 
super-state, CESDP adds another means of implementing CFSP, which itself is far 
from becoming a truly `common, ' let alone `single, ' policy for Europe. 
Nevertheless, it does make the EU a more complete international actor, resembling 
the state more than any other actor on the international stage. As states themselves 
lose some of the traditional assets of statehood, so the acquisition by the EU of 
similar assets could make the two entities more alike. Alternatively, CFSP/CESDP 
could be viewed as adding to the capabilities of the individual member states rather 
than the Union as a whole, producing quite different results. 
As Helen Wallace observes, European defence is being constructed outside the 
Community framework, thus underpinning `intensive transgovernmentalism' rather 
than `communitarization' (H. Wallace 2000, p. 6). Transgovemmentalism goes 
beyond intergovernmentalism in that it implies a `greater intensity' of relations 
across, as well as between, member governments who are prepared to make 
extensive collective commitments but have `judged the full EU institutional 
framework to be inappropriate or unacceptable' (ibid. p. 33). Consequently, to talk in 
terms of the EU taking over the international representation of its citizens from the 
member states would be premature. However, when taken in the context of changing 
concepts of the state and security the acquisition, by a supranational actor, of defence 
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capabilities implies at the very least recognition by national governments that they 
are not individually capable of providing the most basic element of the state-society 
contract i. e. security. This incapacity is hardly new, but the means through which it 
is being resolved, potentially, are. As it stands CFSP/CESDP is a transgovernmental 
process but if internal integrative processes, global forces and national interests 
combine it could develop into a truly common security/defence policy for the 
European Union. At that point the EU would constitute a state as classically (and 
restrictively) defined in International Relations. Meanwhile, the greatest challenge 
for CFSP/CESDP remains to develop real military capabilities and the means and 
political will to use them in support of the Union's global interests. This in turn will 
require the diminution of unique national interests and a revolution in the political 
culture of EU institutions. The processes by which this is (or is not) achieved will 
doubtlessly continue to provide a wealth of material for future research into the 
development of the European polity. 
242 
Appendix A 
Treaty on European Union Title V 
PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
ARTICLE J 
A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed 
by the following provisions. 
ARTICLE J. 1 
1. The union and its Member States shall define and implement a common 
foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and 
covering all areas of foreign and security policy. 
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be: 
to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union; 
to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all 
ways; 
o to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris 
Charter; 
to promote international cooperation; 
o to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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3. The Union shall pursue these objectives; 
o by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the 
conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J. 2; 
o by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J. 3, joint 
action in the areas in which the Member States have important 
interests in common. 
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They 
shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or 
likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. 
The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. 
ARTICLE J. 2 
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on 
any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure 
that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of 
concerted and convergent action. 
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. 
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform on the 
common positions. 
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and 
at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such 
fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not 
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all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the 
common positions. 
ARTICLE J. 3 
The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by foreign and security 
policy shall be the following: 
1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the 
European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. 
Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay 
down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in 
carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures 
and conditions for its implementation. 
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its 
development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a 
qualified majority. 
Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the 
preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in 
accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least 
fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members. 
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question 
subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives 
of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not 
acted, the joint action shall stand. 
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4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and 
in the conduct of their activity. 
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action 
pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if 
necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to 
provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a 
national transposition of Council decisions. 
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a 
Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a 
matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. 
The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any 
such measures. 
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a 
Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and 
seek appropriate solutions. Such solu-tions shall not run counter to the 
objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness. 
ARTICLE J. 4 
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to 
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 
2. The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral 
part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions 
and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, 
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in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements. 
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be 
subject to the procedures set out in Article J. 3. 
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States 
and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North 
Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy established within that framework. 
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer 
cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the 
framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation 
does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. 
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the 
date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the 
provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on 
the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European 
Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the 
experience gained until then. 
ARTICLE J. 5 
1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the 
common foreign and security policy. 
247 
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common 
measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the 
Union in international organizations and international conferences. 
3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the presidency shall be assisted 
if needs be by the previous and next Member States to hold the Presidency. 
The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks. 
4. Without prejudice to Article J. 2(3) and Article J. 3(4), Member States 
represented in international organizations or international conferences where 
not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any 
matter of common interest. 
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security 
Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. 
Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in 
the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the 
interests of the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
ARTICLE J. 6 
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission 
Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations 
to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions 
and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. 
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint 
assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in 
Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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ARTICLE J. 7 
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the 
basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the 
views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European 
Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission 
of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European 
Parliament may ask questions of the Councils or make recommendations to it. It shall 
hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security 
policy. 
ARTICLE J. 8 
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines 
for the common foreign and security policy. 
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing 
the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines 
adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, 
except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J. 3(2). 
3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question 
relating to the common foreign policy and may submit proposals to the 
Council. 
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at 
the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an 
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extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, 
within a shorter period. 
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall 
monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign 
and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering 
opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. 
It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice 
to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. 
ARTICLE J. 9 
The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common 
foreign and security policy field. 
ARTICLE J. 10 
On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J. 4, the 
Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other 
amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and 
security policy. 
ARTICLE J. 11 
1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137,138,139 to 142,146,147,150 to 
153,157 to 163 and 217 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title. 
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred 
to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the 
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European Communities. 
The Council may also: 
o either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which the 
implementation of those provisions gives rise is to be charged to the 
budget of the European Communities; in that event, the budgetary 
procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community shall be applicable; 
o or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the Member 
States, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided. 
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Appendix B 
Declaration on the Western European Union (TEU) 
The Conference notes the following declarations: 
I. DECLARATION 
by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members 
of the Western European Union and also members of the European Union on THE 
ROLE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS RELATIONS 
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WITH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
Introduction 
1. WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European 
security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on 
defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process 
involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of 
the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to 
solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to 
strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common 
defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. 
2. WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union 
and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To 
this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry 
forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its 
own operational role. 
252 
WEU Member States take note of Article J. 4 relating to the common foreign 
and security policy of the Treaty on European Union which reads as follows: 
I. "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions 
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of 
a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence. 
2. The union requests the Western Union (WEU), which is an integral 
part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. 
The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, 
adopt the necessary practical arrangements. 
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall 
not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J. 3. 
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and defence policy established within that 
framework. 
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of 
closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral 
level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, 
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provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that 
provided for in this Title. 
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in 
view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels 
Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in 
Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the 
Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of 
the progress made and the experience gained until then. " 
A. WEU's relations with European Union 
3. The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the 
European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the 
European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the 
Union which have defence implications. 
To this end, WEU will take the following measures to develop a close 
working relationship with the Union: 
o as appropriate, synchronization of the dates and venues of meetings 
and harmonization of working methods; 
o establishment of close cooperation between the Council and 
Secretariat- General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the 
Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other; 
o consideration of the harmonization of the sequence and duration of 
the respective Presidencies; 
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o arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the 
Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, 
as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the 
role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as 
defined in the Treaty on European Union; 
o encouragement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament. 
The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the 
European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. 
B. WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance 
4. The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop 
further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to 
strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States 
in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary 
transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security 
and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the 
positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance. 
o WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance 
issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of 
introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of 
consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for 
consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on 
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policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies 
under the North Atlantic Treaty. 
o Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized 
and working methods harmonized. 
o Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats- 
General of WEU and NATO. 
C. Operational role of WEU 
5. WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining 
appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular: 
o WEU planning cell; 
o closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in 
particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic 
surveillance; 
o meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff; 
o military units answerable to WEU. 
Other proposals will be examined further including: 
enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of 
creating a European armaments agency; 
o development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and 
Defence Academy. 
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Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully 
compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective 
defence of all Allies. 
D. Other measures 
6. As a consequence of the measures set out above, and in order to facilitate the 
strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat 
will be transferred to Brussels. 
7. Representation of the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to 
exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Member States may draw on a double-hatting 
formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance 
and to the European Union. 
8. WEU notes that, in accordance with the provisions of Article J. 4(6) 
concerning the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Union will decide to review the provisions of this 
Article with a view to furthering the objective to be set by it in accordance 
with the procedure defined. The WEU will re-examine the present provisions 
in 1996. This re-examination will take account of the progress and experience 
acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. 
II. DECLARATION 
by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are members 
of the Western European Union. 
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"The Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security 
and defence identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as 
the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and 
the other European States on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in 
Europe. 
In this spirit, they propose the following: 
States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on 
conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European 
Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way 
which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU 
. 
The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding 
with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992. " 
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Appendix C 
Treaty of Amsterdam 
TITLE V 
Provisions on a common foreign and security policy 
Article J. 11 
1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy 
covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: 
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity 
of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; 
- to promote international cooperation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively 
and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. 
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the 
Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations. 
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The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. 
Article J. 12 
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by: 
- defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and 
security policy; 
- deciding on common strategies; 
- adopting joint actions; 
- adopting common positions; 
- and strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of 
policy. 
Article J. 13 
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications. 
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by 
the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made 
available by the Union and the Member States. 
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the 
common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by 
the European Council. 
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The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall 
implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions. 
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union. 
Article J. 14 
1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations 
where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down 
their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary 
their duration, and the conditions for their implementation. 
2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question 
subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that 
action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the 
joint action shall stand. 
3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the 
conduct of their activity. 
4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate 
proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the 
implementation of a joint action. 
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action 
pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if 
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necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior 
information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of 
Council decisions. 
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a 
Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of 
urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member 
State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures. 
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member 
State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate 
solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or 
impair its effectiveness. 
Article J. 15 
The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the 
approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. 
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common 
positions. 
Article J. 16 
Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any 
matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the 
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Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and 
convergent action. 
Article J. 17 
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the 
security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common 
defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to 
the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the 
Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the 
context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the 
common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall 
accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the 
possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European 
Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption 
of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and 
shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common 
defence realized in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with 
the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 
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The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member 
States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments. 
2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. 
3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defence implications. 
The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with 
Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the 
Union avails itself of the WEU. 
When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the 
Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be 
entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with 
the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to 
allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and 
on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU. 
Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken 
without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third 
subparagraph. 
264 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer 
cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the 
framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does 
not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. 
5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this 
Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48. 
Article J. 18 
1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common 
foreign and security policy. 
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken 
under this Title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union 
in international organizations and international conferences. 
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall 
exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security 
policy. 
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 
and 2. The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member 
State to hold the Presidency. 
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5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative 
with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. 
Article J. 19 
1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In 
international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member 
States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14, Member States represented in 
international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member 
States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. 
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are 
permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, 
ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice 
to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
Article J. 20 
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission 
Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations 
to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions 
and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. 
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They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint 
assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in 
Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Article J. 21 
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the 
basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the 
views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European 
Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission 
of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. 
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make 
recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing 
the common foreign and security policy. 
Article J. 22 
1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question 
relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the 
Council. 
2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the 
request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary 
Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter 
period. 
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Article J. 23 
1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. 
Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the 
adoption of such decisions. 
2. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention 
by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall 
not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the 
Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from 
any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and 
the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council 
qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes 
weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the TEC, the decision shall not be 
adopted. 
3. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by 
qualified majority: 
- when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the 
basis of a common strategy; 
- when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position. 
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified 
majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, 
request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by 
unanimity. 
268 
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with 
Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their 
adoption, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 
10 members. 
This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications. 
For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members. 
Article J. 24 
When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or 
international organizations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting 
unanimously, may authorize the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as 
appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded 
by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No 
agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council 
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; 
the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply 
provisionally to them. 
The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI. 
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Article J. 25 
Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, a Political Committee shall monitor the international situation in the 
areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition 
of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on 
its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without 
prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. 
Article J. 26 
The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign 
and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the 
common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the 
formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when 
appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, 
through conducting political dialogue with third parties. 
Article J. 27 
The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common 
foreign and security policy field. 
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Article J. 28 
1. Articles 137,138,139 to 142,146,147,150 to 153,157 to 163,191a and 217 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions 
relating to the areas referred to in this Title. 
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in 
this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European 
Communities. 
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives 
rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for 
such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, 
and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. In cases where 
expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be 
charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, 
unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising 
from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose 
representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23, 
second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof. 
4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European 
Communities. 
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Appendix D 
Franco-British summit Joint Declaration on European defence 
Saint Malo, 4 December 1998 
"The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom 
are agreed that: 
1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role 
on the international stage. This means making a reality of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for 
action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid 
implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This 
includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on 
the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the 
framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions 
on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of 
activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union. 
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide 
to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises. 
In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to 
which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the 
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Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be 
maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member 
states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its 
voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our 
respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality 
of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the 
collective defence of its members. 
Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the 
European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council and 
meetings of Defence Ministers). The reinforcement of European 
solidarity must take into account the various positions of European 
states. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO 
must be respected. 
3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve 
military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the 
Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for 
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for 
relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, 
taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution 
of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union 
will also need to have recourse to suitable military means 
(European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European 
pillar or national or multinational European means outside the 
NATO framework). 
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4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to 
the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and 
competitive European defence industry and technology. 
5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European 
Union to give concrete expression to these objectives". 
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Appendix E 
Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions - 8/12/1999 
II. Common European policy on security and defence 
25. The European Council adopts the two Presidency progress reports (see 
Annex IV) on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management 
capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and 
defence. 
26. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary 
responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
27. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous 
capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch 
and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This 
process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a 
European army. 
28. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on 
the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council has agreed in particular 
the following: 
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- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, 
by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military 
forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg 
tasks; 
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within 
the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance 
and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single 
institutional framework; 
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all 
EU Member States; 
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting 
the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members 
and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management; 
-a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, 
in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the 
Member States. 
29. The European Council asks the incoming Presidency, together with the 
Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs 
Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, including conflict 
prevention and a committee for civilian crisis management. The 
incoming Presidency 
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is invited to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an 
overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate 
recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty 
amendment is judged necessary. The General Affairs Council is invited to begin 
implementing these decisions by establishing as of March 2000 the agreed interim 
bodies and arrangements within the Council, in accordance with the current Treaty 
provisions. 
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Appendix F 
List of Subjects of Elite Interviews 
Richard Balfe, MEP UK Labour Party, London South Inner 
Fraser Cameron, European Commission, DG 1A 
Cesia D'Aniello, Administrator, Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 
DG E 
Rt. Hon. Tristan Garrel-Jones, former UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Leigh Gibson, Research and Analysis Unit (Western & Southern Europe) Foreign 
and 
Commonwealth Office 
Annelisa Gianella, Head of Security Division, Secretariat of the Council of 
The European Union, DG E 
Ahmet Muhtar Gun, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Turkish Delegation to 
WEU 
Col. Nigel Hall, Staff Officer, Plans and Policy, UK Delegation to NATO 
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